

# Do Policy Attributes Matter? A Policy-Centred Approach to European Integration\*

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## Abstract

The differentiation of European integration has received renewed attention from European integration scholars recently. Despite the many contributions on the European integration process, most scholars have neglected policy attributes as an explanation for the variance of the integration extent across member states. In this article, we adopt a policy-centred perspective to analyze the differentiation of European integration across policies and member states. Through the combination of different data sources, we construct an original data set and study the European integration process in the EU-15 from 1989-2011. The empirical analysis shows that the European integration process is chiefly influenced by policy attributes: The more the decision-making in policy area at the European level is leaning to the right, the higher the integration level of this very policy. In addition, the analysis show that national governments only listen to citizen's preferences on European integration if policy decision-making is leaning to the right. By contrast, member state characteristics only have a minor influence on a policy's integration extent. These findings suggest that policy attributes are important in the explanation of the European integration process. This conclusion is relevant for our understanding of how the nature of a policy shapes political institutions.

**Keywords:** Policy, European integration, Differentiated Integration, European Union

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# 1 Introduction

European integration is characterized by an extraordinary organizational and institutional complexity. A major contributor to this complexity is the fact that the extent of integration differs significantly across different policies, which brought about labels such as "multi-speed integration" or "Europe à la carte" (Schimmelfennig & Winzen, 2014). Scholars of European integration and multi-level governance have come up with different analytical tools and explanations for assessing and making sense of this variation, amongst them the post-functionalist theory of European integration (Hooghe & Marks, 2008; Schmitter, 2009; Schimmelfennig, 2014; Hooghe & Marks, 2016) and the concept of differentiated integration (Leuffen et al., 2013; Schimmelfennig & Winzen, 2014; Zhelyazkova, 2014; Winzen & Schimmelfennig, 2016; Duttler, 2016) - to name only two of the most recent innovations. Given the great variance in the extent to which different policies are integrated at the European level, it seems obvious to focus on the attribute of a policy in order to understand its integration. However, policy differences have received little attention in explanations of European integration, not least because only little data is available that allows a comparative analysis across different policies and countries (Holzinger & Schimmelfennig, 2012; Guinaudeau & Schnatterer, 2017).

In order to understand differences across policies, one has to focus on various attributes that policies consist of. Policies are shaped by different cultural contexts, political actors, or financial resources, which mainly influence the outcome of a policy process, e.g. the European integration process. To date, the comparative impact of policy attributes has largely been neglected in European Union (EU) studies, although the effects of policies are prevalent. On the one hand, several studies show that the European integration process differs greatly across policies (Leuffen et al., 2013; Winzen & Schimmelfennig, 2016). On the other hand, we know from public policy literature that political actors, e.g. the European Parliament, European agencies, or national governments, behave quite differently depending on their policy focus (Trauner, 2012; Reh et al., 2013; Font & Durán, 2016). Hence, this raises the question of whether and how policy attributes are linked to policy integration at the European level.

In this paper, we propose a policy-centred framework for explaining European integration by asking how policy attributes influence the extent of a policy's integration in the European context. Based on the literature on European integration, we focus on two particular aspects of a policy and their respective relation to the extent of European integration: national publics' preferences for a policy's integration at the European level and the ideological leaning of decision making in a policy area at the European level.

Existing data sets only allow for limited comparative analysis at the level of the policy. In order to test our hypothesis empirically, we have built a unique data set that enables to study the impact of policy attributes on a policy's integration. Based on a data set on differentiation (Schimmelfennig & Winzen, 2014), we estimate the netto policy integration of thirteen policies for every country of the EU-15 from

1989 to 2011. To operationalize national publics' preferences, we use Eurobarometer survey data from various years to measure the share of citizens that prefer a policy to be dealt with at the European level. To operationalize ideological leaning of a policy over time, we rely on new data from an expert survey on Europeanisation across policies (Nanou et al., 2017).

Our results suggest that public preferences play a minor role, but that the integration process is influenced by a policy's ideological leaning: On the one hand, we only find a limited link between public support for policy integration and the pace of integration of this policy for a given country, and (in)congruence between the ideological leaning of a policy and the ideology of a national government doesn't seem to matter. On the other hand, policy areas in which decision making at the EU level is leaning to the right are generally more integrated than those in which decision making is leaning to the left. In addition, the policy ideology of the European decision-making impact push the relevance of public integration support on the integration of a certain policy area. In contrast, country level factors such as national wealth and economic growth as well as the public's general mood towards European integration matter, but their effects are limited. Ideological leaning has a much stronger effect on the integration of a policy for a certain country than the public's general mood towards European integration. This finding illustrates the benefits and the need of taking on a more nuanced policy-centred perspective for understanding the processes of European integration.

This paper is structured as follows: The first section provides a brief overview of existing explanations of European integration. We then present the theoretical model, and proceed to the measurement of policy integration, the empirical design. The subsequent sections present the empirical analysis and discuss policy implications. The final section concludes and discusses limitations and avenues for future research on European integration.

## 2 Theoretical Argument

### 2.1 Explaining European Integration - A Very Brief Review

Not long after the establishment of the European community, political and social scientists started to develop explanations for the process and the course of European integration. In general, three main approaches are distinguished that aim to explain European integration: Haas (1958) has proposed a (neo-)functionalist explanation of European integration. In a nutshell, it states that integration is not a process that can be deliberately steered by its initiators - the nation-states - but a process that develops a life of its own. Neo-functionalists assume that an initial decision to cooperate in one policy - for example coal and steel - triggers the cooperation and integration of additional policy fields since "all parties realize that additional economic gains can only be arrived at if adjacent sectors are integrated

as well” (Lelieveldt & Princen, 2015, 34). The increasing complexity of interactions among nation-states furthers additional integration of administrative and political functions in order to facilitate governance within this complex institutional venue (Lelieveldt & Princen, 2015). In short, neo-functionalists conceive of European integration as an autonomous process that develops a life of its own and that cannot be completely controlled by any of the actors involved in it.

Liberal intergovernmentalists agree with neo-functionalists that the push towards political integration stems from a pursuit of greater efficiency in a given policy area. Yet, they disagree about the way the integration process is portrayed by neo-functionalists. In their view, national governments are the actors that initiate and drive European integration. They are rational actors who are in ultimate control of the extent to which any single policy is integrated at the supranational level (Moravcsik, 1993; Mattli, 1999). The transfer of decision-making authority to the supranational level indicates that national governments either supported this move from the outset, or - in the case of smaller states - were offered side payments to compensate for their more substantial loss of sovereignty (Mattli, 1999). Simply put, intergovernmentalists believe that if there is no consensus among national governments, there will be no transfer of decision-making authority. An explanation of European integration therefore needs to focus on the interests of national governments in this process.

More recently, Hooghe & Marks (2008, 2016) have proposed a postfunctionalist theory of European integration. While they agree with neo-functionalists and intergovernmentalists that European integration is triggered by a quest for the (economic) efficiency of governance<sup>1</sup>, they do not presume that the result of any integration<sup>2</sup> process represents an efficient arrangement. Rather, they argue that the decisive factor for explaining political integration outcomes is political conflict and more precisely conflicts about different identities (Hooghe & Marks, 2008). Allocating political authority at different scales is not only about finding the most efficient governance arrangement. It also reflects communal identities, i.e. the scale of governance that is desired by political communities, irrespective of its economic efficiency. While the optimal scale for a given policy in terms of efficiency and in terms of community can coincide, this is rarely the case in reality. Essentially, postfunctionalists argue that when the optimal scales for efficiency and community are at odds, community will normally be the more important determinant (Schakel, 2009; Hooghe & Marks, 2016). For an explanation of European integration, this means that salient identities<sup>3</sup> need to be taken into consideration. In a nutshell, the level of integration of any policy at the European level is conceived as an outcome of the extent to which there’s a functionalist push and a communal pull.

These three approaches to the explanation of European integration differ in their core assumptions about actors’ motivations, constraints and rationality. Yet, what they all have in common is that they rarely distinguish political actors’ preferences in different policy areas - even if policy attributes implicitly

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<sup>1</sup>Hooghe & Marks (2008, 2) define governance as “binding decision making in the public sphere.”

<sup>2</sup>Or disintegration for that matter.

<sup>3</sup>Which are in turn mobilized by political actors, mostly domestic political parties (Hooghe & Marks, 2005)

form an important part of the theoretical approach like they do in postfunctionalism (Hooghe & Marks, 2016). In what follows, we argue that we have to pay closer attention to policy characteristics in the analysis of European integration. Existing approaches analyze policies within actors. In what follows we propose to analyze actors within policies.

## 2.2 A Policy-Centred Perspective on European Integration

Since the 1990s, we are witnessing an increased differentiation of European integration - both horizontally across countries and vertically across policies. Supranational integration in Europe at its core still seems to be a process which is largely about the (dis)integration of single policies. These differences across policies in terms of depth of integration (vertical differentiation) and in terms of territorial coverage (horizontal differentiation) are analyzed from different angles (Börzel, 2005; Leuffen et al., 2013; Genschel & Jachtenfuchs, 2016). In her seminal study on the level and scope of authority of EU decision-making, Börzel (2005) finds substantial variation across different policy areas in terms of their vertical integration and points to the limits of neo-functionalism in explaining this variation. Other differentiation scholars have proposed additional explanations for this variation across policies (Leuffen et al., 2013; Schimmelfennig & Winzen, 2014; Winzen & Schimmelfennig, 2016; Duttler et al., 2017). Yet, they normally explain differentiation through policy-invariant country characteristics, with nation-states as the core actors when it comes to integration decisions. Very rarely, they put the attributes of a certain policy at the center of their analysis (Schimmelfennig et al., 2015).

To date, we are lacking a comprehensive analysis across policies. A group of common policies - also referred to as policy fields, areas, sectors, or domains - usually cover a distinct arena that includes different actors, institutional settings, and decision rules (Pollack, 1994). Public policy scholars share the view that in each of these arenas political actors find different political conditions for making policy decisions (Lowi, 1972; Sabatier, 1998; Baumgartner & Jones, 2010).

We argue that these conditions also have an impact on the process of European integration. Following intergovernmentalist and (neo-)functionalist theories we can think of two ways in which policy characteristics have an influence on European integration. On the one hand, policy characteristics can influence the strategic behavior of national governments when it comes to European integration. On the other hand, policy characteristics can be powerful determinants in themselves - irrespective of government strategy and preferences. We develop hypotheses for both of these basic assumptions.

### **Intergovernmentalist Approach: Governments as Vote- and Policy-Seekers**

Intergovernmentalists assume that national governments are the most relevant actors to look at when it comes to decisions about (dis)integration (Moravcsik, 1993). The extent to which any country is

integrated at the European level in any particular policy domain reflects national governments' preferences for European integration in this very domain. This assumption receives empirical support by recent research on differentiated integration and EU policy making (Leuffen et al., 2014; Bickerton et al., 2015; Winzen, 2016). But where do national governments' integration preferences in a particular policy domain come from? In what follows, we argue that - in the context of policy integration at the European level - national governments can either act as vote-seekers or as policy-seekers (cf. Strøm, 1990).

*Governments as Vote-Seekers:* National governments are elected by national publics and thus accountable to these constituencies. If we assume - in line with vote-seeking accounts of party and incumbent behavior - that the main aim of any government is to be re-elected and if we further assume that their re-election depends on the extent to which they implement national constituencies' preferences, we can expect that governments pay attention to mass publics' preferences. For the case of European integration in a specific policy domain, this means that national governments will try to implement public preferences and accordingly expand or retrench integration in a particular policy domain.

Empirically, recent studies provide certain evidence for this assumption. Schimmelfennig et al. (2015) propose an explanation for the extent of vertical and horizontal differentiation which is based on functional interdependence and politicization. They argue that the main driver of vertical integration in a given policy area are interdependencies between nation states. Politicization, in turn, determines the extent to which integration is horizontally differentiated - provided a functional push for integration exists. In a qualitative analysis of three policies - internal market, monetary union, and defense - they show that in a case where there's high interdependence and high politicization - the monetary union - both the level of vertical integration and horizontal differentiation are high (Schimmelfennig et al., 2015, 777). This suggests that national governments try to implement the preferences of their national constituencies when it could become electorally costly not to do so. In a similar vein, Genschel & Jachtenfuchs (2016) argue that national governments are especially constrained by the interests of domestic actors when it comes to the integration of core state powers, i.e. policy domains that are the traditional prerogatives of nation states, such as currency, defense and domestic security policy. They argue that the way a policy is integrated at the European level depends on whether sectoral interests and mass publics are favorably orientated towards integration in a certain domain or not. More often than not, for core state powers, there's opposition to integration either from sectoral groups (e.g. in defense policy), from mass publics (e.g. monetary and fiscal policy), or from both. Accordingly, national governments have to find a way to reconcile the integration extent in a certain policy with these domestic interests to prevent negative electoral consequences. We thus argue here that the extent of vertical and horizontal differentiation of a policy is - in part - a function of mass publics' support for the integration of this policy at the European level. This is the case because national governments are vote-seekers and thus try to implement public

preferences when it comes to the extent of integration in a certain policy domain.

H<sub>1a</sub>: The higher the share of people in a country who want to integrate a policy at the European level, the higher the integration level of the policy for that country.

*Governments as Policy-Seekers*: National governments can not only be conceived of as vote-seekers but also as policy-seekers. This means that they try to make sure that policy-making in a given policy domain matches their political ideology. How is policy-seeking connected to a national government's push for integration or disintegration in a certain policy area? In a recent study, [Nanou et al. \(2017, 7\)](#) propose to distinguish policies at the European level with respect to their "ideological leaning". Based on an expert survey, they situate different policy areas that are dealt with at the European level on a left-right and a libertarian-authoritarian scale. In each of these policy areas, political decision making at the European level thus has a certain bias towards left or right and towards libertarian or authoritarian values. If we accept this idea, we can make propositions about how policy-seeking national governments - which themselves have a certain ideological position - would react in terms of their decision to push for (dis)integration in a given policy area. We argue here that national governments will push for stronger integration in a policy area when their political ideology is coherent with the ideological leaning of decision making in this policy at the European level. Stronger integration of a policy at the European level means less national control over this policy. By pushing for stronger integration in a policy area where decision making is in line with a government's own ideological preferences, current incumbents can reduce their political rivals' control over this policy area - in case the latter win the next elections. While it also reduces their own control and impact over the issue, they can be confident that decision making in this policy area will be in line with their political preferences. The loss of power is thus less grave for themselves than for their political competitors. The latter will find it more difficult to influence political decision making in more integrated policy areas. This means that - once these rivals are in power - they will themselves try to push the integration of policy fields in which the ideological leaning corresponds to their own preferences and they will fight for an opt-out in policy areas in which their own ideological position is at odds with the way decisions are made at the European level. Our second hypothesis thus reads as follows.

H<sub>1b</sub>: The higher the congruence between the ideological leaning of a policy and the ideological position of a national government, the higher the integration level of a policy for a given country.

### **Functionalist Approach: Regulative vs. Distributive Policies**

Functionalists would take a different starting point to theorize the impact of policy characteristics on European integration. Here, national governments preferences are only secondary for the extent to which a policy is integrated at the European level. What functionalists are concerned with if they take on a

policy-centred perspective would be the potential of a policy to be integrated (cf. Haas, 1958, 3). This ‘integratability’ of a policy is what determines political actors’ behavior and not the other way around.

The question is thus what influences the ‘integratability’ of a policy? Functionalists would probably answer that this depends on whether further integration has benefits for the provision of a public good (cf. Alesina & Spolaore, 2005). If, for example, integration in a certain policy domain has the potential to reap scale economies, functionalists would argue that this increases a policies integratability (cf. Hooghe & Marks, 2016, 8-11). Furthermore, spill-overs or negative externalities from policy A to policy B might make it necessary to integrate policy B as well if the benefits of integrating policy A should be sustained (cf. Niemann & Ioannou, 2015).

While these are important and relevant features of a policy, they are also almost impossible to measure - especially across different policies, countries and over time. Because our focus here is on policies that are all - to a greater or lesser extent - integrated at the European level, we posit that the nature of the decisions that are made in a policy matter. By this, we mean that political decision and rule making can have different qualities. It can, for example, be mostly about the setting and harmonization of standards, which means it is mostly regulatory. Decision making can also concern the allocation of certain goods and thus be of a more redistributive nature (cf. Lowi, 1972, 300). We argue that - when decision making at the European level is mostly about regulation - and less about (re-)distribution it is more likely that a policy is integrated at the European level. This is the case because regulation does not create obvious winners and losers as does (re-)distribution. Accordingly, the actors involved in deciding whether a policy should be integrated to a greater or lesser extent at the European level might, first, agree on the mutual benefits of coordination in this policy area and, second, find this agreement much faster because there are less conflicting interests.

How can we measure whether decision-making at the European level is more about regulation or more about (re)distribution? We argue here that the left-right ideological leaning of decision-making in a certain policy is a good proxy for the nature of the decisions taken. Left politics are usually associated with big government and redistribution whereas right politics are associated with state retrenchment and *de*-regulation. In the context of European integration, joint decision and rule making in a policy area is considered left when it involves redistribution of resources from one member state to another. And a policy is considered right when it legislation is mostly about removing barriers to trade or harmonizing standards between different member countries (cf. Nanou et al., 2017). Since in the latter case, the expected benefits are mutual, we expect that areas in which EU policy-making is leaning to the right are more easily integratable than areas where policy-making is leaning to the left.

H<sub>2</sub>: The more decision making at the European level in a certain policy is leaning to the right, the higher the integration level of this policy.



### **Intergovernmentalism vs. Functionalism: What is more important?**

Obviously, one would want to know which of the two explanations is more powerful to account for policy integration at the European level. One way to do this is to look at the reduction in variance when we consider the two explanations separately. A problem with this approach is that the ideological leaning of a policy figures as an explanatory factor in both hypothesis  $H_{1b}$  and  $H_2$ . We thus have to rely on a different way to check for the relative strength of these two approaches in explaining the extent of policy integration.

One way to get a sense of the explanatory power of the two approaches is to look at the *interaction* between integration support among the general public and the ideological leaning of a policy. If the intergovernmentalist approach is more decisive, we would expect that integration support is more important than the ideological leaning of a policy. We can assume that a vote-seeking government is more constrained in its decision to further integrate - or disintegrate - a certain policy, the more pronounced public opinion on integration in a certain policy area is. When the general public is evenly split on the issue, a national government does not lose too many votes by pursuing either strategy, they still have the support of the other half of their constituency. When public opinion is strongly leaning to one or the other side, however, national governments are severely constrained in their decisions if they pursue a vote-seeking strategy. If intergovernmentalism is more relevant, we would thus expect that the effect of ideological leaning is smaller when public opinion is skewed to either strong disintegration preferences or strong integration preferences. In other words, one would expect an inverted U-shaped relationship between integration support and the effect size of ideological leaning.

$H_{3a}$ : When the general public is evenly split on the integration of a specific policy, the effect of ideological leaning is stronger than when the general public strongly opposes or supports integration.

By contrast, if the functionalist approach is more relevant in explaining the extent to which a policy is integrated at the European level, we would expect that there is a positive interaction effect between ideological leaning and integration support. Why would we expect a positive interaction effect? The reason is that in a right policy - characterized by a more regulative and a less redistributive way of policy-making, governments have more leeway to follow the preferences of the general public. This can mean integration, but it can also mean disintegration. In a policy that is more leaning to the left and thus characterized by a more redistributive way of legislative action, governments are more constrained in following public preferences. When, for example, citizens of one country would prefer stronger integration in a policy that is characterized by more redistributive legislation at the European level, the respective national government faces more difficulties to convince other member states that further integration is desirable. Each of these other governments will consider whether redistribution is in its national interest and make their decision dependent on the outcome of that evaluation. However, when citizens make this

demand in a right policy, it is more easily conceivable that other national governments also see potential positive effects of further integration, because it can lead to a decrease and harmonization of national regulations which ultimately might benefit firms in many different countries. Our last hypothesis thus reads as follows

H<sub>3b</sub>: National governments are more likely to follow citizens' preferences on integration in policy areas where decision making at the European level is skewed to the right.

### **Alternative Explanations: Euroscepticism and Wealth**

Previous studies have mainly focused on the national and economic context in order to explain European integration. [Schimmelfennig & Winzen \(2014\)](#) show that constitutional differentiations<sup>4</sup> are more likely to appear when core state powers are supposed to be integrated to the European level and constitutional differentiations are most common among the most eurosceptic member states. Moreover, [Winzen & Schimmelfennig \(2016\)](#) argue that countries with strong national identities are more concerned about the European integration undermining national sovereignty in core state powers. As a consequence, these national governments aim to defend the institutional status quo and thus are able to achieve opt-outs from undesired deepening. Thus, we expect policy integration to be weaker the more eurosceptic a country's public is - irrespective of the policy area.

In addition, [Schimmelfennig & Winzen \(2014\)](#) illustrate that instrumental differentiation mostly takes place among the poorer member states. Using the example of international bailouts, [Bechtel et al. \(2017\)](#) argue that citizens are more likely to be averse towards cost-intensive policies, since they anticipate their effects on their individual wealth. As a consequence, we argue that a country will - on average - have a higher policy integration if it is comparatively poor, since it can expect to benefit from redistributive policies. Hence, we argue that the policy effect of integration support will increase if the country is a poor member state. We expect that the effect of public integration support on the extent of a policy's integration for a given country is stronger for countries that are comparatively poor.

## **3 Data, Measurement and Methods**

Analyzing the determinants of European integration empirically is an ambitious task, even more so if one wants to differentiate integration across policies. According to [Holzinger & Schimmelfennig \(2012\)](#), there are indeed some concepts and theoretical approaches that do so, but there are only few data sets, that allow distinguishing integration levels across policies. That being said, there are several data

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<sup>4</sup>[Schimmelfennig & Winzen \(2014\)](#) distinguish between constitutional and instrumental differentiation. On the one hand, constitutional differentiation originates from treaty revisions among existing Member States, which transfer additional competences to the Union. On the other hand, instrumental differentiation results from accession negotiations between the EU and candidates for membership.

sources that provide selected information. We will therefore combine different data sources that measure policy integration at the EU level (differentiated integration data set), citizens' integration preferences in a specific domain (Eurobarometer), ideological leaning of decision making in a policy area (EU competencies project), as well as structural indicators on the country level (Comparative Political Data Set).

Policies and issue areas are defined and aggregated differently across the different data sources. We thus had to match them manually and pairing the policies turned out to be a tedious task. For some policy areas - e.g. Tax - only rather distant matches were possible, for others we had to combine several indicators of the Eurobarometer data (e.g. foreign and security policy and law and crime) and the same value for ideological leaning for one broad policy are sometimes had to be assigned to more than one more narrow policy area (e.g. economic and financial affairs). An additional challenge is the reduced time period for which data from all three sources is available. Although we cover the time period between 1989 and 2011 which includes the most recent and important European integration treaties (Single European Act, Maastricht Treaty, Amsterdam Treaty, and Treaty of Lisbon), our analysis cannot cover previous and subsequent years since Eurobarometer data is only available for this time period. As a consequence, we limit our analysis to 13 policies<sup>5</sup> and the EU-15.<sup>6</sup>

*Vertical Policy Integration:* To measure our dependent variable, policy integration at the European level, we combine two data sources, which allow us to determine the extent of integration in a specific country in a given year. [Leuffen et al. \(2013\)](#) have expanded the data on vertical integration in the EU from [Börzel \(2005\)](#) for the Treaty of Lisbon. They operationalize vertical integration by determining to which degree member states coordinate policies, pool their sovereignty, and delegate authority to make decisions to supranational institutions (European Commission, European Parliament, European Court of Justice). They distinguish six different levels of vertical policy integration. While this is a useful measure for the overall vertical integration of a policy, it does not allow to assess different vertical integration levels of a policy across countries. Yet, member states highly differ in the degree of policy integration. Prominent examples are Denmark's and the United Kingdom's opt-outs from the Euro zone. In order to determine the extent to which a policy is integrated at the European level for each country, we combine [Leuffen et al.'s \(2013\)](#) measure with data on differentiations in EU treaties from [Schimmelfennig & Winzen \(2014\)](#) For every differentiation, we subtract 0.2 points from the vertical integration measure of [Leuffen et al. \(2013\)](#) which we normalized between 0 and 1. For instance, Denmark, Sweden, and the United Kingdom have a lower degree of integration in the area of monetary policy (Figure 1).


*Policy Integration Support:* To operationalize public support for the integration of policies to the European level over time, we rely on Eurobarometer data. More precisely, we use a set of items that was included on a regular basis in Eurobarometer surveys between 1989 and 2011: the preferred level

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<sup>5</sup>A list of all policies that were part of a survey in four or more consecutive years is presented in Table 3 in the Appendix.

<sup>6</sup>Our dataset thus includes the following countries: AT, FR, BE, NL, DE, DK, ES, FI, IE, IT, LU, GR, PT, SE, UK.

Figure 1: Extent of Vertical Policy Integration in four Selected Policies (1989-2011)



Note: The plots illustrate the development of vertical policy integration in for selected policies across the EU-15. The scale ranges from 0 (no EU-level policy coordination) to 1 (supranational centralization). Source: Own measurement based on (Leuffen et al., 2013; Schimmelfennig & Winzen, 2014).

for decision-making in a number of different policy areas.<sup>7</sup> Data for the years 1989 to 2002 comes from the Mannheim Eurobarometer trend file (Schmitt & Scholz, 2005). We updated this dataset until 2011 with more recent rounds of the Eurobarometer survey.<sup>8</sup> From then on, the question on the policy areas was not included anymore. We generated an aggregate measure of integration support for each policy in each country for each year. This measure captures the average support among a country's population for a given year to integrate a policy to the European level. As a consequence, the kinds of policy areas included in different rounds of Eurobarometer studies are subject to substantial fluctuation. Only for three policy areas - health and social welfare, protection of the environment and defense policy - data is available for each year. To obtain a measure of the extent to which respondents support joint decision-making at the European level, we create a dummy variable for each policy that captures the share of respondents supporting integration of the policy to the European level.<sup>9</sup>

*Policy Ideology:* To measure the ideological leaning of EU decision making in a certain policy area, we rely on a new dataset collected by Nanou et al. (2017). The authors conducted an expert survey with 245 experts on European integration from different countries. Among other things, the experts had to make a

<sup>7</sup>The exact question wording is: "For each of the following areas, do you think that decisions should be made by the (NATIONALITY) government or made jointly within the European Union?"

<sup>8</sup>EB 60.1 (2003), EB 62.0 (2004), EB 64.2 (2005) EB 66.1(2006), EB 67.2 (2007), EB 69.2 (2008), EB 70.1 (2008), EB 73.4 (2010), EB 76.3 (2011). In the year 2009, the policy area question was not included in any of the three surveys conducted.

<sup>9</sup>We decided to include the "don't know" answers in our measure. We assume that respondents choosing the don't know category do not have a strong preference for neither the European nor the national level. Coding them as 0 thus yields a more conservative measure of support for integration.

longitudinal assessment of the ideological leaning of nine different policy areas.<sup>10</sup> Each expert was asked to the one of these nine broad policy areas which best fits his or her expertise. The respondents were then asked to position decision making at the European level in their chosen policy domain either on a left-right scale or on a “new politics” or libertarian-authoritarian scale (both ranging from 0 to 10). A clear majority of the experts (65%) chose to position decision making in their policy area on a left-right scale. We thus use the average of the expert ratings on the left-right scale for each policy and each year as our measure of the ideological leaning of EU decision making in a certain policy area.

*National government ideology:* We also need a measure of government ideology in order to test hypothesis  $H_{1b}$ . As a measure for a national government’s ideological leaning, we rely on an indicator from the Comparative Political Data Set (CPDS) (Armingeon et al., 2013). The CPDS contains a categorical indicator of government composition with five categories: hegemony of left parties, dominance of left parties, balance of power between left and right parties, dominance of right parties and hegemony of right parties. We interact this indicator with the ideological leaning of policy decision making at the European level. With hypothesis  $H_{1b}$  we expect to find no effect of a policy’s ideological leaning on the extent of its integration when a country’s government is balanced, a positive effect, when the government consists of right parties and a negative effect when the government consists of left parties.

*Alternative Explanations:* In addition, we include several other variables that might explain the extent of policy integration at the European level. We distinguish between three different groups of control variables that operate at the country-year or the country level: European mood, national context, and economic context. First, the variables of European mood measure respondents’ beliefs that EU membership is a good thing and the extent of their trust in three core EU institutions: the European Parliament, the Commission and the Council of the European Union. The membership question was a standard question in Eurobarometer surveys from 1973 until 2011. Second, we include an indicator that distinguishes countries that are members of the economic and monetary Union (EMU) and those that are not. Among the EU-15, one can expect countries that are members of the EMU to be generally more open towards further integration than non-members. Finally, we include variables for the economic situation of a country: Gross general government debt (percentage of GDP), annual deficit, total public and mandatory private social expenditure (percentage of GDP), growth of real GDP, and the GDP per capita. With the exception of the latter, which we have obtained through the OECD, we rely on the CPDS for this data (Armingeon et al., 2013).

*Measurement:* Since we focus on differences between policies, the data set is stacked (Van der Eijk et al., 2006). Compared to normal data set, a stacked data set is a matrix that does not represent single policies, but policies  $\times$  countries combinations. Moreover, since the data is nested in years, the data set contains policies  $\times$  years  $\times$  countries combinations. In this data matrix, each policy is represented by as

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<sup>10</sup>Corresponding to the nine substantial policy areas of the Council of the EU.

many cases as there are years and countries. For every policy, an entry is generated that indicates the degree of policy integration at the European level for a given year and a given country. As a consequence, this allows us to assess the variance across policies and across countries.

Methodologically, we rely on a cross-classified multi-level analysis, as the data is nested in non-hierarchical groups (years, policies and countries). We estimate a mixed effects regression model that includes fixed effects parameters on all three levels. The following three-level model is used to estimate the degree of policy integration in the EU in a specific year and a particular country. We thus treat years as one level in the analysis, and policies and countries as the other levels. The following model is used to estimate the extent of policy integration:

$$Y_{i(jk)} = \gamma_{000} + u_{0jk} + v_{0k} + e_{i(jk)} \quad (1)$$

where  $Y$  is the extent of policy integration at the levels  $i$  (year),  $j$  (policy) and  $k$  (country), while  $\gamma_{000}$  stands for the overall intercepts. In addition,  $u_{0jk}$  refers to a residual error for policy  $j$  and  $v_{0k}$  to a residual error term for country  $k$ , while  $e_{i(jk)}$  indicates the residual error term for years  $i$  in the cross-classification of policy  $j$  and country  $k$ .


## 4 Results

### 4.1 The Effects of Policy Integration Support and Policy Ideology on the Policy Integration in the EU

To test the effect of the policy variables - policy integration support and policy ideology - we have specified five different models, which are displayed in the Tables 4, 5, 6 and 7 in the Appendix. The first two models focus on the intergovernmentalist explanation of policy integration. While the first model tests the direct effect of policy integration support, Model 2 tests whether the government composition has an ideological preference to integrate a policy. In contrast, Models 3 and 4 consider the functionalist approach. Model 3 tests the direct effect of policy ideology, and Model 4 investigates the interaction between policy integration support and policy ideology. Finally, Model 5 integrates all variables in a full model. The models are estimated for four different time points of the policy variables and the government composition (simultaneous, t-1, t-2 and t-5), as the effects of the policy variables might take some time until they influence the European integration process. We finally include the lagged dependent variable (policy integration  $_{t-1}$ ) in all our models to account for the impact of previous integration levels.

We first discuss the intergovernmentalist hypotheses. Figure 2 shows the effects of public integration support on policy integration over time. The figure suggests that there is a relationship between public support for integrating a policy and the extent of policy integration. However, the variable's effect is time

Figure 2: The Effects of Public Integration Support and Policy Ideology on Policy Integration



*Note:* Horizontal lines indicate 95% robust confidence intervals; t = effect of policy characteristics on policy integration in the same year, t-1 = effect of policy characteristics on policy integration after one year, t-2 = effect of policy characteristics on policy integration after two years, t-5 = effect of policy characteristics on policy integration after five years. Coefficients retrieved from models (Table 4, 5, 6 and 7 in the Appendix).


shifted, which means that the public opinion on policy integration only influence the real policy integration after some amount of time - which is not really surprising as the negotiations on the European integration process usually takes a couple of years (Bickerton et al., 2015). The extent of European integration of a specific policy increases by 19.2% after one year and by 12.7% after two years if the public support of the integration of this very policy at the European level changes from minimum to maximum.<sup>11</sup> In contrast, the ideological leaning of the government does not have an impact on the policy integration. The interaction between the policy ideology and the government composition has no significant effect in any of our models. This finding suggests that the congruence between the ideological leaning of a policy and the ideological position of a national government does not affect the integration of a policy. E.g. center/right governments do not more likely integrate right policies to the European level, and vice versa. To sum up the intergovernmentalist hypotheses, we find some evidence for the impact of public integration support on the integration of the policy ( $H_{1a}$ ), while our empirical models fails to show an effect of ideological leaning by the national governments ( $H_{1b}$ ).

Next, we discuss the functionalist hypothesis. Figure 2 shows that the policy ideology has a strong impact on the integration of a policy and increases over time. The more the European decision-making of a policy is associated with state retrenchment and de-regulation, the the more integrated is this very policy. The extent of integration of a certain policy increases by 32.2% in the same year, 51.6% after one year, and 75.1% after two years if this very policy is considered to be right instead of left.<sup>12</sup> Albeit

<sup>11</sup>First differences, both significant at the 95% confidence interval (King et al., 2000).

<sup>12</sup>First differences, all significant at the 95% confidence interval (King et al., 2000).

Figure 3: Conditional Effects for Policy Integration Support



*Note:* Conditional effects for policy integration support for left and right policies. t-1 = effect of policy ideology on policy integration after one year, t-2 = effect of policy ideology after two years, t-5 = effect of policy ideology after five years.

the effect changes negatively after five years, we assume that the effect probably disappears by then, as the first differences are not significant at the 95% level. Moreover, our analysis provides evidence that the functionalist approach is more influential than the intergovernmentalist. National governments are more likely to follow their citizens' preferences on integration in policy areas where the decision making is skewed to the right. Figure 3 illustrates the conditional effects for policy integration support. The figure shows that public integration support has only a significant effect on policy integration if the ideological leaning of a policy is more to the right, while the effect of policy ideology is not stronger when the public support is evenly split on the policy integration. The effect is more or less constant over time: The policy integration increases by 19.1%, 20.4%, 12.2%, and 18.8% for the defined time points of the interaction. In short, models 3 and 4 provide strong evidence for the functionalistic approach: A policy is more likely integrated if the ideological leaning of policy-making at the European level is to the right ( $H_2$ ), and the national governments do more likely listen to their constituency when the policy is considered as right ( $H_{3b}$ ). In contrast, there is no evidence for hypothesis  $H_{3a}$ .

Furthermore, the conventional explanations of European integration do not seem to influence the extent of policy integration substantially. On the one hand, Euroscepticism has no significant effect if we include all explanatory variables in the full models. On the other hand, countries with a high amount of social expenditure and low economic growth tend to integrate their policies more often to the European level than the other countries. Moreover, countries with a dominance of left parties or a



hegemony of right/center parties seem to be less eager to integrate policies, while countries with a dominance of right/center parties do more integrate their policies - in contrast to governments with a balance of power between left and right parties. Countries with governments dominated by left and right/center parties coincide with our findings on right policies, the effect for countries with a government of hegemony of right/center parties strikes to be interesting. Governments with a hegemony of right/center parties might have a higher change to be partly consisting of right-populist and Eurosceptic parties (e.g. Danish People's Party in Denmark 2001-2011), which is why they tend to opt-out more often than dominant right/center governments (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2013).

## 5 Conclusion

This paper demonstrates the relevance of policy attributes in explanations of European integration. The more people prefer to integrate a policy to the European level, the higher is the extent of European integration in this very policy for a given country after one respectively two years. In addition, the more the decision making at the European level in a certain policy is leaning to the right, the higher is the overall integration level of this very policy. The latter effect is quite substantial, as it increases the level of policy integration by over 70%. These findings are very important, since they highlight the relevance of distinguishing between different policies in explanations of the European integration process. If we analyze the integration process by looking at national political and economic context characteristics only, we are missing out an important part of the story. Moreover, the results show that public opinion (Hobolt & De Vries, 2016) and policy ideology (Nanou et al., 2017) can be an important predictor for understanding European integration.

Obviously, this study also has some limitations. First, the causal relationship between public opinion and policy integration is unclear. Even if it is very plausible (and normatively desirable) that political elites base their decisions on the preferences of their constituencies, it might also be that public opinion is highly influenced by the already existing extent of policy integration. Second, even though our results are quite robust, the available data has many missing observations that might lead to a biased picture of European integration. However, we are aware that we only investigate a certain period of time as well as only certain countries, which is why we have to be careful when drawing more general conclusions. Nevertheless, we are convinced that this analysis is only a first step in order to investigate European integration across policies.

The starting point of our analysis was the diverse European integration across policies. We have shown that the European integration process covaries with policy attributes as for instance the mass public support to integrate a policy and the decision-making in a policy area at the European level. The implications of these findings are that specific integration steps, for instance treaties, are unlikely to equal

the extent of integration across countries.

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## 6 Appendix

Table 1: Measurement of Vertical Integration of European States in a Policy

Level	Coordination	Delegation	Pooling
0	No EU-level policy coordination	None	None
1	Intergovernmental coordination	None	None
2	Intergovernmental cooperation	Minimal	None
3	Joint decision-making I	"Community method"	Limited pooling
4	Joint decision-making II	"Community method"	Pooling
5	Supranational centralization	Full delegation to supranational bodies	

Source: (Leuffen et al., 2013, 13).

Table 2: Measurement of Netto Policy Integration (Great Britain, Criminal/Domestic Security)

Year	Vertical Integration	Differentiations	Malus	Netto Integration
1989	0.0			0.0
1990	0.0			0.0
1991	0.0			0.0
1992	0.0			0.0
1993	0.2			0.2
1994	0.2			0.2
1995	0.2	Schengen (1), Schengen (31), Schengen (143)	0.6	0.0
1996	0.2	Schengen (1), Schengen (31), Schengen (143)	0.6	0.0
1997	0.2	Schengen (1), Schengen (31), Schengen (143)	0.6	0.0
1998	0.2	Schengen (1), Schengen (31), Schengen (143)	0.6	0.0
1999	0.4	Schengen (1), Schengen (31), Schengen (143)	0.6	0.0
2000	0.4	Schengen (31), Schengen (143)	0.4	0.0
2001	0.4	Schengen (31), Schengen (143)	0.4	0.0
2002	0.4	Schengen (31), Schengen (143)	0.4	0.0
2003	0.6	Schengen (31), Schengen (143)	0.4	0.2
2004	0.6	Schengen (31), Schengen (143)	0.4	0.2
2005	0.6	Schengen (31)	0.2	0.4
2006	0.6	Schengen (31), Pruem (30), Pruem (22)	0.6	0.0
2007	0.6	Schengen (31), Pruem (30), Pruem (22)	0.6	0.0
2008	0.6	Schengen (31), Pruem (22)	0.4	0.2
2010	0.8	Schengen (31), Pruem (22)	0.4	0.4
2011	0.8	Schengen (31), Pruem (22)	0.4	0.4

Note: Number of articles affected by differentiations in parentheses; 0.2 Malus per differentiations; Netto integration cannot decrease under 0.

Table 3: Overview of Selected Policies

Policy	Data				Coverage Period
	Vertical Integration (Leuffen et al., 2013)	Differentiation (Schimmelfennig & Winzen, 2014)	Eurobarometer (Schmitt & Scholz, 2005) add.	EU Competencies Index (Nanou et al., 2017)	
Environment	Environment/ Consumer Protection		Protection of the Environment	Environment	1989-2011 ( $\Delta 22$ )
Foreign and Security Policy	Political External Relations	Foreign and Security Policy	Defense Policy	Foreign and Security Policy	1989-2011 ( $\Delta 22$ )
			Foreign Policy (Outside EU) Cooperation with Developing Countries		1989-2004 ( $\Delta 16$ ) 1989-1998 ( $\Delta 10$ )
Welfare	Welfare	Social Policy	Health and Social Welfare	Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs	1989-2011 ( $\Delta 22$ )
Research	Research and Development		Scientific and Technological Research	Competitiveness	1989-2010 ( $\Delta 21$ )
Labour	Labour		Unemployment	Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs	1992-2011 ( $\Delta 20$ )
Law and Crime	Criminal/Domestic Security	Schengen/Prüm	Immigration	Justice and Home Affairs	1992-2011 ( $\Delta 20$ )
			Political Asylum Fight Against Drugs Fighting International Terrorism Fighting Organized Crime		1992-2004 ( $\Delta 13$ ) 1993-2003 ( $\Delta 11$ ) 2003-2011 ( $\Delta 8$ ) 2005-2010 ( $\Delta 6$ )
Monetary Policy	Monetary Policy	Economic and Monetary Union	Currency	Economic and Financial Affairs	1989-2004 ( $\Delta 16$ )
Culture	Culture	Cultural Policy	Culture	Education, Youth and Culture	1992-2004 ( $\Delta 13$ )
Tax	Tax	Taxation	Value Added Tax Taxation	Economic and Financial Affairs	1989-1998 ( $\Delta 10$ ) 2005-2011 ( $\Delta 5$ )
Competition	Competition and Industry	Competition	Industrial Policy Competition Policy	Competitiveness	1992-1995 ( $\Delta 4$ ) 2005-2010 ( $\Delta 6$ )
Agriculture	Agriculture	Agriculture	Agriculture/ Fishing	Agriculture and Fisheries	2004-2011 ( $\Delta 8$ )
Energy and Transport	Energy and Transport		Energy	Transport, Telecommunications, and Energy	2005-2010 ( $\Delta 6$ )
Macro-economics	Macroeconomic Policy and Employment	Free Market (Goods, Capital, and Workers)	Economic Policy	Economic and Financial Affairs	2007-2010 ( $\Delta 3$ )

*Note:* Policies are ordered by coverage period. Coverage periods vary due to variation/termination of survey items in Eurobarometer.

Table 4: Cross-Classified Multilevel Regression Model of European Policy Integration

	<i>Intergovernmentalist</i>		<i>Functionalist</i>		
	(1) Public Support	(2) Ideological Leaning	(3) Right Policy	(4) Public Leaning	(5) Full
Policy integration ( $t-1$ )	0.799*** (0.011)	0.813*** (0.010)	0.813*** (0.010)	0.787*** (0.012)	0.792*** (0.012)
Policy integration support	0.012 (0.012)			0.011 (0.014)	0.013 (0.014)
Policy ideology		0.059** (0.022)	0.060** (0.020)	0.061* (0.025)	0.058* (0.025)
Dominance of left parties	-0.092** (0.035)	-0.074* (0.036)	-0.074* (0.036)	-0.102** (0.038)	-0.098* (0.039)
Dominance of right/center parties	0.063* (0.026)	0.079** (0.027)	0.078** (0.027)	0.062* (0.029)	0.066* (0.029)
Hegemony of left parties	-0.042 (0.025)	-0.028 (0.026)	-0.028 (0.026)	-0.049 (0.026)	-0.046 (0.027)
Hegemony of right/center parties	-0.037 (0.020)	-0.012 (0.021)	-0.012 (0.021)	-0.049* (0.022)	-0.044* (0.022)
Dominance of left parties $\times$ Policy ideology		-0.019 (0.030)			
Dominance of right/center parties $\times$ Policy ideology		0.000 (0.025)			
Hegemony of left parties $\times$ Policy ideology		0.005 (0.017)			
Hegemony of right/center parties $\times$ Policy ideology		0.002 (0.016)			
Policy integration support $\times$ Policy ideology				0.040*** (0.011)	
EU mood	-0.006 (0.014)	-0.032* (0.015)	-0.032* (0.015)	-0.002 (0.015)	-0.005 (0.016)
Founding member	-0.053 (0.039)	-0.061 (0.069)	-0.062 (0.069)	-0.048 (0.035)	-0.052 (0.041)
Debt	0.021 (0.015)	0.027 (0.018)	0.027 (0.018)	0.013 (0.014)	0.022 (0.016)
Deficit	-0.007 (0.010)	-0.014 (0.011)	-0.014 (0.011)	-0.014 (0.011)	-0.011 (0.011)
Unemployment	0.002 (0.012)	-0.018 (0.013)	-0.018 (0.013)	0.010 (0.012)	0.007 (0.013)
Social expenditures	0.058*** (0.016)	0.114*** (0.020)	0.115*** (0.020)	0.048** (0.016)	0.056** (0.017)
Real GDP growth	-0.041*** (0.008)	-0.030*** (0.008)	-0.030*** (0.008)	-0.042*** (0.009)	-0.044*** (0.009)
Constant	0.102* (0.049)	0.083 (0.059)	0.083 (0.059)	0.118* (0.053)	0.119* (0.055)
N	2649	3384	3384	2352	2352
Log. Likelihood	-774.15	-1355.89	-1356.21	-807.87	-814.54
Wald chi2	6476.79	8724.37	8723.55	5792.67	5751.64
p > chi2	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
AIC	1582.29	2753.78	2746.43	1653.73	1665.07
BIC	1682.29	2882.45	2850.58	1763.23	1768.81

Note: \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001; Regression coefficients shown with robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table 5: Cross-Classified Multilevel Regression Model of European Policy Integration ( $t_{-1}$ )

	<i>Intergovernmentalist</i>		<i>Functionalist</i>		
	(1) Public Support	(2) Ideological Leaning	(3) Right Policy	(4) Public Leaning	(5) Full
Policy integration ( $t_{-1}$ )	0.774*** (0.011)	0.809*** (0.010)	0.809*** (0.010)	0.753*** (0.012)	0.761*** (0.012)
Policy integration support ( $t_{-1}$ )	0.040*** (0.012)			0.049*** (0.014)	0.051*** (0.014)
Policy ideology ( $t_{-1}$ )		0.111*** (0.022)	0.102*** (0.020)	0.111*** (0.027)	0.113*** (0.027)
Dominance of left parties ( $t_{-1}$ )	-0.041 (0.035)	-0.047 (0.036)	-0.046 (0.036)	-0.052 (0.039)	-0.047 (0.039)
Dominance of right/center parties ( $t_{-1}$ )	0.021 (0.027)	0.041 (0.027)	0.043 (0.027)	0.016 (0.031)	0.017 (0.031)
Hegemony of left parties ( $t_{-1}$ )	0.008 (0.025)	-0.009 (0.026)	-0.008 (0.026)	0.003 (0.027)	0.007 (0.028)
Hegemony of right/center parties ( $t_{-1}$ )	0.003 (0.021)	-0.000 (0.021)	0.000 (0.021)	-0.008 (0.023)	-0.003 (0.023)
Dominance of left parties $\times$ Policy ideology ( $t_{-1}$ )		-0.025 (0.030)			
Dominance of right/center parties $\times$ Policy ideology ( $t_{-1}$ )		0.010 (0.025)			
Hegemony of left parties $\times$ Policy ideology ( $t_{-1}$ )		-0.011 (0.017)			
Hegemony of right/center parties $\times$ Policy ideology ( $t_{-1}$ )		-0.020 (0.015)			
Policy integration support $\times$ Policy ideology ( $t_{-1}$ )				0.040*** (0.011)	
EU mood	0.005 (0.014)	-0.031* (0.015)	-0.031* (0.015)	0.004 (0.015)	0.002 (0.016)
Founding member	-0.066 (0.042)	-0.046 (0.064)	-0.045 (0.064)	-0.063 (0.041)	-0.062 (0.043)
Debt	0.020 (0.015)	0.021 (0.017)	0.021 (0.017)	0.016 (0.016)	0.020 (0.016)
Deficit	-0.014 (0.010)	-0.021* (0.010)	-0.021* (0.010)	-0.020 (0.011)	-0.018 (0.011)
Unemployment	-0.005 (0.012)	-0.016 (0.013)	-0.015 (0.013)	0.006 (0.013)	0.005 (0.013)
Social expenditures	0.065*** (0.017)	0.103*** (0.019)	0.102*** (0.019)	0.054** (0.017)	0.056** (0.018)
Real GDP growth	-0.045*** (0.009)	-0.029*** (0.009)	-0.029*** (0.009)	-0.046*** (0.010)	-0.046*** (0.010)
Constant	0.097 (0.053)	0.073 (0.063)	0.072 (0.063)	0.114 (0.067)	0.113 (0.069)
N	2571	3384	3384	2289	2289
Log. Likelihood	-744.87	-1355.35	-1356.71	-771.91	-778.77
Wald chi2	5730.41	8634.67	8624.74	5136.04	5091.71
p > chi2	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Note: \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001; Regression coefficients shown with robust standard errors in parentheses.



Table 6: Cross-Classified Multilevel Regression Model of European Policy Integration ( $t-2$ )

	<i>Intergovernmentalist</i>		<i>Functionalist</i>		
	(1) Public Support	(2) Ideological Leaning	(3) Right Policy	(4) Public Leaning	(5) Full
Policy integration ( $t-1$ )	0.803*** (0.011)	0.763*** (0.011)	0.763*** (0.011)	0.790*** (0.012)	0.796*** (0.012)
Policy integration support ( $t-2$ )	0.026* (0.011)			0.027* (0.013)	0.028* (0.013)
Policy ideology( $t-2$ )		0.161*** (0.025)	0.149*** (0.023)	0.147*** (0.027)	0.151*** (0.027)
Dominance of left parties( $t-2$ )	0.034 (0.032)	0.055 (0.036)	0.056 (0.036)	-0.007 (0.032)	-0.007 (0.032)
Dominance of right/center parties( $t-2$ )	0.009 (0.028)	-0.006 (0.030)	-0.005 (0.030)	-0.004 (0.030)	-0.004 (0.030)
Hegemony of left parties( $t-2$ )	-0.012 (0.024)	-0.032 (0.027)	-0.032 (0.027)	-0.043* (0.021)	-0.044* (0.021)
Hegemony of right/center parties( $t-2$ )	-0.008 (0.020)	-0.016 (0.022)	-0.015 (0.022)	-0.041* (0.018)	-0.041* (0.018)
Dominance of left parties $\times$ Policy ideology ( $t-2$ )		-0.005 (0.030)			
Dominance of right/center parties $\times$ Policy ideology ( $t-2$ )		0.002 (0.028)			
Hegemony of left parties $\times$ Policy ideology ( $t-2$ )		-0.013 (0.017)			
Hegemony of right/center parties $\times$ Policy ideology ( $t-2$ )		-0.026 (0.016)			
Policy integration support $\times$ Policy ideology ( $t-2$ )				0.024* (0.010)	
EU mood	-0.005 (0.013)	-0.030 (0.015)	-0.030* (0.015)	-0.001 (0.010)	-0.001 (0.010)
Founding member	-0.059 (0.042)	-0.046 (0.066)	-0.046 (0.066)	-0.030 (0.021)	-0.030 (0.021)
Debt	0.004 (0.015)	0.005 (0.018)	0.004 (0.018)	-0.016 (0.009)	-0.016 (0.009)
Deficit	-0.024* (0.010)	-0.034** (0.011)	-0.034** (0.011)	-0.031** (0.010)	-0.030** (0.010)
Unemployment	-0.011 (0.012)	-0.015 (0.013)	-0.014 (0.013)	0.006 (0.009)	0.007 (0.009)
Social expenditures	0.079*** (0.016)	0.113*** (0.021)	0.113*** (0.021)	0.031** (0.010)	0.032** (0.010)
Real GDP growth	-0.018* (0.008)	-0.019* (0.009)	-0.019* (0.009)	-0.010 (0.009)	-0.010 (0.009)
Constant	0.100 (0.054)	0.098 (0.077)	0.097 (0.077)	0.130 (0.070)	0.130 (0.072)
N	2391	3204	3204	2139	2139
Log. Likelihood	-462.72	-1308.92	-1310.46	-512.63	-515.33
Wald chi2	5828.19	6485.13	6475.60	5288.64	5267.26
p > chi2	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Note: \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001; Regression coefficients shown with robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table 7: Cross-Classified Multilevel Regression Model of European Policy Integration ( $t-5$ )

	<i>Intergovernmentalist</i>		<i>Functionalist</i>		
	(1) Public Support	(2) Ideological Leaning	(3) Right Policy	(4) Public Leaning	(5) Full
Policy integration ( $t-1$ )	0.914*** (0.015)	0.917*** (0.008)	0.917*** (0.008)	0.857*** (0.018)	0.868*** (0.018)
Policy integration support ( $t-5$ )	-0.005 (0.013)			0.001 (0.014)	0.003 (0.014)
Policy ideology ( $t-5$ )		0.007 (0.011)	-0.003 (0.007)	-0.148*** (0.023)	-0.131*** (0.023)
Dominance of left parties ( $t-5$ )	-0.034 (0.041)	-0.004 (0.037)	-0.005 (0.037)	-0.023 (0.044)	-0.020 (0.045)
Dominance of right/center parties ( $t-5$ )	-0.022 (0.033)	0.012 (0.030)	0.012 (0.030)	-0.014 (0.035)	-0.009 (0.035)
Hegemony of left parties ( $t-5$ )	-0.055 (0.030)	-0.043 (0.027)	-0.043 (0.027)	-0.042 (0.033)	-0.037 (0.033)
Hegemony of right/center parties ( $t-5$ )	0.015 (0.023)	0.015 (0.021)	0.015 (0.021)	0.022 (0.025)	0.027 (0.026)
Dominance of left parties $\times$ Policy ideology ( $t-5$ )		-0.033 (0.030)			
Dominance of right/center parties $\times$ Policy ideology ( $t-5$ )		-0.025 (0.026)			
Hegemony of left parties $\times$ Policy ideology ( $t-5$ )		-0.014 (0.017)			
Hegemony of right/center parties $\times$ Policy ideology ( $t-5$ )		-0.011 (0.016)			
Policy integration support $\times$ Policy ideology ( $t-5$ )				0.037** (0.011)	
EU mood	-0.008 (0.017)	-0.007 (0.016)	-0.007 (0.016)	-0.002 (0.019)	0.001 (0.019)
Founding member	-0.068 (0.056)	-0.089 (0.067)	-0.089 (0.066)	-0.090 (0.065)	-0.092 (0.066)
Debt	0.012 (0.021)	0.004 (0.021)	0.003 (0.020)	0.010 (0.023)	0.009 (0.023)
Deficit	-0.037** (0.012)	-0.046*** (0.011)	-0.046*** (0.011)	-0.039** (0.013)	-0.041** (0.013)
Unemployment	0.004 (0.016)	-0.012 (0.015)	-0.012 (0.015)	-0.004 (0.018)	-0.008 (0.018)
Social expenditures	0.119*** (0.021)	0.161*** (0.021)	0.160*** (0.021)	0.146*** (0.024)	0.151*** (0.024)
Real GDP growth	0.014 (0.010)	0.021* (0.009)	0.021* (0.009)	0.011 (0.011)	0.011 (0.011)
Constant	0.101 (0.054)	0.089* (0.044)	0.089* (0.044)	0.106 (0.061)	0.112 (0.061)
N	1953	2664	2664	1779	1779
Log. Likelihood	-516.67	-774.51	-775.48	-523.54	-528.85
Wald chi2	4684.63	15086.33	15356.99	3429.63	3422.77
p > chi2	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Note: \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001; Regression coefficients shown with robust standard errors in parentheses.