

Congruence or Compensation? How Support for Subnational Democracy is Linked to Support for Metropolitan Integration*

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Abstract

Modern democracies face two major challenges to their legitimacy: i.) the spread of public disaffection with politics and ii.) the transfer of governance functions away from nation-state institutions. In this paper I aim to link these two challenges by taking on an attitudinal perspective. Analyzing metropolitan areas, subnational multi-level governance contexts, I assess how public discontent is linked to citizens' support for the political integration of metropolitan areas. Public opinion scholar investigating European integration have proposed a negative - compensation - and a positive - congruence - relation between public discontent and support for integration. Drawing on data from a recent citizen survey in eight Western European metropolitan areas, I test these two propositions for the metropolitan context. The findings support the congruence proposition: Citizens that are dissatisfied and distrusting of subnational democracy are also less supportive of metropolitan integration. Citizens do certainly not view transferring governance functions to other levels as a remedy for some of nation-state's deficiencies - whether such reforms are the cause of their discontent or act as an enhancer is a question to be answered by future research.

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1 Introduction

Today's nation-state¹ democracies face two major challenges: i.) a decline of citizens' satisfaction with democracy and trust in democratic institutions and ii.) the transfer of governance² functions upwards, downwards and sideways away from nation-state institutions.

These two challenges can affect the legitimacy of nation-state democracies. While distrusting and dissatisfied citizens can pose a threat to the survival of politicians in office, to the standing of a political system as a whole and can reduce the state's ability to exert control (see e.g. Putnam, Pharr and Dalton, 2000), the transfer of governance functions to non-representative and non-elected actors questions fundamental principles of representative democracy such as the accountability of governing actors to their constituencies and reduces the decision-making power and autonomy of representative institutions (Papadopoulos, 2007; Jensen, 2009; Williams and Warren, 2014).

Existing research proposes two ways of linking these challenges. On the one hand, some scholars argue that dissatisfaction with and distrust in politicians and democratic institutions can partly be explained by their limited capacity to govern, which in turn partly results from the transfer of governance functions to institutions above, below or aside of the nation-state. This "de-nationalization" of governance is, thus, seen as a potential cause for the decline of satisfaction and trust Putnam, Pharr and Dalton (2000, 24). Here, a macro event - i.e. the transfer of governance functions - is seen as a cause for a micro level change - i.e. the decline of public support. On the other hand, scholars investigate the links between support for nation-state democracy and support for governance institutions and processes "beyond the state" (see e.g. Hooghe and Marks, 2004; Ecker-Ehrhardt, 2011; Fuchs and Klingemann, 2011; Kübler, 2016). In other words, they link two micro level phenomena to one another - usually assuming that support for nation-state democ-

¹When I speak of the nation-state I do not mean a political community consisting of a certain 'ethnos'. Rather, I use this term to speak of "established" governance institutions and levels within the multi-level structure of modern democracies, e.g. the local or the national level.

²Throughout this paper, I use the term governance as "all forms of governing" (Bevir, 2013, 1) and not as opposed to the term government (Stoker, 1998).

racy determines support for transferring governance functions “beyond the state”.

In this paper, I take on the second perspective and hence adopt an attitudinal approach to explore the links between the two challenges. I do so by analyzing citizens’ support for the political integration of metropolitan areas³ - a context in which the transfer and re-organization of governance functions is a debated issue (Swanstrom, 2001; Savitch and Vogel, 2009) but little is known about citizens’ attitudes towards it. More specifically, I assess *how citizens’ support for subnational democracy and political institutions is linked to support for the political integration of metropolitan areas*. The data under scrutiny stem from a unique online-survey among 5’000 citizens in eight metropolitan areas in Switzerland, Germany, France and the United Kingdom.

A positive correlation indicates that dissatisfied citizens are not only critical of the functioning of nation-state governance but of today’s governance arrangements more generally - the causes for dissatisfaction would hence have to be sought in common structural features shared by politics both within and “beyond the state”. A negative correlation could indicate that citizens’ perceive the transfer of governance functions away from nation-state institutions as a potential remedy for the deficiencies of nation-state democracy.

³A metropolitan area here refers to a region with one or several urban centres at its core and a surrounding belt of suburban territories. These regions are defined by their strong functional integration in terms of economic and social interactions and high spatial mobility of its residents. For a comparable definition of these areas, I rely on the “larger urban zones” as defined by Urban Audit (2011).

2 Theoretical Argument

In this section, I very briefly introduce two challenges to democratic legitimacy. In a second step I elaborate on the links between support for nation-state democracy and support for the transfer of governance functions by drawing on public opinion research investigating European integration and apply it to the metropolitan context.

2.1 Two Challenges to Modern Democracies

Challenge 1: Public Discontent with Modern Democracy

The question of how citizens (should) perceive political institutions and participate in political processes in a functioning democracy has generated a lot of both normative and empirical scholarly attention (Åmna and Ekman, 2014). Generally speaking, there are two different interpretations of declining support for democracy mentioned in the introduction: a pessimistic and an optimistic one.

Pessimists view the decline in support for democracy as a serious threat to modern democracy (Pharr and Putnam, 2000; Putnam, 2000). The functioning of representative democracy hinges on active citizens that voice their claims in recurring elections. Furthermore, they have to believe that political institutions and the political system in general is responsive to their preferences. In established democracies, this belief has eroded over the last decades. According to some scholars, citizens became increasingly alienated from politics and electoral abstention became a widespread phenomenon (Pharr and Putnam, 2000). In their eyes, electoral abstention in combination with low levels of satisfaction and low levels of trust in political institutions, is a reason for concern: Citizens do not approve of their rulers' actions and at the same time they do not *perceive* to have a viable exit or voice option (Hirschman, 1970). This combination then can enhance the alienation from politics even further (Lyons and Lowery, 1986) and - ultimately - lead to disapproval of democracy as the preferable system of government altogether (see Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2006).

A more optimistic interpretation of the declining support for democracy is offered by

Norris (1999a). Following Easton (1965) she differentiates between different *objects* of political support that have different degrees of specificity. The most diffuse object of support is the political community, while the most specific object of support are the political actors (Norris, 1999b). Empirical analyses show, that the time trends for political support are not uniform across different objects. While diffuse support (i.e. for the political community and for regime principles) remains stable over time, “there is clear evidence of a general erosion in support for politicians in most advanced industrial democracies” (Dalton, 1999, 63). These diverging trends of support for different political objects with different degrees of specificity are interpreted as a good sign for democracy: citizens uphold the fundamental values of democracy but they are more *critical* of political authorities and political actors, and they monitor their actions more closely (Inglehart, 1999). This is interpreted as a contribution to the functioning of democracy: only when citizens are critical of their representatives, they will throw potential rascals out. Accordingly, Norris (1999b, 27) states that “too much blind trust by citizens and misplaced confidence in leaders, for good or ill, can be as problematic for democracy as too little”.

Challenge 2: The Transfer of Governance Functions

The transfer of governance functions is the second challenge for nation-state democracies’ legitimacy that I address in this paper. Here, the transfer of governance functions refers to the relocation of political power and decision-making authority from nation-state institutions and levels - e.g. parliaments at the local or the national level - towards governance institutions “beyond the state”, usually operating at other levels. This process of “de- and reterritorialization” (Brenner, 1999, 435) puts pressure on nation-state institutions “from above, from below and from within” (Kübler, 2015, 59). From above some nation-state institutions face constraints in their governing capacity by a proliferation of international institutions and regulations.⁴ This upward transfer of governance functions manifests itself most evidently in the processes associated with European integration (Mattli, 1999).

⁴Such institutions and regulations are in turn portrayed as a result of increasing interdependencies between nation-states in economic, cultural, and political terms (Kriesi, 2013, 3).

From below, nation-state democracies are challenged by transformations that occur within their territories. Most notably, the rise of metropolitan areas - functionally and economically highly integrated territories - pose new problems to nation-state governance. On the one hand, the significance of these areas for nation-state economies renders region-wide governance and political control desirable to enhance a region's global competitiveness (Brenner, 1999). On the other hand, metropolitan areas cross-cut existing political and administrative boundaries, which requires new forms and levels of governance to efficiently govern them. Finally, nation-state democracy is challenged from within by increasingly "blurred boundaries between the public and the private" (Kübler, 2015, 60). An increasing number of non-elected and private actors participate in policy-making processes and exert influence on elected representatives and governments (Papadopoulos, 2007). Furthermore, nation-states delegate numerous tasks to semi-public or private organizations hoping to thereby increase the efficiency and flexibility of service provision (Andrew and Goldsmith, 1998).

A common allegation against these transfers of governance functions is that they bring about legitimacy deficits for nation-state democracies and governance institutions "beyond the state" alike (Kriesi, 2013, 8). The latter usually lack input legitimacy. They have at best indirect links to citizens because decision-makers in these institutions are not, or not directly, elected representatives of a - however defined - people (Jensen, 2009). For citizens, this means that it is more difficult, if not impossible, to hold such decision-makers accountable (Papadopoulos, 2007). Hence, their input legitimacy is put into question.

For nation-state institutions the challenge is another one. While legislative and executive institutions formally possess input legitimacy - they are elected by their constituencies and accountable to them - they might lack output legitimacy. Their capacity to act is - to a greater or lesser extent - constrained by regulations and actions of governance institutions "beyond the state".⁵ Under certain circumstances, such external constraints can inhibit nation-state institutions from meeting the demands of their constituencies and

⁵An example is national monetary policy for the members of the Economic and Monetary Union: For individual nation-states it is no longer possible to boost the economy of their countries by turning on the cash printing presses. To do so, they have to negotiate with the other member states of this institution.

thereby decrease their output legitimacy.⁶. In sum, the transfer of governance functions can pose a challenge to some of modern representative democracies' foundations.

2.2 Public Discontent and the Transfer of Governance Functions

To link the two challenges identified in subsection 2.1 I adopt an attitudinal approach. This means that I do not analyze how *effective* transfers of governance functions impact citizens' support for nation-state democracy but rather how support for nation-state democracy is linked to support for transferring governance functions to institutions that operate "beyond the state". There are numerous studies that investigate citizens' attitudes towards governance institutions "beyond the state" (Ecker-Ehrhardt, 2011; Zürn, 2014; Owens and Sumner, 2016). However, mainly due to issues of data availability, the majority of these studies analyzes citizens' support for EU institutions and processes at the European level (Hooghe and Marks, 2004; Recchi, 2008; Fuchs and Klingemann, 2011). Only few studies have analyzed such attitudes on other levels and in other contexts. Because of these limitations, I first elaborate on the arguments made with respect to support for European integration and try to adapt them to the metropolitan context in a second step.

Public Support for the Transfer of Governance Functions - The European Debate

Public opinion scholars have proposed many different factors that influence citizens' support for European integration and EU institutions. Apart from socio-demographic explanations, scholars also include citizens' nation-state context - and perceptions thereof - in their analysis to explain support for European integration and EU institutions (Hooghe and Marks, 2005; Fuchs, Magni-Berton and Roger, 2009; Sanders et al., 2012). Most of these studies indeed find a link between perceptions and orientations towards the nation-state level and support for European integration.

⁶This is not to say that effective output delivery by the nation-state is necessarily inhibited through authority transfers. Such competence transfers can also increase the performance in a certain policy area and some argue that they would not happen in the first place, if this was not the case (Moravcsik, 1993).

Especially relevant for this paper are studies that analyze how support for European integration and EU institutions is linked citizens' perceptions of nation-state institutions. There are two answers to this question. The first one was proposed by Sánchez-Cuenca (2000) and it is referred to as the "compensation" argument (Muñoz, Torcal and Bonet, 2011, 554). Here, the relationship between perceptions of national and European institutions is said to be a negative one. The more citizens are dissatisfied with nation-state democracy, the more they are willing to transfer power to the European level. The purported reason is that "the worse the political system works at home and the better it works at the supranational level, the smaller the risk involved in transferring national sovereignty to a supranational body" (Sánchez-Cuenca, 2000, 148). In line with this, Rohrschneider (2002) argues that the quality of national institutions functions as the benchmark against which citizens evaluate other institutions. The better nation-state institutions' performance is perceived, the more difficult it is for other levels to live up to this. Accordingly, in this perspective support for European integration and EU institutions should be lower when support for nation-state institutions is high.

The second answer assumes the opposite relationship and this is termed the "congruence" argument, because citizens who support nation-state institutions are expected to be supportive of institutions on other levels as well (Muñoz, Torcal and Bonet, 2011, 553). Hobolt (2012), for example, argues that a positive spillover from support in nation-state institutions towards EU institutions takes place. The reason for this is seen in the fact that citizens - having less knowledge about European than national institutions - will use "their attitudes towards national democratic institutions as a 'proxy' when forming opinions about EU democracy" (Hobolt, 2012; Anderson, 1998, 94). A similar argument is made by Van Kersbergen (2000). He introduces the concept of "double allegiance" (Van Kersbergen, 2000, 5) to the study of EU support. It consists of primary - the support of a public for the national system - and secondary allegiance - the support of that same public for the European system. Citizens will only have a positive image of transferring governance functions if national welfare is increased - since that is the purported argument made to do so in the first place (Fuchs, 2011*b*). If welfare indeed increases,

this will not only have a positive effect support for nation-state institutions, but also for European ones - and vice versa (Van Kersbergen, 2000, 12).

Public Support for Metropolitan Integration

How do these arguments translate to the context of metropolitan areas? To make this argument transfer, I first introduce the concept of “metropolitan integration” and discuss (the limits of) the analogy with European integration. In a second step I review the very few studies that explain citizens’ orientations towards metropolitan areas and present two hypotheses.

Metropolitan areas are functionally highly integrated spaces. They constitute a dense network of physical, economic and social interactions. Yet, this “web of economic and social structure is [...] by no means equalled by political interconnections” (Bromage, 1958). As this 60-year-old quote demonstrates, the debate on metropolitan governance and governance reforms has quite a history (see Savitch and Vogel, 2009), yet to date most of these areas remain fragmented in politico-administrative terms. With the term “metropolitan integration” I refer - in analogy to European integration - to governance reforms through which this political fragmentation is reduced. Put differently, it refers to processes by which governance functions of nation-state institutions, in this case of local and regional ones, are transferred to institutions that cover the whole or parts of the metropolitan territory. Metropolitan integration can, thus, take on different forms.⁷ First, it can mean that a number of local governments cooperate in the provision of one or several public services, e.g. waste disposal (Hulst and Van Montfort, 2007). Second, metropolitan integration can mean that a number of local governments merge and thereby create bigger and more consolidated municipalities (Heinelt and Kübler, 2005). Third, and probably most prominently, metropolitan integration can refer to the creation of metropolitan governments - new government tiers with directly elected representatives,

⁷In addition to the reforms described here, the political cohesion of metropolitan areas can also be strengthened through the decentralization of governance functions from the national to the metropolitan level (Kübler, 2012). In what follows, I only focus on bottom-up reforms and not on top-down reforms like decentralization.

that take on governance functions previously vested with local or regional governments (Lefèvre, 1998; Frug, 2002). Finally, metropolitan integration can also mean that certain governance functions are transferred from local governments to the next higher government tier (when the territorial scope of this government tier coincides with the territorial scope of the metropolitan area).

Taken together, these different reform types could be characterized as a “system of differentiated integration” as Leuffen, Rittberger and Schimmelfennig (2013, 10) characterize the EU and European integration. For two of these reforms, the analogy with European integration is straightforward. Inter-municipal cooperation can be equated with international agreements, where nation-state actors remain the dominant players. The introduction of a new tier with directly elected representatives also exists in the form of the European parliament, and is embodied in a weaker form in many EU institutions such as the European Commission or the European Court of Justice. For the other two reforms, no direct analogies at the European level exist: A merger of two (or more) member states has not occurred so far and is not very likely to do so in the near future. Centralization also does not have a clear counterpart in European integration, although one could argue that there’s a parallel when nation-state competences are transferred upward to already existing European institutions. In sum, the commonality between metropolitan and European integration does not predominantly lie in the specific ways of how competences are transferred upwards, but more in the general aim of reducing political fragmentation within a more or less clearly defined territory.

The aim of this paper is to link citizens’ support for metropolitan integration⁸ back to their evaluation of nation-state democracy. With respect to this attitudinal dimension, there are important differences between metropolitan and European integration. First, compared to political integration at the European level, metropolitan integration is rather unpoliticized (Hutter and Grande, 2014; Höglinger, 2016). While metropolitan space is riddled by deep political cleavages in many established democracies (Sellers et al., 2013), especially between suburbs and cities (Walks, 2006), the *content* of these cleavages is not

⁸See subsection 3.3 for details on operationalization.

related to metropolitan integration. Neither among the general public nor among political elites, there are clear-cut camps that support or oppose metropolitan integration. Public opinion in this setting is not - or not to the same extent - influenced by public debates and party cues on the issue (Steenbergen and Jones, 218-237). Rather, we are dealing with a situation, in which citizens' are to a large extent left to themselves and can rely on party cues and political cleavages only to a limited extent when forming an opinion (Oliver, 2012, 185).

This goes hand in hand with a second important caveat. As already mentioned before, many metropolitan areas - while functionally integrated - are rather fragmented in political terms. The extent of "metropolitan integration" is quite low in contrast to the extent of European integration which is much more advanced (Hix, 2011). For the assessment of citizens' preferences, this means that usually one cannot ask about their attitudes towards specific institutions as it is frequently done in research on European integration (Torcal, Bonet and Costa Lobo, 2012). And even if such institutions exist - e.g. inter-municipal cooperation arrangements or metropolitan governments - citizens lack knowledge about them (Lackwoska and Mikuła, 2015). Even in survey research in the European context, researchers face the problem of item non-response when asking citizens about their attitudes towards specific institutions and policies (Schoen, 2008). This is even more the case in a metropolitan context. When there is comparatively little public debate on metropolitan institutions they are not salient political objects. For an investigation of citizens' support for metropolitan integration, this means that one needs to rely on underlying principles and rather general questions to grasp citizens' attitudes.

For this reason, the few studies that analyze public attitudes towards metropolitan areas and metropolitan issues measure rather general and diffuse orientations. On a very basic level, Vallbé, Magre and Tomàs (2015) and Lackwoska and Mikuła (2015) assess citizens' identification with the metropolitan area as a measure of their metropolitan orientation (see also Kübler, 2005*b*, 2016). Furthermore, citizens' political interest in inter-municipal and supralocal politics is used as an indicator for their metropolitan orientation (Lidström, 2015; Lackwoska and Mikuła, 2015). On a more specific level, some authors assess

citizens' support for specific metropolitan policies, e.g. land-use planning (Mohamed, 2008) or intra-metropolitan tax distribution (Owens and Sumner, 2016). Finally, there are studies that assess citizens' support for specific reforms proposals - e.g. merging the centre city of a metropolitan area with its surrounding parts or increasing inter-municipal cooperation (Lackwoska and Mikuła, 2015; Kübler, 2016).

For explaining variations in these attitudes, most scholars rely on socio-demographic features, on general measures of political ideology and on local context conditions (Mohamed, 2008; Lackwoska and Mikuła, 2015; Owens and Sumner, 2016). So far, there are almost no studies that link citizens' orientation towards the metropolitan level and their support for certain metropolitan governance mechanisms to support for nation-state governance. In a study of Swiss metropolitan areas, Kübler (2016, 18) finds that citizens strongly identifying with the metropolitan level are less satisfied with local democracy and concludes that "[t]he emergence of city-regional orientations [...] seems to threaten the legitimacy of the local state". By contrast, in a study of two Swedish city regions, Lidström (2015) finds partial evidence for a positive relationship between citizens' satisfaction with democracy and their political orientation towards the inter-municipal level.

On a very basic level, these findings mirror the debate in research on support for European integration. On the one hand, Kübler (2016) finds evidence for a "compensation"-mechanism. This can be explained by citizens' perceived deficiencies of the "local state" in delivering public services and the belief that other levels could do better. On the other hand, Lidström (2015)'s evidence for the "congruence"-mechanism suggests that support for nation-state democracy and institutions spills over to a more positive evaluation of politics on the inter-municipal level and thus support for both nation-state democracy and support for politics on other levels can be thought of as two aspects of the same latent construct - namely a general affection or disaffection with politics (cf. Muñoz, Torcal and Bonet, 2011). Taking up the argument from Hobolt (2012) and Muñoz, Torcal and Bonet (2011) of national institutions being proxies for the evaluation of European, the "congruence"-mechanism might be more likely to be observed, since the low politicization of metropolitan integration and citizens' limited knowledge about politics at the

metropolitan level makes the use of proxies more likely. Nevertheless, I formulate two hypotheses:

1. "Compensation"-Hypothesis: The higher citizens' support for subnational political institutions, the lower their support for metropolitan integration.
2. "Congruence"-Hypothesis: The higher citizens' support for subnational political institutions, the higher their support for metropolitan integration.

3 Research Design

To test these hypotheses, I analyze citizens' support for metropolitan integration in eight metropolitan areas in Switzerland, Germany, France and the United Kingdom (UK). In this section, I first present the most different case selection logic together with the most important case features. In a second step, I introduce the survey data used for the analysis and I discuss the operationalization of "support for metropolitan integration" and "support for subnational democracy". Finally, I briefly discuss why OLS-regression analysis is a suitable way to put the hypotheses to a first test.

3.1 Case Selection

In Table 1 the reader finds an overview of the cases selected for the analysis, two metropolitan areas in each of the four countries. They vary systematically on different important dimensions that can impact citizens' support for metropolitan integration and accordingly the case selection logic corresponds to the most different cases design (Gerring, 2008). On the national level, the four countries vary in terms of their state structure. Switzerland and Germany have a federal, France and the UK have a unitary structure. Building on institutionalist theories for explaining political attitudes (see e.g. Anderson and Guillory, 1997), we can expect citizens to have a stronger subnational orientations in federal countries than in unitary ones. If citizens in these countries assign more importance to the subnational level, they might be more reluctant to reform the existing system and show lower support for metropolitan integration. The four countries also differ with respect to the role of local governments in the multi-level system - i.e. their local government system type. Hesse and Sharpe (1991) distinguish three types of local government systems: the Anglo-Saxon one, where local governments have "a weak legal, financial and political status" (John and Copus, 2011) but are important for delivering public services, the Napoleonic model, where municipalities are strong in political terms but weak in delivering services - i.e. in functional terms (Cole, 2011) and the North Middle European model, where local governments are important both in political and

functional terms (Benz and Zimmer, 2011; Ladner, 2011). Again, this institutional trait might affect the importance citizens attribute to the local level and in turn their support for metropolitan integration: When local government has a strong position in the multi-level system of the nation-state, citizens might be more reluctant to accept reforms and transfer competences.

For each country, the capital region as well as another major city-region was selected. Fitjar (2010) has shown that inter-regional differences exist with respect to the importance citizens attribute to subnational state levels: Those living in the capital region identify less with their region (compared to the national level) than citizens living in more peripheral regions (Fitjar, 2010, 536). With respect to support for metropolitan integration, this could mean that there's less of it in the non-capital regions. Furthermore, for each country - except for Switzerland⁹ - a region with and one without a metropolitan government¹⁰ was selected. A metropolitan government is a strong form of metropolitan integration. The presence or absence of such institutions could increase citizens' support for metropolitan integration, because they can already participate directly on the metropolitan level. Finally, the eight metropolitan areas come in all sizes, from the Greater London area with over 12,000,000 inhabitants to the rather small metropolitan area of Bern with its 360,000 inhabitants.

3.2 Data: An Online-Survey in 8 Metropolitan Areas

The data for this study stem from a large-N online-survey conducted in fall 2015 realized in the eight metropolitan areas. The survey is part of a bigger research project on challenges to democracy in the 21st century (NCCR Democracy, 2016). The general aim of the survey is to identify citizen's attitudes towards new forms of democracy "beyond the state".

⁹In Switzerland, no metropolitan area with a metropolitan government exists. One could argue, however, that the metropolitan area of Zurich has a metropolitan government de facto, namely the canton, since the functional extension of the metropolitan area coincides to a large extent with the politico-administrative boundaries of the canton. Yet, the canton was not *created* to deal with metropolitan problems but has a number of other tasks and goals, which is why this analogy is somewhat limited.

¹⁰See subsection 2.2 for definition

Table 1: Case Selection: 8 Metropolitan Areas in 4 Countries

Country	State Structure	Local Government Type	Govern-System	Metropolitan Area	Capital City	Metropolitan Govern-ment	Population (2012)
Switzerland	Federal	North European	Middle	Bern	Yes	No	360,127
				Zurich	No	No	1,217,751
Germany	Federal	North European	Middle	Berlin	Yes	No	4,951,687
				Stuttgart	No	Yes	2,647,134
France	Unitary	Napoleonic		Lyon	No	Yes	1,934,717
				Paris	Yes	No	11,800,687
United Kingdom	Unitary	Anglo-Saxon		London	Yes	Yes	12,208,100
				Birmingham	No	No	2,873,800

The target population of the survey are individuals between 18-75 years of age that live within the boundaries of the eight metropolitan areas, as defined by Urban Audit (2011). The samples are stratified within metropolitan areas: The sample reflects the spatial distribution of the target population in the metropolitan area: Respondents were selected according to whether they live in the center city or in the surrounding zone. However, the samples are not stratified between metropolitan areas, meaning that the population size of an area is not reflected in the size of the sample. For each metropolitan area a similar number of individuals was invited to participate in the survey (see Table 2). In Germany, France and the UK, a quota sample strategy was chosen ¹¹ and respondents were recruited via online-access panels. For Bern and Zurich, the Swiss federal office of statistics provided a random sample of addresses from their population registry. The randomly selected individuals then received an invitation letter by mail with a link to a website (and including an incentive) to participate in the online-survey. The response rate for the Swiss sample amounts to almost 50%.

A total number of 5,044 respondents across the four countries participated in the online-survey that took approximately 25 minutes to answer. Under exclusion of participants with irregular response patterns (i.e. those with a large number of don't know answers or very uniform (block answer) response patterns) 4,895 respondents remain in the sample.

¹¹Due to financial restrictions.

Table 2: Data: Spatial Distribution of Respondents Across Metropolitan Areas

Metropolitan Area	Centre City	Surrounding	Total
Bern	187 (35%)	352 (65%)	539 (11%)
Zurich	171 (30%)	402 (70%)	573 (12%)
Berlin	491 (76%)	155 (23%)	646 (13%)
Stuttgart	151 (25%)	450 (75%)	601 (12%)
Lyon	187 (29%)	462 (71%)	649 (13%)
Paris	117 (19%)	507 (81%)	624 (13%)
London	219 (34%)	430 (66%)	649 (13%)
Birmingham	321 (52%)	293 (48%)	614 (13%)
Total	1844 (38%)	3051 (62%)	4895 (100%)

3.3 Operationalization

Dependent Variables: Support for Metropolitan Integration

There are different possibilities to operationalize citizens' support for the political integration of a given territory. Studies analyzing the case of European integration can rely on a variety of different measures: rather general and prospective indicators, such as support for further integration of the EU (Rohrschneider, 2002; Roeder, 2011), citizens' evaluation of EU performance (Hobolt, 2012), and also citizens' support for specific institutions (see e.g. Sánchez-Cuenca, 2000; Muñoz, Torcal and Bonet, 2011). For the metropolitan level, measures of performance and institutional evaluation are difficult to use as already discussed in subsection 2.2.¹² Therefore, scholars investigating citizens' orientations towards the metropolitan level use citizens' identification with this level (Lidström, 2015; Vallbé, Magre and Tomàs, 2015), they ask about their support for more general principles of metropolitan integration (Owens and Sumner, 2016), or assess citizens' attitudes towards specific reform proposals (Kübler, 2005*a*, 2016). In this paper, I build on the latter two options and operationalize two concepts: i.) principles for metropolitan integration and ii.) paths towards metropolitan integration. In Table 3 the reader finds an overview of these two different concepts and the corresponding variables and survey items used to measure them.

¹²An additional hurdle for comparative research is that the measures have to be similar across different regions and countries. If citizens evaluate very context-specific institutions, it is difficult to compare their evaluations across different regions and countries.

On a more general level, I operationalize two principles that are important underlying conditions for the political integration of metropolitan areas: On the one hand citizens have to be willing to share their *decision-making capacity* over local issues with citizens in other local governments and on the other hand citizens also have to be willing to share a part of their local *resources* with citizens in other municipalities of the same area. To operationalize these two principles I adapt on two items from the European Social Survey and from the Eurobarometer series. For "inter-municipal power-sharing" I transformed an item from the ESS Round 6 (E16)¹³ and added the opposite statement. For "inter-municipal resource-sharing" I transformed an item that was used in the early Eurobarometer series to make it fit to the metropolitan context (Commission of the European Communities, 1985, 93).

For the regression analysis, I combine the survey items for each of the two variables and z-standardize them. For inter-municipal power-sharing, I subtract respondents' support for statement B from their support for statement A. The result indicates citizens' *net support* for this principle of integration. For inter-municipal resource-sharing, I qualify respondents' support for statement A with their support for statement B. More precisely, I multiply statement A with a transformation of the difference between statement A and statement B¹⁴: The bigger the difference between statement A and statement B, the more the value of statement A is adjusted in one or the other direction. This is done because statement A asks about a general principle, while statement B checks whether respondents would be willing to contribute to its realization. In other words, respondents are 'punished' when their behavioral intentions contradict their stated values. This means that the resulting variable, a fraction of the value for statement A, represents *qualified support* for the second integration principle.

To operationalize what I call "paths to metropolitan integration" I build on an item proposed by Kübler (2005a). It asks respondents about their support for four different types

¹³"How important do you think it is for democracy in general that national governments take into account the views of other European governments before making decisions?" (European Social Survey, 2012).

¹⁴For a negative difference of -1, the value for A is multiplied by 0.9, for a difference of -2, it is multiplied by 0.8; for a positive difference of 1, A is multiplied with 1.1, etc.

of institutional reforms already introduced in subsection 2.2, all of which involve the transfer of competences to another governance institution and all of which contribute to the political integration of metropolitan areas. The four items are incorporated into the regression analysis as one z-standardized indicator.¹⁵

In sum, I analyze three different dependent variables: i.) net support for inter-municipal power-sharing; ii.) qualified support for inter-municipal resource-sharing and iii.) support for metropolitan reforms. I tested whether these three variables are components of the same latent scale, which is not the case: Cronbach's α is rather low (.44) as well as the correlations between the different variables. They, thus, seem to measure different aspects of metropolitan integration and should be analyzed separately.

In Figure 1, the reader finds an overview of the distributions of the three dependent variables across metropolitan areas. Generally, there are no strong differences across metropolitan areas with respect to the univariate distributions, although the two British metropolitan areas are a bit more favorable for inter-municipal resource-sharing.

Independent Variables: Support for Subnational Democracy

In contrast to measuring support for metropolitan integration, measuring support for nation-state democracy has a long history and a widely accepted set of measures exists. To measure support for nation-state democracy, I follow Norris (1999b) who suggested a modification to the concept of diffuse and specific support developed by Easton (1965). While Easton (1965, 171-220) distinguishes between three different objects of support (i.e. the political community (most diffuse), the political regime and the political authorities (most specific)), Norris (1999b) puts the three *regime* components identified by Easton into a hierarchical order. Regime principles (i.e. the fundamental values on which a system is based) are the most diffuse objects of support, followed by regime performance (i.e. how the regime functions in practice) and regime institutions (i.e. how different components of the regime function) (Norris, 1999b, 10-12).


In this paper, I confine the analysis to the two more specific objects of support, i.e.

¹⁵Cronbach's $\alpha=.715$ and a factor analysis yields one factor on which all items load higher than 0.68.

Table 3: Operationalization: Support for Metropolitan Integration

Concept	Variable	Survey Item
Principles for Metropolitan Integration	Inter-municipal Power-sharing	<p>Agreement with following statements:</p> <p>A. When making decisions, local politicians should take into account the interests of other localities in the [X] region.</p> <p>B. When making decisions, local politicians should orient themselves solely and exclusively towards the good of their own locality.</p> <p>[0-10]</p>
	Inter-municipal Resource-sharing	<p>Agreement with following statements:</p> <p>A. When a locality in the [X] region is facing financial difficulties, it should be supported by the other localities via equalisation payments.</p> <p>B. I would personally be ready to pay higher taxes, to help other localities via equalisation payments.</p> <p>[0-10]</p>
Paths towards Metropolitan Integration	Metropolitan Reform Index	<p>Support for the following reforms as a solution to governance problems in the [X] region:</p> <p>A. the merger of several local authorities into larger local authority areas</p> <p>B. the cooperation of several local authorities in the corresponding problem areas</p> <p>C. handing over the corresponding tasks to the/a Metropolitan Government to develop uniform solutions for the whole [X] region</p> <p>D. handing over the corresponding tasks to the [next higher government tier]</p> <p>[0-10]</p>

Figure 1: Boxplot: Distribution of Dependent Variables Across Metropolitan Areas



Note. IMPS=Inter-Municipal Power-Sharing, IMRS=Inter-Municipal Resource-Sharing.

regime performance and regime institutions. In Table 4 the reader finds a list of these two different objects of support. To analyze the hypotheses stated in subsection 2.2, I use citizens' assessment of regime performance and regime institutions as a measure of support for nation-state democracy. Regime performance "is commonly measured as '*satisfaction with the performance of democracy*'" (Norris, 1999b, 11). In the online-survey, this indicator was measured on four different levels. I only assess the impact of satisfaction with *subnational* democracy, since metropolitan integration especially changes governance on the local and the state/province¹⁶ level. For the measurement of support for regime institutions, I rely on an item that measures trust in different institutions (Muñoz, Torcal and Bonet, 2011). Again, I confine the analysis to support for subnational institutions,

¹⁶For the cases of France and the United Kingdom, the 'state/province' level refers to the 'département' and the 'county' level, respectively.

Table 4: Operationalization: Support for Subnational Democracy

Concept	Variable	Survey Item
Regime Performance	Satisfaction with Democracy	How satisfied are you with the way democracy work... A. in your local authority? B. in your state/province? C. in [country]? D. in the EU? [0-10]
Regime Institutions	Trust in Institutions	How much do you personally trust... A. the [country] Parliament? B. the [country] Government? C. the legal system in [country]? D. the media in [country]? E. the state/province government? F. the state/province parliament? G. local government? H. the United Nations? I. scientists / academic experts? [0-10]


since these are the most proximate ones to the metropolitan level. For both satisfaction with subnational democracy and trust in subnational institutions, I assessed whether the respective items form one scale. This is the case, Cronbach's α equals 0.934 (satisfaction) and 0.953 respectively. Each respondents mean over the respective items is calculated and the resulting variable is z-standardized.

Again, Figure 2 displays the univariate distributions of the two independent variables across metropolitan areas. In contrast to the dependent variables, there is some variation both across and within countries: Citizens in the two Swiss metropolitan areas are both more trustful and more satisfied with subnational democracy than citizens in the other three countries. Furthermore, respondents in Berlin are both less satisfied and less trustful of subnational institutions than their fellow countrymen in Stuttgart.

Control Variables

I also include a set of control variables that can be relevant for an analysis of support for metropolitan integration and political support more generally. Apart from socio-demographic variables (age, gender, education and income) that were found to be associated with a variety of political attitudes and behavior (see e.g. Brady, Verba and Schlozman, 1995) I include a dummy-variable that indicates whether a respondent lives

Figure 2: Boxplot: Distribution of Independent Variables Across Metropolitan Areas



in the centre city or in the surrounding of the metropolitan area (assessed via their postal code). Respondents living in the centre city might be more supportive of metropolitan integration: Since their place of residence forms the centre of the metropolitan area, they can expect that further integration also means that more power is transferred to the centre. Finally, I include additional perception measures, such as respondents' self-placement on a left-right scale (as a very basic measure of political ideology), their overall stated political interest and a measure for their feeling of external and internal political efficacy on the local level. ¹⁷ An overview of descriptive statistics for all the indicators can be found in Table A1.

¹⁷The items for this measure are adapted to the local level from a short scale developed by GESIS (2016). The scale consists of four items. A factor analysis clearly yielded two factors that correspond to the concepts of external and internal efficacy.

3.4 Methodology

To analyze the two hypotheses stated in subsection 2.2 I rely on standard OLS-regression techniques, since the dependent variables are all indexes of several variables and they can be treated as interval-scaled. An issue with the use of standard OLS-regression is the hierarchical structure of the data. In this case one should normally use multi-level regression analysis to account for the variance at higher levels (Steenbergen and Jones, 218-237). However, the few numbers of level-2 units (i.e. metropolitan areas) and the even fewer number of level-3 units (i.e. countries) does not permit to use this technique. Therefore, I use a dummy variable approach (for both metropolitan areas and countries) to capture the variation induced by the two higher levels.¹⁸

I proceed in two steps to analyze the relationship between support for metropolitan integration and support for subnational democracy. In a first step, I calculate OLS-regression models for the whole sample metropolitan area- and country-dummies. In a second step I run the same models for the eight regions and the four countries separately to establish a more detailed picture of the relationship between the dependent and the independent variables.

Two general problems associated with survey research are on the one hand a potential bias in the sample compared to the target population and on the other hand non-response or “don’t know” answers of participants for individual items. To cope with the first issue, one can generate survey weights (based on indicators that are available for both survey participants and the target population) and “mirror” the target population with these indicators. For this survey, weights were calculated based on age, gender, education and occupational status. A comparison of the weighted and the non-weighted distributions of the three dependent variables can be found in Figure A1, Figure A2 and Figure A3 in the appendix. The distributions of the three variables do not substantially differ across the weighted and the non-weighted sample.¹⁹

¹⁸A robustness check in the form of a multi-level regression with the eight metropolitan areas as level-2 units and dummy variables for the country level yields essentially the same results as the dummy variable approach.

¹⁹An additional estimation of the regression models of the general analysis (Table A2) yields essentially the same results as for the non-weighted sample.

With respect to the second issue, the online-setting allows to force respondents to answer each question. However, respondents were given a “don’t know” option for attitudinal questions. For the OLS-regression models, respondents that ticked the “don’t know” option for one of the items used in the analysis are deleted listwise. In Table A1 the reader finds four dummy variables²⁰ that distinguish respondents with respect to whether they gave an opinion on an item or whether they used the “don’t know” option. For all three dependent variables taken together, the number of “don’t know” answers amounts to 14.2%. To test whether respondents using the “don’t know” option for one of these items systematically differ from the other respondents, I estimated a logistic regression model with the same variables as in the OLS-regression models (see Table A3). With respect to socio-demographic variables, the results show that especially female respondents and those with low education and little income are more likely to tick the “don’t know” category. Furthermore, respondents feeling less politically efficacious on the local level are also more likely to tick this category. However, the two independent variables are not significantly correlated with having an opinion on metropolitan integration or not, even though the negative coefficient for trust in subnational democracy is rather big and close to being significant with 95% confidence.


²⁰One for each dependent variable and one for all dependent variables taken together

4 Results

4.1 General Analysis: Support for Metropolitan Integration

How is support for subnational democracy linked to support for metropolitan integration? Is there evidence for the compensation mechanism, meaning a negative relationship, or does the observed pattern rather reflect a congruence between the two variables, meaning a positive relationship? A first answer to these questions can be found in the coefficients plot in Figure 3 and Figure 4. Figure 3 shows the effects of satisfaction with subnational

Figure 3: Coefficients Plot: Support for Metropolitan Integration and Satisfaction with Subnational Democracy



Note. Displayed coefficients are standardized beta coefficients with 95% confidence interval. Corresponding models can be found in Table A2 in the appendix. IMPS=Inter-Municipal Power-Sharing, IMRS=Inter-Municipal Resource-Sharing.

democracy on the three dependent variables “Net Support for Inter-Municipal Power-Sharing”, “Qualified Support for Inter-Municipal Resource-Sharing” and “Support for


Metropolitan Reform”. Respondents that are more satisfied with subnational democracy show significantly higher support for two of the three dependent variables (support for resource-sharing and support for metropolitan reform), which corroborates the “congruence”-hypothesis. Most of the socio-demographic control variables do not yield significant effects, except for highly educated respondents being slightly more supportive of inter-municipal power-sharing and women being a little less supportive of resource-sharing and metropolitan reforms. With respect to the control variables measuring other political attitudes, the figure especially shows the relevance of political efficacy for being more or less supportive of metropolitan integration. However, the effects of external and internal political efficacy differ across the three dependent variables. Being on the right of the political spectrum significantly decreases support for the two integration principles but not for metropolitan reform. Finally, respondents living in the centre city of a metropolitan area show moderately higher support for metropolitan integration.

The results for the second independent variable depicted in Figure 4 support this picture. Respondents with higher trust in subnational institutions are more supportive of metropolitan integration - again with the exception for power-sharing - which lends additional support to the “congruence”-hypothesis. The other indicators remain by and large the same.

4.2 Cross-National and Cross-Regional Comparison

What becomes evident from both Figure 3 and Figure 4 is that respondents differ in their support for metropolitan integration both across the eight metropolitan areas and across the four countries. Especially on the country level there are significant differences with respect to the support for metropolitan integration. While German, French and British respondents are less supportive of power-sharing than Swiss ones, they are more supportive of resource-sharing and of metropolitan reform. In this subsection I assess whether the relationship between support for subnational democracy and support for metropolitan integration differs across these contexts.

Figure 4: Coefficients Plot: Support for Metropolitan Integration and Trust in Subnational Institutions




Note. Displayed coefficients are standardized beta coefficients with 95% confidence interval. Corresponding models can be found in Table A2 in the appendix. IMPS=Inter-Municipal Power-Sharing, IMRS=Inter-Municipal Resource-Sharing.

Figure 5 and Figure 6 show the coefficients for satisfaction with subnational democracy and trust in subnational institutions for each of the four countries. While the general pattern from subsection 4.1 is confirmed - a significant positive relationship between support for subnational democracy and two of the three dependent variables - the effects of subnational democracy on support for metropolitan integration vary across countries. It becomes evident that the relation is stronger in France and the UK and weaker in Switzerland and Germany. Furthermore, the effects of trust in subnational institutions are generally stronger than those of satisfaction with subnational democracy. The latter coefficient is even insignificant in Switzerland for all three dependent variables.

A similar picture emerges when turning to the eight different metropolitan areas. Fig-


Figure 5: Coefficient Plot: Support for Metropolitan Integration and Satisfaction with Subnational Democracy by Country



Note. Displayed coefficients are standardized betas for satisfaction with subnational democracy for individual countries. Full regression models can be found in Table A4, Table A5 and Table A6 in the appendix. IMPS=Inter-Municipal Power-Sharing, IMRS=Inter-Municipal Resource-Sharing.


ure 7 and Figure 8 show the coefficients for the independent variables across the eight regions. Again, the coefficients are not significant when it comes to inter-municipal power-sharing (except for Paris) but more so when it comes to resource-sharing and support for metropolitan reform. The relationship is stronger in the French and the British metropolitan areas and generally the impact of trust in subnational institutions is a bit stronger. For the metropolitan areas of Bern and Stuttgart, the effects are not or only marginally significant.

Figure 6: Coefficient Plot: Support for Metropolitan Integration and Trust in Subnational Institutions by Country




Note. Displayed coefficients are standardized betas for satisfaction with subnational democracy for individual regions. Full regression models can be found in Table A7, Table A8 and Table A9 in the appendix. IMPS=Inter-Municipal Power-Sharing, IMRS=Inter-Municipal Resource-Sharing.

Figure 7: Coefficient Plot: Support for Metropolitan Integration and Satisfaction with Subnational Democracy by Metropolitan Area



Note. Displayed coefficients are standardized betas for satisfaction with subnational democracy for individual regions. Full regression models can be found in Table A10, Table A11 and Table A12 in the appendix. IMPS=Inter-Municipal Power-Sharing, IMRS=Inter-Municipal Resource-Sharing.

Figure 8: Coefficient Plot: Support for Metropolitan Integration and Trust in Subnational Institutions by Metropolitan Area



Note. Displayed coefficients are standardized betas for satisfaction with subnational democracy for individual regions. Full regression models can be found in Table A13, Table A14 and Table A15 in the appendix. IMPS=Inter-Municipal Power-Sharing, IMRS=Inter-Municipal Resource-Sharing.

5 Discussion

What can these results tell us about support for metropolitan integration and how do they link to the debates in the European context? Notwithstanding some caveats, one can state that the results corroborate the “congruence”-mechanism. For two of three dependent variables, the link between support for subnational democracy and support for metropolitan integration is generally positive and significant. Furthermore, the effects of trust in subnational institutions are stronger than those for satisfaction with subnational democracy.

For both inter-municipal resource-sharing and support for metropolitan reform, trust in subnational institutions has a stronger effect than satisfaction with subnational democracy. Moreover, in both cases feelings of local external political efficacy have a positive effect on support. This suggests that a generally positive stance towards democratic politics can make citizens less risk averse and more supportive of changing the status quo. While the evidence for these two dependent variables is rather clear, they are more inconclusive for inter-municipal power-sharing. Support for subnational democracy is not significantly linked to support for this principle of metropolitan integration. One potential explanation for this finding is what the literature on European integration calls "cognitive mobilization" (Fuchs, 2011a, 224): Citizens that are more knowledgeable and more confident about their capabilities for participating in politics are also more supportive of potentially making the existing system more complex by introducing additional elements and mechanisms of multi-level governance. Figure 3 and Figure 4 show that the highly educated and those feeling confident about their political capabilities vis-à-vis the local level (high internal political efficacy) are more supportive of inter-municipal power-sharing. This finding could be explained by the fact that this is the most abstract of the three dependent variables: A stronger cognitive effort is needed to think of a specific situation in which inter-municipal power-sharing becomes meaningful.

Comparing the results across different context shows that the extent of support for metropolitan integration especially varies across countries (see Figure 3 and Figure 4).

There are no strong differences among metropolitan areas in the same country, except for respondents in Zurich and Paris. They are significantly less supportive of metropolitan reform or respectively of inter-municipal power-sharing than their fellow countrymen in Bern and Lyon. The effects of support for subnational democracy on support for metropolitan integration are less pronounced in the two federal countries than in the two unitary ones (see Figure 5 and Figure 6). This qualifies the overall findings to a certain extent, since the relationship is less pronounced in those contexts, where the subnational level matters more in the daily life of the citizens (Benz and Zimmer, 2011; Ladner, 2011). For French and British citizens with a more subnational orientation, metropolitan integration might be seen as a way to strengthen the subnational level compared to the national one, whereas for Swiss and German citizens, the metropolitan level might also be seen as a competition to nation-state governance on the subnational level.

The different effect sizes of support for subnational democracy across metropolitan areas are more difficult to explain. While the smaller effect size in federal countries is also reproduced at this level, some individual deviations (e.g. Birmingham for inter-municipal resource-sharing or Stuttgart for metropolitan reform) remain puzzling. This has to be explored further in a next step.²¹

In sum, the results speak to more recent studies on support for European integration, which argue that evaluations of nation-state democracy function as a reference point for the evaluation of European Union institutions (Hobolt, 2012; Muñoz, Torcal and Bonet, 2011; Torcal, Bonet and Costa Lobo, 2012). However, an important difference is that the dependent variables analyzed in this paper are not evaluations of existing institutions but rather associated with the latter's creation. This might be interpreted in the sense that a positive evaluation of nation-state politics is an expression of more positive evaluations of politics in general - which goes along with support for reforming and transforming existing governance arrangements: When citizens trust their representatives and think that the democratic system works well in general, this seems to go along with the belief that

²¹A disaggregated analysis of the four items that measure metropolitan reform shows for example that in areas with a metropolitan government (i.e. Stuttgart, Lyon and London) support for transferring competences to a metropolitan government is significantly higher than in the other regions

reforms can strengthen and do not weaken the system.

6 Conclusion

This paper started out with two challenges modern democracies face - decline of public support for democratic institutions and the transfer of governance functions away from nation-state institutions - and aimed at assessing their relationship through the analysis of citizens' attitudes in a specific context: How is support for subnational democracy linked to support for metropolitan integration?

The results suggest that citizens' political support for the subnational state is congruent with their support for the political integration of metropolitan areas. When citizens are confident about politics in nation-state institutions, they are more confident about transferring competences and making changes to the status quo.

The paper has some important limitations, however. First, the present version of this paper lacks measures for the local context a respondent resides in. However, existing research on local political attitudes, local-level indicators such as the size, socio-economic structure and geographical location of a municipality were found to covary systematically with citizens' political attitudes (Denk, 2012; Lidström, 2013; Denters et al., 2014).²² An inclusion of such indicators will also strengthen the links of the paper to the literature on support for European integration, since scholars in this field emphasize the impact of the national context, e.g. in the form of economic performance and quality of governance, on support for European integration (Hooghe and Marks, 2005; Fuchs, 2011*b*; Muñoz, Torcal and Bonet, 2011).

Second, the theoretical argument of the paper heavily relies on research on support for European integration. Admittedly, this analogy has severe limitations. For one, the issue at stake - i.e. European or metropolitan integration respectively - varies greatly in the extent to which it is politicized in public debates and mobilized by political parties (Hutter and Grande, 2014; Hasler and Kübler, 2016; Höglinger, 2016). Moreover, the political communities affected by these two types of integration differ substantially in

²²Data collection on these indicators is still under way. In addition to these structural indicators, the extent to which a municipality is participating in area-wide or least supra-local governance schemes would be an important control measure. However, such information is difficult to obtain and its measurement and quality varies widely across different contexts.

the extent to which individuals feel attached to them: While local attachment can be a source of mobilization in some cases (Baldersheim and Rose, 2010), national attachment and identification is much more salient than local one (Antonsich and Holland, 2014) and accordingly European integration faces much stronger resistance than metropolitan one. Finally, the institutional context conditions are very different: Integrating a policy at the European level requires a much bigger efforts by much more actors than integrating a policy at the metropolitan level, where this is usually a more technical than political or politicized issue. Despite these limitations, there's also a potential benefit of testing integration-support theories in the metropolitan context. Doing so offers the advantage of comparison: Support for integration can be compared across different political and institutional contexts that share basic functional conditions, namely a dense web of social, economic and cultural interactions that requires governance in one or the other form. Overall, the findings of this study suggest - in line with recent research on support for European integration (Hobolt, 2012) - that public discontent with nation-state democracy spills over to governance "beyond the state" as well. To find out whether the causal effect works that way - as suggested by some scholars (Muñoz, Torcal and Bonet, 2011) - or whether the actual transfer of governance functions to institutions and bodies "beyond the state" causes public discontent - as suggested by others (Putnam, Pharr and Dalton, 2000) is left to future research.

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Appendices

Figure A1: Histogram: Inter-Municipal Power-Sharing: Net Support




Figure A2: Histogram: Inter-Municipal Resource-Sharing: Qualified Support




Figure A3: Histogram: Metropolitan Reform Index




Table A1: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	P25	P50	P75
<i>Dependent Variables</i>								
Inter-Municipal Power-Sharing: Net Support ^a	4747	.006	1.004	-2.998	2.193	-.402	-.143	.636
Inter-Municipal Resource-Sharing: Qualified Support ^a	4540	-.007	.996	-1.746	2.344	-.764	-.028	.708
Metropolitan Reform Index ^a	4396	-.002	.996	-3.075	2.152	-.592	.062	.715
<i>Independent Variables</i>								
Satisfaction: Subnational Democracy ^a	4670	.002	.994	-2.52	1.718	-.401	.235	.658
Trust: Subnational Institutions ^a	4465	.001	.994	-2.223	1.977	-.543	.157	.717
<i>Control Variables</i>								
Female(=1)	4888	.494	.5	0	1	0	0	1
Age in Years	4895	45.239	14.501	18	79	33	45	57
Education: 3 categories	4895	1.352	.706	0	2	1	1	2
Income: 3 categories	4895	1.035	.763	0	2	0	1	2
Interest in Politics, General	4860	.712	.453	0	1	0	1	1
Local External Pol. Efficacy	4665	-.001	.997	-1.697	3.281	-.866	-.032	.728
Local Internal Pol. Efficacy	4665	.021	.985	-2.948	1.929	-.592	.113	.725
Left-Right Self-Placement	4384	5.303	2.647	0	10	3	5	7
Centre City(=1)	4895	.377	.485	0	1	0	0	1
<i>Missing Values (DK)</i>								
Inter-Municipal Power-Sharing: Net Support (DK=1)	4895	.03	.171	0	1	0	0	0
Inter-Municipal Resource-Sharing: Qualified Support (DK=1)	4895	.073	.259	0	1	0	0	0
Metropolitan Reform Index (DK=1)	4895	.102	.303	0	1	0	0	0
All Dependent Variables (DK=1)	4895	.142	.349	0	1	0	0	0

Note. Obs.=Number of Observations, Std. Dev.=Standard Deviation, Min=Minimum, Max=Maximum, P25=25th percentile, P50=Median, P75=75th percentile.

^a z-standardized variable.

Table A2: OLS-Regression: Support for Metropolitan Integration

		Inter-Municipal Power-Sharing: Net Support		Inter-Municipal Resource- Sharing: Quali- fied Support		Metropolitan Reform Index	
		(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
		β	β	β	β	β	β
		(p> t)	(p> t)	(p> t)	(p> t)	(p> t)	(p> t)
Satisfaction: Subnational Democracy		0.027 (0.130)		0.133*** (0.000)		0.191*** (0.000)	
Trust: Subnational Institutions			0.021 (0.262)		0.222*** (0.000)		0.278*** (0.000)
Female(=1)		-0.011 (0.729)	-0.016 (0.611)	-0.057 (0.054)	-0.059* (0.047)	-0.086** (0.005)	-0.085** (0.006)
Age in Years		0.002* (0.030)	0.003* (0.023)	-0.008*** (0.000)	-0.008*** (0.000)	-0.007*** (0.000)	-0.007*** (0.000)
Education (Baseline=Low)							
<i>Edu. Medium</i>		-0.047 (0.378)	-0.049 (0.361)	-0.025 (0.618)	-0.020 (0.690)	0.001 (0.984)	0.016 (0.759)
<i>Edu. High</i>		0.127* (0.016)	0.123* (0.021)	0.059 (0.240)	0.052 (0.302)	0.080 (0.121)	0.073 (0.158)
Income (Baseline=Low)							
<i>Inc. Medium</i>		0.028 (0.473)	0.026 (0.506)	-0.003 (0.935)	0.029 (0.442)	0.046 (0.230)	0.065 (0.090)
<i>Inc. High</i>		0.070 (0.102)	0.071 (0.104)	-0.054 (0.184)	-0.031 (0.455)	0.042 (0.321)	0.054 (0.197)
Political Interest (Baseline=Low)							
<i>Int. High</i>		-0.030 (0.470)	-0.035 (0.412)	0.221*** (0.000)	0.178*** (0.000)	0.111** (0.006)	0.088* (0.032)
Local External Pol. Efficacy		-0.010 (0.584)	-0.010 (0.591)	0.283*** (0.000)	0.242*** (0.000)	0.186*** (0.000)	0.133*** (0.000)
Local Internal Pol. Efficacy		0.091*** (0.000)	0.094*** (0.000)	-0.042* (0.021)	-0.036* (0.049)	0.083*** (0.000)	0.088*** (0.000)
Left-Right Self-Placement		-0.069*** (0.000)	-0.071*** (0.000)	-0.037*** (0.000)	-0.038*** (0.000)	-0.001 (0.885)	-0.002 (0.701)
Centre City(=1)		0.073* (0.031)	0.078* (0.023)	0.102** (0.002)	0.122*** (0.000)	0.111*** (0.001)	0.113*** (0.001)
Metropolitan Area (Baseline=Bern)							
<i>Zurich</i>		-0.098 (0.122)	-0.103 (0.112)	-0.079 (0.185)	-0.057 (0.344)	-0.198** (0.001)	-0.193** (0.002)
<i>Berlin</i>		-0.052 (0.394)	-0.052 (0.404)	0.000	0.000	-0.114 (0.057)	-0.082 (0.171)

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Table A2 – *Continued*

	Inter-Municipal Power-Sharing: Net Support		Inter-Municipal Resource- Sharing: Quali- fied Support		Metropolitan Reform Index	
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
	β	β	β	β	β	β
	(p> t)	(p> t)	(p> t)	(p> t)	(p> t)	(p> t)
<i>Stuttgart</i>	<i>omit.</i>	<i>omit.</i>	-0.063 (0.283)	-0.080 (0.172)	<i>omit.</i>	<i>omit.</i>
<i>Lyon</i>	0.183** (0.002)	<i>omit.</i>	<i>omit.</i>	-0.014 (0.804)	<i>omit.</i>	-0.030 (0.615)
<i>Paris</i>	<i>omit.</i>	-0.184** (0.003)	0.003 (0.963)	<i>omit.</i>	-0.014 (0.807)	<i>omit.</i>
<i>London</i>	<i>omit.</i>	-0.085 (0.174)	<i>omit.</i>	-0.010 (0.861)	<i>omit.</i>	0.084 (0.160)
<i>Birmingham</i>	0.040 (0.512)	<i>omit.</i>	-0.028 (0.627)	<i>omit.</i>	-0.155** (0.008)	0.000
Country (Baseline=CH)						
<i>DE</i>	-0.374*** (0.000)	-0.412*** (0.000)	0.113 (0.062)	0.103 (0.090)	0.259*** (0.000)	0.202** (0.001)
<i>FR</i>	-0.209** (0.001)	-0.058 (0.371)	0.216*** (0.000)	0.262*** (0.000)	0.300*** (0.000)	0.322*** (0.000)
<i>UK</i>	-0.334*** (0.000)	-0.289*** (0.000)	0.443*** (0.000)	0.478*** (0.000)	0.208*** (0.001)	0.131* (0.041)
Constant	0.401*** (0.000)	0.441*** (0.000)	0.217* (0.021)	0.231* (0.015)	0.009 (0.922)	0.025 (0.799)
N	4003	3844	3863	3716	3792	3672
Adjusted-R ²	0.078	0.082	0.205	0.231	0.150	0.169
F-Test	18.706***	19.154***	53.319***	59.599***	36.194***	40.388***
p > F	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Note. Own Calculations. Models estimated with OLS-regression (-regress-) in Stata. Entries are OLS-coefficients (p-values in parentheses). *omit.*: Coefficient omitted; region=country intercept.

Significance Levels: *<0.05 **<0.01 ***<0.001.

Table A3: Logistic Regression: Missing Values (DK=1) for Support for Metropolitan Integration

	Socio-Demographic Model	Satisfaction Model	Trust Model
	β	β	β
	(p> z)	(p> z)	(p> z)
Female(=1)	0.721*** (0.000)	0.540*** (0.000)	0.509*** (0.000)
Age in Years	-0.002 (0.402)	0.004 (0.272)	0.006 (0.131)
Education (Baseline=Low)			
<i>Edu. Medium</i>	-0.334** (0.008)	-0.123 (0.471)	-0.223 (0.204)
<i>Edu. High</i>	-0.413** (0.001)	-0.196 (0.254)	-0.315 (0.075)
Income (Baseline=Low)			
<i>Inc. Medium</i>	-0.401*** (0.000)	-0.264* (0.042)	-0.111 (0.425)
<i>Inc. High</i>	-0.584*** (0.000)	-0.293* (0.049)	-0.177 (0.268)
Centre City(=1)	0.075 (0.416)	0.112 (0.348)	0.131 (0.304)
Satisfaction: Subnational Democracy		-0.020 (0.751)	
Trust: Subnational Institu- tions			-0.132 (0.054)
Political Interest (Baseline=Low)			
<i>Int. High</i>		-0.221 (0.102)	-0.083 (0.572)
Local External Pol. Effi- cacy		-0.176** (0.007)	-0.228** (0.002)
Local Internal Pol. Efficacy		-0.210** (0.001)	-0.237*** (0.001)
Left-Right Self-Placement		-0.043* (0.039)	-0.054* (0.015)
Metropolitan Area (Baseline=Bern)			
<i>Zurich</i>	-0.017 (0.931)	-0.234 (0.328)	-0.292 (0.257)
<i>Berlin</i>	0.269 (0.130)	0.028 (0.900)	-0.131 (0.578)
<i>Stuttgart</i>	0.078 (0.671)	-0.145 (0.526)	-0.172 (0.473)
<i>Lyon</i>	0.196 (0.269)	-0.145 (0.525)	-0.501 (0.052)
<i>Paris</i>	0.121 (0.509)	-0.175 (0.451)	-0.317 (0.204)

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Table A3 – *Continued*

	Socio-Demographic Model	Satisfaction Model	Trust Model
	β	β	β
	(p> z)	(p> z)	(p> z)
<i>London</i>	0.439* (0.011)	0.178 (0.415)	0.190 (0.407)
<i>Birmingham</i>	0.081 (0.655)	-0.273 (0.251)	-0.282 (0.259)
Country (Baseline=CH)			
<i>DE</i>	<i>omit.</i>	<i>omit.</i>	<i>omit.</i>
<i>FR</i>	<i>omit.</i>	<i>omit.</i>	<i>omit.</i>
<i>UK</i>	<i>omit.</i>	<i>omit.</i>	<i>omit.</i>
Constant	-1.648*** (0.000)	-1.955*** (0.000)	-2.125*** (0.000)
N	4888	4060	3896
Pseudo-R ²	0.040	0.042	0.050
χ^2	161.566***	108.511***	117.603***
p > χ^2	0.000	0.000	0.000

Note. Own Calculations. Models estimated with binary logistic regression (-logistic-) in Stata. Entries are logit coefficients (p-values in parentheses). *omit.*: Coefficient omitted, country=baseline

Significance Levels: *<0.05 **<0.01 ***<0.001.

Table A4: OLS-Regression: Net Support for Inter-Municipal Power-Sharing and Satisfaction with Subnational Democracy by Country

		Switzerland	Germany	France	United Kingdom
		β	β	β	β
		(p> t)	(p> t)	(p> t)	(p> t)
Satisfaction: Subnational Democracy		-0.006 (0.905)	-0.011 (0.760)	0.118*** (0.001)	0.002 (0.948)
Female(=1)		-0.056 (0.443)	-0.016 (0.812)	-0.100 (0.098)	0.098 (0.057)
Age in Years		0.004 (0.079)	0.002 (0.400)	0.003 (0.226)	0.001 (0.517)
Education (Baseline=Low)					
<i>Edu. Medium</i>		-0.170 (0.277)	0.162 (0.126)	-0.118 (0.397)	-0.027 (0.728)
<i>Edu. High</i>		0.103 (0.527)	0.312** (0.005)	0.052 (0.712)	0.039 (0.552)
Income (Baseline=Low)					
<i>Inc. Medium</i>	0.171	-0.004 (0.066)	-0.013 (0.956)	0.039 (0.867)	
<i>Inc. High</i>		0.336** (0.001)	0.015 (0.860)	-0.008 (0.929)	0.009 (0.896)
Political Interest (Baseline=Low)					
<i>Int. High</i>		0.004 (0.967)	-0.018 (0.840)	-0.050 (0.497)	-0.032 (0.657)
Local External Pol. Efficacy		0.077 (0.074)	0.090* (0.019)	-0.086* (0.012)	-0.086** (0.003)
Local Internal Pol. Efficacy		0.064 (0.201)	0.094* (0.015)	0.085* (0.018)	0.091** (0.003)
Left-Right Self-Placement		-0.101*** (0.000)	-0.073*** (0.000)	-0.051*** (0.000)	-0.049*** (0.000)
Centre City(=1)		0.120 (0.119)	0.076 (0.305)	0.070 (0.311)	-0.007 (0.894)
Zurich (Baseline=Bern)		-0.085 (0.222)			
Berlin (Baseline=Stuttgart)			-0.076 (0.298)		
Lyon (Baseline=Paris)				0.177** (0.003)	
Birmingham (Baseline=London)					-0.019 (0.719)
Constant		0.348 (0.116)	-0.058 (0.756)	0.247 (0.209)	0.092 (0.554)
N		914	1050	1015	1024
Adjusted-R ²		0.109	0.044	0.065	0.048
F-Test		9.573	4.720	6.433	5.005
p > F		0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Note. Own Calculations. Models estimated with OLS-regression (-regress-) in Stata. Entries are OLS-coefficients (p-values in parentheses). Significance Levels: *<0.05 **<0.01 ***<0.001.

Table A5: OLS-Regression: Qualified Support for Inter-Municipal Resource-Sharing and Satisfaction with Subnational Democracy by Country

	Switzerland	Germany	France	United Kingdom
	β	β	β	β
	(p> t)	(p> t)	(p> t)	(p> t)
Satisfaction: Subnational Democracy	-0.021 (0.597)	0.090** (0.003)	0.198*** (0.000)	0.215*** (0.000)
Female(=1)	-0.109 (0.073)	-0.061 (0.280)	-0.141* (0.015)	0.027 (0.655)
Age in Years	-0.001 (0.503)	-0.009*** (0.000)	-0.004 (0.068)	-0.014*** (0.000)
Education (Baseline=Low)				
<i>Edu. Medium</i>	-0.040 (0.757)	0.135 (0.140)	-0.163 (0.217)	-0.131 (0.150)
<i>Edu. High</i>	-0.004 (0.975)	0.232* (0.016)	-0.055 (0.677)	0.006 (0.935)
Income (Baseline=Low)				
<i>Inc. Medium</i>	-0.038 (0.616)	-0.027 (0.693)	0.049 (0.516)	-0.009 (0.910)
<i>Inc. High</i>	0.108 (0.208)	-0.088 (0.235)	-0.080 (0.337)	-0.181* (0.035)
Political Interest (Baseline=Low)				
<i>Int. High</i>	0.167* (0.040)	0.129 (0.091)	0.230** (0.001)	0.303*** (0.000)
Local External Pol. Efficacy	0.185*** (0.000)	0.338*** (0.000)	0.288*** (0.000)	0.252*** (0.000)
Local Internal Pol. Efficacy	0.007 (0.860)	-0.054 (0.107)	-0.098** (0.005)	0.016 (0.670)
Left-Right Self-Placement	-0.091*** (0.000)	-0.027* (0.025)	-0.032*** (0.001)	-0.020 (0.104)
Centre City(=1)	0.066 (0.303)	0.134* (0.035)	0.135* (0.042)	0.055 (0.376)
Zurich (Baseline=Bern)	-0.088 (0.126)			
Berlin (Baseline=Stuttgart)		0.034 (0.594)		
Lyon (Baseline=Paris)			0.015 (0.789)	
London (Baseline=Birmingham)				0.032 (0.611)
Constant	0.359 (0.052)	0.230 (0.154)	0.343 (0.069)	0.851*** (0.000)
N	888	1018	996	961
Adjusted-R ²	0.118	0.199	0.201	0.251
F-Test	10.146	20.492	20.254	25.683
p > F	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Note. Own Calculations. Models estimated with OLS-regression (-regress-) in Stata. Entries are OLS-coefficients (p-values in parentheses). Significance Levels: *<0.05 **<0.01 ***<0.001.

Table A6: OLS-Regression: Metropolitan Reform Index and Satisfaction with Subnational Democracy by Country

	Switzerland	Germany	France	United Kingdom
	β	β	β	β
	(p> t)	(p> t)	(p> t)	(p> t)
Satisfaction: Subnational Democracy	0.048 (0.246)	0.113*** (0.001)	0.229*** (0.000)	0.296*** (0.000)
Female(=1)	-0.206** (0.001)	-0.124* (0.040)	-0.146* (0.019)	0.049 (0.385)
Age in Years	-0.007*** (0.000)	-0.004* (0.049)	-0.000 (0.971)	-0.012*** (0.000)
Education (Baseline=Low)				
<i>Edu. Medium</i>	-0.058 (0.675)	0.058 (0.553)	-0.201 (0.153)	0.048 (0.567)
<i>Edu. High</i>	0.061 (0.669)	0.039 (0.704)	-0.046 (0.745)	0.086 (0.242)
Income (Baseline=Low)				
<i>Inc. Medium</i>	0.105 (0.180)	0.028 (0.707)	-0.050 (0.537)	0.096 (0.181)
<i>Inc. High</i>	0.177* (0.045)	-0.020 (0.801)	-0.066 (0.460)	0.032 (0.687)
Political Interest (Baseline=Low)				
<i>Int. High</i>	0.024 (0.774)	0.078 (0.341)	0.232** (0.002)	0.050 (0.536)
Local External Pol. Efficacy	0.120** (0.001)	0.187*** (0.000)	0.139*** (0.000)	0.207*** (0.000)
Local Internal Pol. Efficacy	0.056 (0.185)	0.144*** (0.000)	0.023 (0.534)	0.092** (0.007)
Left-Right Self-Placement	-0.060*** (0.000)	0.002 (0.851)	-0.013 (0.191)	0.051*** (0.000)
Centre City(=1)	0.072 (0.268)	0.198** (0.004)	0.045 (0.528)	0.057 (0.321)
Zurich (Baseline=Bern)	-0.201*** (0.001)			
Stuttgart (Baseline=Berlin)		0.188** (0.006)		
Lyon (Baseline=Paris)			0.050 (0.411)	
London (Baseline=Birmingham)				0.141* (0.014)
Constant	0.533** (0.006)	-0.021 (0.907)	0.230 (0.253)	-0.004 (0.983)
N	868	989	961	974
Adjusted-R ²	0.112	0.105	0.120	0.327
F-Test	9.390	9.957	11.104	37.355
p > F	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Note. Own Calculations. Models estimated with OLS-regression (-regress-) in Stata. Entries are OLS-coefficients. (p-values in parentheses). Significance Levels: *<0.05 **<0.01 ***<0.001.

Table A7: OLS-Regression: Net Support for Inter-Municipal Power-Sharing and Trust in Subnational Institutions by Country

	Switzerland	Germany	France	United Kingdom
	β	β	β	β
	(p> t)	(p> t)	(p> t)	(p> t)
Trust: Subnational Institutions	0.051 (0.348)	-0.003 (0.938)	0.069* (0.048)	-0.021 (0.500)
Female(=1)	-0.045 (0.544)	-0.038 (0.566)	-0.095 (0.123)	0.102 (0.051)
Age in Years	0.004 (0.103)	0.001 (0.630)	0.004 (0.092)	0.001 (0.450)
Education (Baseline=Low)				
<i>Edu. Medium</i>	-0.163 (0.292)	0.174 (0.108)	-0.155 (0.267)	-0.025 (0.744)
<i>Edu. High</i>	0.141 (0.383)	0.318** (0.005)	-0.005 (0.974)	0.037 (0.579)
Income (Baseline=Low)				
<i>Inc. Medium</i>	0.175 (0.063)	-0.009 (0.906)	0.006 (0.943)	0.022 (0.743)
<i>Inc. High</i>	0.320** (0.002)	-0.005 (0.956)	0.049 (0.580)	-0.004 (0.951)
Political Interest (Baseline=Low)				
<i>Int. High</i>	0.012 (0.905)	-0.036 (0.686)	-0.052 (0.490)	-0.034 (0.644)
Local External Pol. Efficacy	0.045 (0.317)	0.084* (0.040)	-0.066 (0.066)	-0.080** (0.008)
Local Internal Pol. Efficacy	0.050 (0.317)	0.096* (0.014)	0.103** (0.005)	0.098** (0.001)
Left-Right Self-Placement	-0.106*** (0.000)	-0.070*** (0.000)	-0.053*** (0.000)	-0.050*** (0.000)
Centre City(=1)	0.110 (0.162)	0.083 (0.266)	0.057 (0.426)	0.017 (0.742)
Zurich (Baseline=Bern)	-0.090 (0.206)			
Berlin (Baseline=Stuttgart)		-0.074 (0.322)		
Lyon (Baseline=Paris)			0.187** (0.002)	
Birmingham (Baseline=London)				0.049 (0.351)
Constant	0.373 (0.093)	-0.020 (0.917)	0.216 (0.278)	0.062 (0.695)
N	876	1029	976	963
Adjusted-R ²	0.117	0.040	0.063	0.057
F-Test	9.897	4.333	6.018	5.508
p > F	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Note. Own Calculations. Models estimated with OLS-regression (-regress-) in Stata. Entries are OLS-coefficients (p-values in parentheses). Significance Levels: *<0.05 **<0.01 ***<0.001.

Table A8: OLS-Regression: Qualified Support for Inter-Municipal Resource-Sharing and Trust in Subnational Institutions by Country

	Switzerland	Germany	France	United Kingdom
	β	β	β	β
	(p> t)	(p> t)	(p> t)	(p> t)
Trust: Subnational Institutions	0.135** (0.003)	0.132*** (0.000)	0.298*** (0.000)	0.270*** (0.000)
Female(=1)	-0.118 (0.055)	-0.071 (0.205)	-0.119* (0.042)	0.010 (0.872)
Age in Years	-0.002 (0.259)	-0.010*** (0.000)	-0.004 (0.083)	-0.013*** (0.000)
Education (Baseline=Low)				
<i>Edu. Medium</i>	-0.078 (0.541)	0.131 (0.158)	-0.119 (0.362)	-0.078 (0.401)
<i>Edu. High</i>	-0.018 (0.892)	0.215* (0.027)	-0.048 (0.714)	0.008 (0.917)
Income (Baseline=Low)				
<i>Inc. Medium</i>	-0.021 (0.791)	-0.009 (0.898)	0.097 (0.201)	0.031 (0.697)
<i>Inc. High</i>	0.093 (0.287)	-0.088 (0.236)	-0.032 (0.701)	-0.101 (0.243)
Political Interest (Baseline=Low)				
<i>Int. High</i>	0.151 (0.072)	0.109 (0.158)	0.138 (0.055)	0.266** (0.003)
Local External Pol. Efficacy	0.143*** (0.000)	0.308*** (0.000)	0.254*** (0.000)	0.222*** (0.000)
Local Internal Pol. Efficacy	0.003 (0.945)	-0.044 (0.188)	-0.076* (0.028)	0.019 (0.602)
Left-Right Self-Placement	-0.098*** (0.000)	-0.025* (0.036)	-0.025** (0.008)	-0.027* (0.034)
Centre City(=1)	0.082 (0.207)	0.143* (0.025)	0.137* (0.043)	0.083 (0.187)
Zurich (Baseline=Bern)	-0.068 (0.246)			
Berlin (Baseline=Stuttgart)		0.039 (0.539)		
Lyon (Baseline=Paris)			-0.000 (0.997)	
London (Baseline=Birmingham)				-0.019 (0.759)
Constant	0.432* (0.020)	0.268 (0.100)	0.336 (0.074)	0.842*** (0.000)
N	854	1001	957	904
Adjusted-R ²	0.141	0.206	0.239	0.263
F-Test	11.815	20.899	24.064	25.803
p > F	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Note. Own Calculations. Models estimated with OLS-regression (-regress-) in Stata. Entries are OLS-coefficients (p-values in parentheses). Significance Levels: *<0.05 **<0.01 ***<0.001.

Table A9: OLS-Regression: Metropolitan Reform Index and Trust in Subnational Institutions by Country

	Switzerland	Germany	France	United Kingdom
	β	β	β	β
	(p> t)	(p> t)	(p> t)	(p> t)
Trust: Subnational Institutions	0.140** (0.002)	0.202*** (0.000)	0.328*** (0.000)	0.326*** (0.000)
Female(=1)	-0.186** (0.003)	-0.126* (0.036)	-0.121 (0.051)	0.021 (0.725)
Age in Years	-0.008*** (0.000)	-0.005* (0.011)	0.000 (0.990)	-0.010*** (0.000)
Education (Baseline=Low)				
<i>Edu. Medium</i>	-0.041 (0.764)	0.052 (0.598)	-0.156 (0.259)	0.111 (0.199)
<i>Edu. High</i>	0.087 (0.540)	0.025 (0.810)	-0.040 (0.774)	0.101 (0.179)
Income (Baseline=Low)				
<i>Inc. Medium</i>	0.117 (0.144)	0.039 (0.588)	-0.006 (0.940)	0.106 (0.152)
<i>Inc. High</i>	0.188* (0.036)	-0.042 (0.594)	-0.034 (0.703)	0.082 (0.307)
Political Interest (Baseline=Low)				
<i>Int. High</i>	0.015 (0.861)	0.095 (0.243)	0.188* (0.014)	0.012 (0.881)
Local External Pol. Efficacy	0.091* (0.019)	0.129*** (0.000)	0.085* (0.019)	0.179*** (0.000)
Local Internal Pol. Efficacy	0.030 (0.490)	0.138*** (0.000)	0.036 (0.328)	0.119*** (0.001)
Left-Right Self-Placement	-0.061*** (0.000)	0.007 (0.600)	-0.006 (0.535)	0.038** (0.002)
Centre City(=1)	0.089 (0.183)	0.191** (0.005)	0.021 (0.764)	0.067 (0.250)
Zurich (Baseline=Bern)	-0.193** (0.001)			
Stuttgart (Baseline=Berlin)		-0.154* (0.023)		
Lyon (Baseline=Paris)			0.003 (0.963)	
London (Baseline=Birmingham)				0.057 (0.333)
Constant	0.532** (0.006)	0.158 (0.360)	0.198 (0.321)	0.058 (0.740)
N	834	976	941	921
Adjusted-R ²	0.120	0.125	0.154	0.321
F-Test	9.775	11.687	14.163	34.423
p > F	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Note. Own Calculations. Models estimated with OLS-regression (-regress-) in Stata. Entries are OLS-coefficients (p-values in parentheses). Significance Levels: *<0.05 **<0.01 ***<0.001.

Table A10: OLS-Regression: Net Support for Inter-Municipal Power-Sharing and Satisfaction with Subnational Democracy by Metropolitan Area

	Bern	Zurich	Berlin	Stuttgart	Paris	Lyon	London	Birmingham
	β	β	β	β	β	β	β	β
	(p> t)	(p> t)	(p> t)	(p> t)	(p> t)	(p> t)	(p> t)	(p> t)
Satisfaction: Subnational	-0.031 (0.660)	0.017 (0.799)	-0.091 (0.082)	0.066 (0.160)	0.175*** (0.001)	0.084 (0.080)	0.015 (0.733)	-0.007 (0.868)
Democracy	-0.034 (0.739)	-0.069 (0.528)	-0.055 (0.560)	0.022 (0.801)	-0.123 (0.149)	-0.090 (0.294)	0.048 (0.519)	0.165* (0.021)
Female(=1)	0.004 (0.187)	0.004 (0.219)	0.004 (0.248)	0.001 (0.818)	0.004 (0.210)	0.001 (0.708)	0.003 (0.293)	-0.001 (0.811)
Age in Years								
Education (Baseline=Low)	0.040 (0.855)	-0.352 (0.129)	0.453** (0.006)	-0.046 (0.736)	-0.405 (0.098)	-0.017 (0.921)	0.017 (0.887)	-0.050 (0.610)
<i>Edu. Medium</i>	0.291 (0.202)	-0.031 (0.896)	0.695*** (0.000)	0.015 (0.917)	-0.210 (0.395)	0.148 (0.391)	0.188 (0.063)	-0.113 (0.196)
Income (Baseline=Low)	0.099 (0.427)	0.238 (0.090)	-0.018 (0.870)	0.020 (0.864)	-0.110 (0.309)	0.097 (0.393)	0.064 (0.526)	0.007 (0.934)
<i>Inc. Medium</i>	0.150 (0.302)	0.480** (0.002)	-0.123 (0.321)	0.203 (0.091)	-0.155 (0.224)	0.117 (0.328)	-0.047 (0.648)	0.102 (0.301)
<i>Inc. High</i>								
Political Interest (Baseline=Low)	-0.072 (0.607)	0.051 (0.714)	-0.141 (0.279)	0.135 (0.255)	0.001 (0.994)	-0.071 (0.509)	-0.077 (0.481)	-0.023 (0.810)
<i>Int. High</i>	0.074 (0.218)	0.078 (0.215)	0.184*** (0.001)	0.004 (0.946)	-0.109* (0.026)	-0.053 (0.272)	-0.050 (0.200)	-0.142*** (0.001)
Local External Pol. Efficacy	0.106 (0.142)	0.050 (0.479)	0.222*** (0.000)	-0.044 (0.398)	0.069 (0.193)	0.088 (0.079)	0.061 (0.155)	0.129** (0.004)
Local Internal Pol. Efficacy	-0.071*** (0.000)	-0.129*** (0.000)	-0.074*** (0.000)	-0.070*** (0.000)	-0.042** (0.003)	-0.058*** (0.000)	-0.044** (0.003)	-0.053*** (0.000)
Left-Right Self-Placement	0.042 (0.690)	0.184 (0.111)	0.051 (0.640)	0.110 (0.266)	0.237* (0.011)	-0.147 (0.162)	0.042 (0.588)	-0.056 (0.423)
Centre City(=1)	0.177 (0.551)	0.413 (0.206)	-0.360 (0.200)	-0.024 (0.924)	0.588 (0.062)	0.220 (0.393)	-0.089 (0.698)	0.265 (0.198)
Constant								
N	448	466	540	510	513	502	533	491
Adjusted-R ²	0.064	0.137	0.094	0.022	0.073	0.047	0.025	0.088
F-Test	3.558	7.133	5.675	1.951	4.348	3.075	2.118	4.935
p > F	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.027	0.000	0.000	0.015	0.000

Note. Own Calculations. Models estimated with OLS-regression (-regress-) in Stata. Entries are OLS-coefficients. (p-values in parentheses). Significance Levels: * < 0.05 ** < 0.01 *** < 0.001.

Table A11: OLS-Regression: Qualified Support for Inter-Municipal Resource-Sharing and Satisfaction with Subnational Democracy by Metropolitan Area

	Bern	Zurich	Berlin	Stuttgart	Paris	Lyon	London	Birmingham
	β	β	β	β	β	β	β	β
	(p> t)	(p> t)	(p> t)	(p> t)	(p> t)	(p> t)	(p> t)	(p> t)
Satisfaction: Subnational Institutions	-0.078 (0.207)	0.018 (0.733)	0.119** (0.005)	0.056 (0.192)	0.132** (0.005)	0.218*** (0.000)	0.187*** (0.000)	0.270*** (0.000)
Female(=1)	-0.214* (0.014)	-0.018 (0.838)	-0.122 (0.110)	-0.005 (0.949)	-0.155* (0.050)	-0.150 (0.078)	-0.058 (0.510)	0.114 (0.191)
Age in Years	0.002 (0.593)	-0.004 (0.155)	-0.011*** (0.000)	-0.007* (0.021)	0.002 (0.511)	-0.009** (0.004)	-0.017*** (0.000)	-0.013*** (0.000)
Education (Baseline=Low)	-0.031 (0.867)	-0.082 (0.659)	0.430** (0.001)	-0.061 (0.630)	0.442* (0.049)	-0.446** (0.007)	-0.155 (0.276)	-0.123 (0.306)
<i>Edu. Medium</i>	-0.059 (0.764)	0.025 (0.897)	0.588*** (0.000)	0.007 (0.956)	0.551* (0.015)	-0.344* (0.041)	-0.091 (0.457)	0.073 (0.493)
Income (Baseline=Low)	-0.083 (0.433)	0.058 (0.607)	-0.219* (0.013)	0.212* (0.047)	0.011 (0.914)	0.074 (0.509)	-0.112 (0.367)	0.089 (0.390)
<i>Inc. Medium</i>	0.154 (0.215)	0.114 (0.342)	-0.149 (0.141)	0.052 (0.638)	-0.167 (0.154)	0.019 (0.869)	-0.256* (0.044)	-0.102 (0.395)
<i>Inc. High</i>								
Political Interest (Baseline=Low)	0.250* (0.040)	0.109 (0.324)	0.155 (0.145)	0.107 (0.334)	0.131 (0.163)	0.323** (0.003)	0.327* (0.013)	0.307** (0.010)
<i>Int. High</i>	0.249*** (0.000)	0.124* (0.014)	0.327*** (0.000)	0.355*** (0.000)	0.299*** (0.000)	0.282*** (0.000)	0.284*** (0.000)	0.199*** (0.000)
Local External Pol. Efficacy	0.011 (0.857)	-0.024 (0.667)	-0.013 (0.785)	-0.107* (0.027)	-0.045 (0.365)	-0.148** (0.003)	0.061 (0.225)	-0.054 (0.318)
Local Internal Pol. Efficacy	-0.096*** (0.000)	-0.083*** (0.000)	-0.022 (0.176)	-0.029 (0.091)	-0.035** (0.007)	-0.031* (0.026)	-0.031 (0.069)	-0.010 (0.604)
Left-Right Self-Placement	0.119 (0.189)	0.016 (0.860)	0.016 (0.857)	0.267** (0.004)	0.005 (0.951)	0.261* (0.012)	-0.053 (0.564)	0.149 (0.081)
Centre City(=1)	0.240 (0.354)	0.355 (0.175)	0.208 (0.356)	0.139 (0.549)	-0.303 (0.298)	0.689** (0.007)	1.260*** (0.000)	0.553* (0.027)
Constant	436	452	524	494	498	498	493	468
N	0.152	0.079	0.241	0.185	0.165	0.252	0.248	0.255
Adjusted-R ²	7.521	4.204	14.843	10.336	9.211	14.979	14.500	14.294
F-Test	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
p > F								

Note. Own Calculations. Models estimated with OLS-regression (-regress-) in Stata. Entries are OLS-coefficients (p-values in parentheses). Significance Levels: * < 0.05 ** < 0.01 *** < 0.001.

Table A12: OLS-Regression: Metropolitan Reform Index and Satisfaction with Subnational Democracy by Metropolitan Area

	Bern	Zurich	Berlin	Stuttgart	Paris	Lyon	London	Birmingham
	β	β	β	β	β	β	β	β
	(p> t)	(p> t)	(p> t)	(p> t)	(p> t)	(p> t)	(p> t)	(p> t)
Satisfaction: Subnational Institutions	0.041 (0.512)	0.057 (0.313)	0.137** (0.004)	0.092* (0.041)	0.214*** (0.000)	0.191*** (0.000)	0.340*** (0.000)	0.265*** (0.000)
Female(=1)	-0.228* (0.010)	-0.201* (0.027)	-0.127 (0.140)	-0.128 (0.135)	-0.142 (0.124)	-0.167* (0.049)	0.080 (0.300)	0.007 (0.937)
Age in Years	-0.008** (0.009)	-0.007* (0.025)	0.000 (0.986)	-0.008** (0.007)	-0.005 (0.155)	0.005 (0.137)	-0.011*** (0.000)	-0.014*** (0.000)
Education (Baseline=Low)								
<i>Edu. Medium</i>	-0.024 (0.904)	-0.093 (0.644)	0.162 (0.270)	-0.039 (0.771)	-0.355* (0.046)	0.179 (0.453)	0.112 (0.374)	0.043 (0.705)
<i>Edu. High</i>	0.031 (0.878)	0.081 (0.694)	0.148 (0.339)	-0.037 (0.793)	-0.250 (0.162)	0.356 (0.139)	0.121 (0.264)	0.104 (0.310)
Income (Baseline=Low)								
<i>Inc. Medium</i>	0.080 (0.464)	0.125 (0.280)	-0.022 (0.825)	0.079 (0.478)	-0.019 (0.879)	-0.091 (0.401)	-0.113 (0.291)	0.284** (0.004)
<i>Inc. High</i>	0.186 (0.144)	0.186 (0.141)	-0.063 (0.577)	0.027 (0.813)	-0.031 (0.809)	-0.071 (0.572)	-0.045 (0.682)	0.044 (0.707)
Political Interest (Baseline=Low)								
<i>Int. High</i>	0.037 (0.772)	0.005 (0.966)	0.037 (0.758)	0.125 (0.279)	0.362** (0.002)	0.119 (0.236)	0.028 (0.809)	0.059 (0.609)
Local External Pol. Efficacy	0.100 (0.068)	0.148** (0.005)	0.203*** (0.000)	0.160** (0.002)	0.163** (0.002)	0.137** (0.005)	0.186*** (0.000)	0.223*** (0.000)
Local Internal Pol. Efficacy	-0.019 (0.766)	0.120* (0.042)	0.150** (0.003)	0.142** (0.004)	0.013 (0.810)	0.033 (0.532)	0.145** (0.001)	0.030 (0.560)
Left-Right Self-Placement	-0.067*** (0.000)	-0.061*** (0.001)	0.018 (0.320)	-0.012 (0.509)	0.017 (0.262)	-0.044** (0.002)	0.034* (0.027)	0.069*** (0.000)
Centre City(=1)	0.061 (0.512)	0.075 (0.432)	0.165 (0.090)	0.225* (0.020)	-0.069 (0.542)	0.094 (0.310)	-0.088 (0.271)	0.187* (0.022)
Constant	0.629* (0.017)	0.286 (0.306)	-0.280 (0.267)	0.406 (0.095)	0.341 (0.217)	-0.031 (0.920)	0.317 (0.182)	-0.164 (0.493)
N	424	444	505	484	481	480	503	471
Adjusted-R ²	0.076	0.107	0.112	0.086	0.142	0.118	0.329	0.332
F-Test	3.885	5.414	6.293	4.787	7.641	6.341	21.471	20.479
p > F	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Note. Own Calculations. Models estimated with OLS-regression (-regress-) in Stata. Entries are OLS-coefficients (p-values in parentheses). Significance Levels: * < 0.05 ** < 0.01 *** < 0.001.

Table A13: OLS-Regression: Net Support for Inter-Municipal Power-Sharing and Trust in Subnational Institutions by Metropolitan

Area

	Bern	Zurich	Berlin	Stuttgart	Paris	Lyon	London	Birmingham	
	β	β	β	β	β	β	β	β	
	(p> t)	(p> t)	(p> t)	(p> t)	(p> t)	(p> t)	(p> t)	(p> t)	
Trust: Subnational Institutions	-0.072 (0.360)	0.150* (0.049)	-0.062 (0.257)	0.050 (0.340)	0.114* (0.038)	0.040 (0.388)	0.030 (0.523)	-0.065 (0.125)	
Female(=1)	-0.036 (0.723)	-0.047 (0.665)	-0.071 (0.458)	-0.015 (0.869)	-0.112 (0.202)	-0.096 (0.279)	0.056 (0.454)	0.168* (0.023)	
Age in Years	0.005 (0.143)	0.004 (0.330)	0.003 (0.350)	0.000 (0.942)	0.006 (0.084)	0.002 (0.529)	0.003 (0.368)	-0.000 (0.953)	
Education (Baseline=Low)	0.097 (0.654)	-0.351 (0.120)	0.481** (0.004)	-0.058 (0.676)	-0.343 (0.163)	-0.102 (0.552)	0.015 (0.900)	-0.047 (0.640)	
<i>Edu. Medium</i>	0.348 (0.124)	0.004 (0.985)	0.699*** (0.000)	0.008 (0.956)	-0.180 (0.470)	0.056 (0.748)	0.161 (0.112)	-0.107 (0.233)	
Income (Baseline=Low)	0.124 (0.323)	0.203 (0.156)	-0.030 (0.789)	0.020 (0.866)	-0.099 (0.376)	0.125 (0.284)	0.031 (0.759)	0.007 (0.940)	
<i>Inc. Medium</i>	0.171 (0.242)	0.415** (0.007)	-0.145 (0.248)	0.179 (0.142)	-0.081 (0.530)	0.166 (0.175)	-0.058 (0.569)	0.080 (0.427)	
Political Interest (Baseline=Low)	-0.129 (0.363)	0.111 (0.437)	-0.187 (0.156)	0.130 (0.283)	-0.005 (0.963)	-0.077 (0.491)	-0.044 (0.692)	-0.055 (0.579)	
<i>Int. High</i>	0.075 (0.238)	0.033 (0.616)	0.164** (0.005)	0.016 (0.778)	-0.099 (0.061)	-0.031 (0.537)	-0.053 (0.195)	-0.125** (0.005)	
Local External Pol. Efficacy	0.093 (0.198)	0.043 (0.554)	0.218*** (0.000)	-0.024 (0.643)	0.087 (0.109)	0.103* (0.042)	0.056 (0.186)	0.150*** (0.001)	
Local Internal Pol. Efficacy	-0.078*** (0.000)	-0.137*** (0.000)	-0.068*** (0.001)	-0.070*** (0.000)	-0.046** (0.002)	-0.056*** (0.000)	-0.047** (0.002)	-0.057*** (0.000)	
Left-Right Self-Placement	0.013 (0.900)	0.179 (0.126)	0.066 (0.550)	0.101 (0.321)	0.182 (0.058)	-0.118 (0.283)	0.074 (0.332)	-0.038 (0.595)	
Centre City(=1)	0.210 (0.483)	0.444 (0.169)	-0.326 (0.255)	0.023 (0.930)	0.485 (0.130)	0.220 (0.407)	-0.073 (0.749)	0.301 (0.157)	
Constant	430	446	528	501	494	482	501	462	
N	0.068	0.157	0.082	0.019	0.061	0.045	0.024	0.112	
Adjusted-R ²	3.604	7.929	4.947	1.803	3.667	2.882	2.010	5.843	
F-Test	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.045	0.000	0.001	0.022	0.000	
p > F									

Note. Own Calculations. Models estimated with OLS-regression (-regress-) in Stata. Entries are OLS-coefficients.(p-values in parentheses). Significance Levels: * < 0.05 ** < 0.01 *** < 0.001.

Table A14: OLS-Regression: Qualified Support for Inter-Municipal Resource-Sharing and Trust in Subnational Institutions by Metropolitan Area

	Bern	Zurich	Berlin	Stuttgart	Paris	Lyon	London	Birmingham
	β	β	β	β	β	β	β	β
	(p> t)	(p> t)	(p> t)	(p> t)	(p> t)	(p> t)	(p> t)	(p> t)
Trust: Subnational Institutions	0.062 (0.367)	0.180** (0.003)	0.159*** (0.000)	0.087 (0.068)	0.283*** (0.000)	0.276*** (0.000)	0.227*** (0.000)	0.315*** (0.000)
Female(=1)	-0.228* (0.011)	-0.031 (0.721)	-0.128 (0.094)	-0.024 (0.770)	-0.148 (0.062)	-0.117 (0.177)	-0.051 (0.571)	0.078 (0.377)
Age in Years	0.001 (0.796)	-0.005 (0.093)	-0.012*** (0.000)	-0.008** (0.007)	0.001 (0.726)	-0.009** (0.006)	-0.016*** (0.000)	-0.011*** (0.001)
Education (Baseline=Low)	-0.036 (0.848)	-0.122 (0.503)	0.444*** (0.001)	-0.075 (0.557)	0.408 (0.065)	-0.382* (0.022)	-0.116 (0.426)	-0.055 (0.651)
<i>Edu. Medium</i>	-0.057 (0.772)	0.006 (0.973)	0.587*** (0.000)	-0.007 (0.957)	0.521* (0.020)	-0.363* (0.029)	-0.123 (0.330)	0.108 (0.313)
Income (Baseline=Low)	-0.051 (0.636)	0.044 (0.701)	-0.195* (0.026)	0.223* (0.037)	0.042 (0.680)	0.128 (0.264)	-0.105 (0.403)	0.151 (0.150)
<i>Inc. Medium</i>	0.165 (0.189)	0.062 (0.616)	-0.152 (0.130)	0.051 (0.647)	-0.156 (0.182)	0.087 (0.471)	-0.202 (0.112)	-0.017 (0.890)
Political Interest (Baseline=Low)	0.199 (0.109)	0.115 (0.320)	0.153 (0.144)	0.063 (0.576)	0.053 (0.578)	0.228* (0.036)	0.330* (0.015)	0.248* (0.037)
<i>Int. High</i>	0.205*** (0.000)	0.097 (0.064)	0.303*** (0.000)	0.329*** (0.000)	0.250*** (0.000)	0.269*** (0.000)	0.267*** (0.000)	0.169** (0.001)
Local External Pol. Efficacy	-0.010 (0.870)	-0.013 (0.821)	-0.003 (0.944)	-0.101* (0.035)	-0.033 (0.512)	-0.121* (0.013)	0.050 (0.339)	-0.026 (0.623)
Local Internal Pol. Efficacy	-0.110*** (0.000)	-0.089*** (0.000)	-0.019 (0.231)	-0.029 (0.096)	-0.024 (0.072)	-0.027 (0.052)	-0.039* (0.031)	-0.010 (0.601)
Left-Right Self-Placement	0.131 (0.153)	0.029 (0.760)	0.013 (0.877)	0.297** (0.002)	0.007 (0.935)	0.281** (0.008)	-0.015 (0.871)	0.162 (0.061)
Centre City(=1)	0.339 (0.195)	0.447 (0.090)	0.209 (0.355)	0.226 (0.341)	-0.242 (0.403)	0.687** (0.008)	1.224*** (0.000)	0.497 (0.050)
Constant	418	436	515	486	479	478	465	439
N	0.166	0.111	0.249	0.194	0.209	0.279	0.246	0.284
Adjusted-R ²	7.910	5.508	15.168	10.704	11.552	16.382	13.630	15.499
F-Test	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
p > F								

Note. Own Calculations. Models estimated with OLS-regression (-regress-) in Stata. Entries are OLS-coefficients. (p-values in parentheses). Significance Levels: * < 0.05 ** < 0.01 *** < 0.001.

Table A15: OLS-Regression: Metropolitan Reform Index and Trust in Subnational Institutions by Metropolitan Area

	Bern	Zurich	Berlin	Stuttgart	Paris	Lyon	London	Birmingham
	β	β	β	β	β	β	β	β
	(p> t)	(p> t)	(p> t)	(p> t)	(p> t)	(p> t)	(p> t)	(p> t)
Trust: Subnational Institutions	0.081 (0.237)	0.193** (0.002)	0.285*** (0.000)	0.119* (0.016)	0.303*** (0.000)	0.322*** (0.000)	0.424*** (0.000)	0.245*** (0.000)
Female(=1)	-0.214* (0.018)	-0.179 (0.052)	-0.133 (0.113)	-0.127 (0.142)	-0.093 (0.309)	-0.155 (0.068)	0.063 (0.427)	-0.019 (0.825)
Age in Years	-0.009** (0.004)	-0.007* (0.017)	-0.002 (0.450)	-0.009** (0.005)	-0.003 (0.392)	0.003 (0.399)	-0.010** (0.001)	-0.012*** (0.000)
Education (Baseline=Low)								
<i>Edu. Medium</i>	-0.044 (0.822)	-0.035 (0.857)	0.173 (0.227)	-0.053 (0.696)	-0.287 (0.100)	0.159 (0.504)	0.186 (0.144)	0.100 (0.399)
<i>Edu. High</i>	0.026 (0.897)	0.129 (0.525)	0.168 (0.268)	-0.063 (0.659)	-0.226 (0.196)	0.300 (0.213)	0.093 (0.396)	0.156 (0.143)
Income (Baseline=Low)								
<i>Inc. Medium</i>	0.129 (0.246)	0.091 (0.443)	0.006 (0.950)	0.068 (0.541)	0.025 (0.836)	-0.053 (0.626)	-0.066 (0.546)	0.268** (0.009)
<i>Inc. High</i>	0.245 (0.057)	0.146 (0.257)	-0.083 (0.449)	-0.004 (0.974)	0.006 (0.964)	-0.063 (0.616)	0.056 (0.611)	0.040 (0.737)
Political Interest (Baseline=Low)								
<i>Int. High</i>	0.027 (0.837)	0.001 (0.990)	0.084 (0.462)	0.114 (0.330)	0.335** (0.004)	0.068 (0.505)	0.033 (0.776)	-0.012 (0.919)
Local External Pol. Efficacy	0.072 (0.205)	0.124* (0.022)	0.112* (0.026)	0.140* (0.011)	0.106* (0.040)	0.080 (0.114)	0.126*** (0.004)	0.229*** (0.000)
Local Internal Pol. Efficacy	-0.049 (0.438)	0.103 (0.088)	0.108* (0.029)	0.163** (0.001)	0.030 (0.566)	0.032 (0.549)	0.165*** (0.000)	0.065 (0.211)
Left-Right Self-Placement	-0.070*** (0.000)	-0.062*** (0.000)	0.030 (0.094)	-0.015 (0.417)	0.024 (0.107)	-0.036* (0.012)	0.012 (0.439)	0.063*** (0.001)
Centre City(=1)	0.090 (0.336)	0.087 (0.373)	0.187* (0.048)	0.204* (0.039)	-0.094 (0.400)	0.076 (0.410)	-0.055 (0.497)	0.186* (0.029)
Constant	0.673* (0.011)	0.260 (0.351)	-0.309 (0.210)	0.459 (0.065)	0.182 (0.507)	0.054 (0.862)	0.315 (0.189)	-0.145 (0.561)
N	408	426	498	478	467	474	477	444
Adjusted-R ²	0.087	0.121	0.155	0.091	0.174	0.148	0.340	0.316
F-Test	4.233	5.890	8.587	4.998	9.165	7.842	21.414	18.077
p > F	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Note. Own Calculations. Models estimated with OLS-regression (-regress-) in Stata. Entries are OLS-coefficients (p-values in parentheses). Significance Levels: * < 0.05 ** < 0.01 *** < 0.001.