

The Local State Between Autonomy and Cooperation: A Citizens' View

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Abstract

Recent decades have seen a strengthening of local autonomy in many European states. At the same time, local government structures in underwent consolidation and restructuring. Local governments increasingly need to cooperate in order to cope with their various tasks – leading to the proliferation of intermunicipal structures and to the consolidation of local government landscapes. In this paper, we assess what citizens think about strengthening local autonomy and strengthening local cooperation. We argue that those citizens who support a strengthening of local autonomy are opposed to strengthening cooperation among local governments and vice versa. This is a function of their embeddedness in and valuation of “the local”. The more citizens are embedded in their local context and idealize “the local”, the more they support autonomous local governments, but the less they support a strengthening of cooperation between local governments. Using data from a population-based survey in eight West European metropolitan areas in France, Germany, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, we show that strong local ties, voting for traditionalist/authoritarian/nationalist parties, and living in smaller communities increases preferences for local autonomy, but not for local cooperation. The latter is preferred by citizens with weaker local ties, weak local identification, and voters of green/alternative/liberal parties. Citizens supporting both local autonomy and local cooperation are rare, putting policy-makers in a difficult position. If they want to devolve political authority to local governments, they need to square the circle to get citizens' support: strengthen local autonomy without strengthening cooperation among local governments.

1. Introduction

In recent decades, many countries have engaged in decentralizing political authority from the national level to regional tiers and to local governments (Hooghe et al. 2010; Ladner et al. 2019). Such devolution and decentralization processes require that subnational governments have the appropriate capacities to deal with these additional tasks. However, existing politico-administrative structures at the local level are not always conducive to this. Be it because some governance problems extend beyond the boundaries of existing local governments, or be it, because local governments lack the organizational capacities to deal with such problems (Denters 2005). To strengthen these problem-solving capacities, many countries promoted and conducted territorial or organizational reforms of their local government landscape. For example, the French government has devolved political authority to its regions, departements and municipalities since the 1980s. At the same time, the so-called Chevènement law from 1999 lead to the widespread introduction of multi-purpose intermunicipal cooperation structures, which take over the competences of municipalities in certain policy areas (Cole 2011). The decentralization and devolution of political authority thus often is accompanied by a transformation of local governance structures.

In this paper, we take a citizens' perspective on this nexus. We assess citizens' attitudes towards local autonomy and local cooperation. We argue that those citizens who are in favor of strong local autonomy and those who are open to local cooperation are not the same people. Rather, the mindsets associated with local autonomy and with local cooperation differ substantially. They are situated on opposite ends of an ideological divide that has become increasingly important in structuring politic conflict globally: the divide between cosmopolitans and communitarians (Kriesi et al. 2008, De Wilde et al. 2019). While local autonomy is cherished by what we might call "locally rooted communitarians", local cooperation is supported by "locally detached cosmopolitans".

We examine this argument with survey data from eight West European metropolitan areas in France, Germany, Switzerland, and the UK. In metropolitan areas, the mismatch between politico-administrative and functional structures is particularly pronounced and citizens witness the consequences of potential deficiencies in local governance structures in their everyday lives, for example in transportation or spatial planning. Therefore, we would expect that if the desire for local autonomy would coincide with the desire for local cooperation, this would most likely be the case in metropolitan areas – due to the heightened problem pressure in these contexts. If

we do not find an overlap of these attitudes here, we can be rather confident that local autonomy and local cooperation attitudes are subject to different explanations more generally.

2. Attitudes towards Local Autonomy and Local Cooperation

Subnational governance has transformed substantively since World War II. Political authority has been decentralized from the national to the regional and to the local level (Kersting 2009, Hooghe et al. 2010). At the same time, many countries have engaged in local territorial and functional reforms – such as the consolidation of the local government landscape or the proliferation of intermunicipal governance structures (Hulst & van Montfort 2007, Baldersheim & Rose 2010). These two processes are intertwined, as Van Houwelingen (2018, 198) observes:

Administrative reform and the transfer of responsibilities from the national or regional government to local governments is often accompanied or preceded by a process of municipal amalgamations.

Citizens are affected by these processes. Local governments and local administrations are the first point of contact for citizens demanding public services. In addition, local politics is commonly perceived as an important venue for political socialization (Ladner & Bühlmann 2007). That the local level matters for citizens' political behavior and attitudes is demonstrated by recent studies on the effects of local government mergers. Evidence from a variety of OECD countries suggests that citizens in merged municipalities participate less in local elections, feel less competent to understand politics, and are less satisfied with local democracy than citizens in comparable non-merged municipalities (Hansen 2015, Koch & Rochat 2017, Tavares 2018). This suggests that reforms to local governance matter for citizens' political behavior and attitudes.

Yet, we know little about citizens' perceptions of such reforms to local governance. More precisely: i.) what do citizens think about strengthening the autonomy of local governments vis-à-vis higher government tiers? ii.) what do they think about cooperation and exchange with other local governments? And most importantly: iii.) do the same citizens that support local autonomy also support local cooperation and exchange?

With respect to the first question, some studies look at the effects of local autonomy at the country level. Vetter (2007) finds a positive correlation between local autonomy and satisfaction with democracy, while Van Houwelingen (2018) finds no association between local autonomy and local political interest. The only study we could identify that looks at citizens' *preferences* for local autonomy stems from Baker et al. (2011). In a country-level analysis of European Values Study data, they find no association between local governments'

responsibilities and citizens' desire for strengthening local autonomy – even if there is substantial cross-country variation in both citizens' attitudes and in local governments' responsibilities. Citizens' attitudes towards strengthening local autonomy thus remain largely unexplored.¹

For the second question, we have some more evidence. In a recent special issue in the *Journal of Urban Affairs*, several contributions assess citizens' attitudes towards cooperation and integration of local governance functions in metropolitan areas. These studies focus on metropolitan areas in different OECD countries. They show that residents in the center city of a metropolitan area, those with stronger attachment to the city-region, those interested in local politics, more educated individuals and tenants are more supportive of local cooperation and integration (Eklund 2018, Kübler 2018, Owens & Sumner 2018, Vallbé 2018). With respect to the role of gender, local residence duration, and left-right ideology, the findings are more mixed and seem to differ across countries. In addition to the contributions from this special issue, some earlier studies on local cooperation attitudes in the US (Gerston & Haas 1993, Wassmer & Lascher 2006, Mohamed 2008) as well as a more recent contribution on local governance perceptions in a Swiss metropolitan area exist (Wicki et al. 2019). These studies emphasize the importance of socio-demographic characteristics (age and education), of left-right ideology, and of local ties (homeownership, residence duration, and commuting) for citizens' support for local cooperation and regional integration. In sum, these contributions highlight the role of socio-demographic, attitudinal, place-based, and contextual characteristics for citizens' attitudes towards local cooperation.

We assess whether the characteristics identified by these studies are also relevant for citizens' attitudes towards local autonomy. However, we argue that they do not play out in the same way as they do for attitudes towards local cooperation – rather to the contrary: while devolving political authority often goes together with integrative reforms of local governance structures, we expect that citizens either prefer one or the other. Our contention is that citizens' attitudes towards local autonomy and towards local cooperation hinges on their insertion in a local context, their valuation of that local context and “the local” more generally, as well as on the

¹ In part, this is due to the lack of appropriate questions in large international surveys. While a number of these surveys include questions on local attachment, almost none include questions on citizens' preferences and perceptions of political authority distribution across levels of government. Exceptions are one Eurobarometer and on European Values Study wave. The Eurobarometer 70.1 (2008) includes questions on the influence of different scales of government on the personal life, citizens' perceptions of interest consideration of different government levels at the European level, and regional/local MPs suitedness to represent citizens at the EU level. It is notable that this survey does not allow to distinguish between regional and local levels. The European Values Study (1999) includes a question on whether respondents think that giving more power to local authorities would be a good or a bad thing. Cross-national differences on these questions are illustrated in Figure B.1 in Appendix B.

local context itself. In what follows, we argue that a stronger insertion in a local context, a stronger “valuation” of that context and “the local” more generally, and living in a more intimate and peripheral local context increases support for strengthening local autonomy but decreases support for local cooperation. We present four hypotheses that further detail this assumption.

The first hypothesis revolves around individuals’ local ties. Local ties refer to individuals’ various connections with a local community – for example their residence tenure, or their involvement in local associations. Ladner & Bühlmann (2007) argue that local ties are crucial for a person’s social integration in a local community. Persons with strong local ties tend to be more integrated in a municipality and hence attribute more value to the local community than persons with weak local ties. The strength of citizens’ local ties and their integration in a local community might in turn affect their attitudes towards local autonomy and local cooperation. We expect that citizens with strong local ties are more supportive of local autonomy, but less supportive of local cooperation.

H_{1a}: The stronger citizens’ local ties, the more they support local autonomy.

H_{1b}: The stronger citizens’ local ties, the less they support local cooperation.

The rationale behind this is that local autonomy raises the importance of the local community to which individuals’ with strong local ties are attached. By contrast, local cooperation means that political authority has to be shared with other communities than the one these individuals have established strong local ties with. As a consequence, they view local cooperation more critically. Existing research supports the latter argument: Owens and Sumner (2018) show that homeowners and persons with longer local residence tenure are less supportive of sharing local tax revenues with other local governments in their region than tenants and persons with short residence tenure.

The second hypothesis concerns individuals’ attachment to their local community. Local attachment is an important explanatory variable for political attitudes and behavior. Collignon and Sajuria (2018) show that persons with strong local identities attribute more importance to the local rootedness of political candidates and they are more likely to vote for local independent candidates (Otjes 2018). Moreover, in a recent book, Fitzgerald (2018) shows that individuals with stronger local attachment are more supportive of radical right parties, because the latter appeal to “localist” individuals by emphasizing the value of traditional local communities and rejecting bigger and more diverse political communities. Finally, in a review article on place attachment, Lewicka (2011) reports that people with stronger local attachment are more likely to exhibit NIMBY behavior if their local community might be adversely

affected by spatial planning decisions. We argue that individuals' local attachment is also linked to their attitudes towards local autonomy and local cooperation. We expect that the more locally attached – like those with strong local ties – are more supportive of local autonomy and more skeptical of local cooperation. Increasing local autonomy means attributing more importance to the local level, which locally attached people strongly care about. At the same time, local cooperation means sharing local political authority, which diminishes the independent political control of a local community over its resources and policies.

H_{2a}: The more citizens are attached to their local government, the more they support local autonomy.

H_{2b}: The more citizens are attached to their local government, the less they support local cooperation.

In his study on attitudes towards metropolitan governance in two Swedish city-regions, Eklund (2018) provides evidence for the second hypothesis. He shows that those who feel mostly at home in their municipality support the status quo and are more critical of metropolitan reform. Our third hypothesis concerns citizens' political orientations. Both local autonomy and local cooperation are issues that concern the allocation of political authority both vertically and horizontally. In recent decades, this issue has been predominantly politicized at the international level along the GAL-TAN conflict (Hooghe et al. 2002). Supporters of green/alternative/liberal (GAL) parties have a cosmopolitan orientation and support the reallocation of political authority from national to supranational institutions, while supporters of traditionalist/authoritarian/nationalist (TAN) parties have a communitarian orientation and are opposed to this authority transfer (Kriesi et al. 2008, De Wilde et al. 2019). Recently, scholars have shown that the allocation of political authority at the subnational level might mobilize voters along the same conflict. Both Rösel and Sonnenberg (2016) and Fitzgerald (2018) show that radical right parties, which to a large extent overlap with TAN parties, are particularly successful when they can mobilize protest votes after a reallocation of political authority from local to intermunicipal levels. In a similar vein, Strebel (2019) shows that the local share of TAN party voters is negatively correlated with the success of municipal merger projects in local popular votes. These findings suggest that the GAL-TAN divide is also relevant for attitudes towards local autonomy and local cooperation. Like stated above, Fitzgerald (2018) shows that voters of radical right or TAN parties have a greater affinity and emotional attachment to “the local”. In line with the findings from these studies, we assume that TAN party voters support local autonomy – because this means allocating authority to more immediate communities –

whereas they oppose local cooperation, given that this means sharing authority with other communities.

H_{3a}: Voters of TAN parties, are more supportive of local autonomy.

H_{3b}: Voters of TAN parties, are less supportive of local cooperation.

Finally, we argue that local context characteristics matter for citizens' attitudes towards local autonomy and local cooperation. We assume that citizens living in smaller and more peripheral municipalities are more supportive of local autonomy and less supportive of local cooperation. Generally, smaller municipalities have a more vibrant local life than bigger ones and residents in these municipalities might thus want to take more political decisions in their intimate local community (Denters et al. 2014). Similarly, residents of more peripheral municipalities might feel that their local government has too little authority to take political decisions and hence support more local autonomy. In line with the results from studies on citizens' attitudes towards metropolitan governance, we expect that residents from more peripheral (and smaller) municipalities are more skeptical of local cooperation – because they fear that their voice would not count much anymore in the interplay with larger and more central municipalities (Eklund 2018, Kübler 2018, Owens & Sumner 2018, Vallbé 2018).

H_{4a}: Citizens of smaller and more peripheral local governments, are more supportive of local autonomy.

H_{4b}: Citizens of smaller and more peripheral local governments, are less supportive of local cooperation.

3. Research Design

3.1 Case Selection and Data

For the empirical test of our hypotheses, we use data from the “Democratic Governance and Citizenship Regional Survey” (NCCR Democracy 2016). The survey's aim was to gauge citizens' perceptions of democratic legitimacy beyond the state in eight West European metropolitan areas in France, Germany, Switzerland and the United Kingdom (Strebel et al. 2019).² The four countries and the eight metropolitan areas represent a diverse set of cases. We have selected two federal and two unitary countries with different levels of local autonomy as measured by the Local Autonomy Index (Ladner et al. 2019). The metropolitan areas were selected based on their metropolitan governance structure – i.e. whether they have a

² Detailed information on the sampling procedure can be found in Appendix A.

metropolitan government-like institution or not (Lefèvre 1998). In addition, for each country, we have selected the capital city and another major metropolitan area. The sample was stratified in order to reflect the population distribution between the center city and the suburbs of the metropolitan area.³ This diverse case selection allows us to test our hypotheses across a variety of different contexts.

Table 1: Case Selection and Data

Country	LAI-Score	Metro. Area	Metro. Gov.	Capital	Population (2012)	Survey-Respondents		
						Cent.	Surr.	Total
CH	29.57	Bern	Yes	Yes	360,127	193 (35%)	366 (65%)	559 (100%)
		Zurich	No	No	1,217,751	188 (31%)	419 (69%)	607 (100%)
DE	27.24	Berlin	No	Yes	4,951,687	494 (76%)	158 (24%)	652 (100%)
		Stuttgart	Yes	No	2,647,134	153 (25%)	453 (75%)	606 (100%)
FR	25.64	Paris	No	Yes	11,800,687	119 (19%)	522 (81%)	641 (100%)
		Lyon	Yes	No	1,934,717	194 (29%)	473 (71%)	667 (100%)
UK	17.39	London	Yes	Yes	12,208,100	226 (34%)	440 (66%)	666 (100%)
		Birmingham	No	No	2,873,800	349 (53%)	305 (47%)	654 (100%)
Total						1,916 (38%)	3,136 (62%)	5,052 (100%)

Note. LAI-Score=Local Autonomy Index-Score (2010) by Ladner et al. (2015) (Range: 0-37), Metro. Gov.=Metropolitan Government, Cent.=Residents in center city, Surr.=Residents in surrounding area.

3.2 Operationalization

To operationalize local autonomy and local cooperation, the two dependent variables in our study, we rely on six items from the survey. The three items to operationalize citizens' attitudes towards local autonomy stem from a question asking respondents to give their opinion on whether a.) things would work better if local or if national governments would take important decisions, b.) local or national politicians know better what citizens want, and c.) local or national governments should determine taxes. The respondents could place themselves on a scale ranging from 0 (high local autonomy) to 10 (low local autonomy). These three items tap into important dimensions of local autonomy, such as local decision-making authority, local

³ To identify the geographical scope of a metropolitan area, we used the functional urban area definition by Eurostat (2013).

representation, and fiscal autonomy (see Ladner et al. 2019). We recode the three items so that low values mean preference for low and high values preference for high local autonomy.

We equally rely on three items to measure citizens’ attitudes towards cooperation and exchange with other local governments. Citizens were asked whether they think that a.) their local officials should take the interests of other municipalities in the same region into account before making decisions, b.) local governments should help local governments in the same region facing financial difficulties with equalization payments and c.) intermunicipal cooperation is a good way to deal with governance problems in metropolitan areas. Again, these three items capture crucial dimensions of local cooperation such as interest negotiation, fiscal equalization, and joint problem-solving (see e.g. Hulst & van Montfort 2007, Sellers et al. 2017).⁴

Figure 1: Mean of Items Across Eight Metropolitan Areas




Figure 1 shows the mean values for the six items across the different metropolitan areas. While we can see that the extent of agreement differs across metropolitan areas, we can also see that the rank order of the six items is surprisingly similar. With respect to local autonomy, we can see that in (almost) all eight metropolitan areas, respondents agree most that local representatives are better suited to represent citizens interest, closely followed by the statement that things would work better if more decisions were taken locally. The statement that local governments should be able to determine their own tax rates receives the least support across all metropolitan areas. With respect to local cooperation, we can see an interesting difference between the two federal and the two unitary countries. Intermunicipal cooperation as a way of dealing with metropolitan governance problems is the item that is most positively evaluated in the two federal countries, followed by the consideration of other local governments’ interests

⁴ The detailed question wording for the six items can be found in Table B.1 in Appendix B.

whereas it is the opposite in the two unitary countries. In all eight metropolitan areas, equalization payments as a form of local cooperation and equity receive the least support.

To test whether the six items indeed form two dimensions, we conduct an exploratory factor analysis. Table 2 shows that the six items form two distinct factors with which the respective items are strongly associated. This suggests that we are indeed dealing with two distinct concepts which are meaningful for citizens in the eight metropolitan areas.⁵

Table 2: Exploratory Factor Analysis of Autonomy and Cooperation

	Local Autonomy	Local Cooperation
Intermunicipal Decisions: Other Interests	.04	.79
Intermunicipal Resources: Sharing	-.12	.71
Intermunicipal Cooperation	.09	.76
Local vs. Central Decisions	.89	.01
Local vs. Central Interest Representation	.89	.03
Local vs. Central Tax Collection	.65	-.05
Eigenvalues	2.26	1.47
Variance (%)	34.9	29.7

Note. Exploratory factor analysis with oblique promax rotation in Stata (-factor, pcf- oblique, promax-); N=3,982.

To operationalize the four independent variables – local ties, local identity, GAL-TAN party identification, and local political control – we use a variety of different items. Local ties are operationalized by respondents’ duration of residence in their municipality, whether they own their house or apartment, whether they commute to other municipalities in the metropolitan area for professional or leisure activities, and whether they are a member of a local or a non-local association. The rationale is that respondents with a longer residence tenure, those that own property, those that commute less frequently, and members of a local association exhibit stronger ties to their local community (see Ladner & Bühlmann 2007, Fitzgerald 2018, Kübler 2018). The strength of local attachment is operationalized via a question that asks respondents to indicate their level of attachment to different territorial scales – from local to global. Their answers are used to construct a rank-ordered indicator of local attachment. Higher levels indicate that individuals feel more attached to the local as opposed to other territorial scales. To operationalize respondents’ preferences for GAL or TAN parties, we code whether respondents

⁵ A concern of comparative research is equivalence, i.e. whether certain items measure the same thing across different contexts (Van Deth 1998). To assess whether we find the same item-factor structure across all eight metropolitan areas, we conduct separate factor analysis for the individual metropolitan areas. Table C.1 in Appendix C shows that the six items load on the same two factors in all eight metropolitan areas.

feel close to no party, another party, a TAN party, or a GAL party.⁶ Finally, to operationalize the extent to which a municipality could exert political control in metropolitan governance, we use a municipality's population size and its location in the metropolitan area. The rationale is that small and suburban municipalities could exert less political control in a more politically integrated metropolitan area.⁷

In our analysis, we control for socio-demographic characteristics (age, gender, education, and income) as well as for the local median income and the local unemployment rate.⁸

3.3 Estimation

Due to the hierarchical nature of our data – respondents nested in municipalities and in metropolitan areas – we use linear multilevel regression models with random intercepts (Hox 2010). Respondents constitute the lower level in our analysis, whereas municipalities constitute the higher level. Due to the limited number of metropolitan areas, we cannot incorporate a third level in our multilevel model. Therefore, we include metropolitan-area fixed effects to account for variation in the dependent variables across metropolitan areas.⁹

⁶ GAL and TAN parties were coded based on the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Polk et al. 2017).

⁷ Question wordings for the various items can be found in Table B.1 in Appendix B.

⁸ Descriptive statistics for all variables can be found in Table C.2 in Appendix C.

⁹ Random effects ANOVA with municipalities, metropolitan areas, or countries as level-2 show that variation (intra-class correlation) in the dependent variable exists mostly at the level of the municipality, and less so at the level of the metropolitan area or the country (see Table C.3 in Appendix C). This suggests that two respondents living in the same municipality are more similar to one another than two respondents from different municipalities, but that differences between respondents from different metropolitan areas and countries are not much more pronounced than differences between respondents from the same metropolitan area or country.

4. Local Autonomy versus Local Cooperation

The four hypotheses formulated in section 2 postulate that citizens with stronger local ties, stronger local identification, a preference for TAN parties, and residing in small and peripheral municipalities favor local autonomy and oppose local cooperation.

Figure 2: Local Ties




Figure 2 shows the results for hypothesis H_{1a} and H_{1b}. Contrary to our expectations, residents with very short residence tenure are more supportive of local autonomy and less supportive of local cooperation than long term residents (>20 years). At the same time, those who lived their whole life in the same municipality are less supportive of local cooperation than those with more than 20 years residence tenure, which is in line with our expectation. For residents with short to medium residence tenure, we do not find significant differences in their support for local autonomy or local cooperation compared to those with more than 20 years tenure. Contrary to our expectation, however, homeowners are less and not more supportive of local autonomy than tenants, but they do not differ from tenants in their attitudes towards local cooperation. In line with our expectations, we find that frequent commuters are less supportive of local autonomy and more supportive of local cooperation. This suggests that their multi-local experiences indeed have a certain impact on their governance attitudes. Finally, members of local associations are not more supportive of local autonomy than non-members. However, respondents that are members of associations in a *different* municipality are much less

supportive of local autonomy – again suggesting that their multi-local experience makes them more skeptical of increasing competences of individual municipalities. With respect to local cooperation we find that association members – both of local and of non-local associations – are more supportive of local cooperation. This might be the case, because associational membership is associated with higher social capital (Ladner & Bühlmann 2007) and because these respondents likely have made positive experiences with cooperation in their associations, which they extrapolate to cooperation between municipalities. In sum, evidence for the hypotheses on local ties is mixed.

Figure 3: Local Identity, GAL-TAN, and Political Control




Figure 3 shows the results for the remaining hypotheses. We do not find that citizens with stronger local attachment are more supportive of local autonomy and thus have to reject H_{2a}. However, individuals with stronger local attachment are indeed less supportive of local cooperation – corroborating hypothesis H_{2b}.

For the third set of hypotheses, interesting patterns emerge. First, we find that TAN supporters are indeed more fond of local autonomy and more opposed to local cooperation than supporters of no particular party, lending support to both hypotheses H_{3a} and H_{3b}. The opposite pattern can be found for supporters of “other parties”, which includes both major center-left and center-right parties. These people are more opposed to local autonomy and more supportive of local cooperation than respondents with no particular party affiliation. They can thus be regarded as

the “antipodes” of the TAN supporters concerning questions of local governance reforms. The most interesting result emerges for GAL supporters, however. Like TAN supporters, they are supportive of the idea of stronger local autonomy, but unlike TAN supporters, they are also more supportive of local cooperation. While the latter finding is not surprising, the former is – at first sight. Yet, it might be explained by the fact that green and alternative parties traditionally have called for decentralizing political power to local communities alongside with demands for more direct citizen participation than is offered by most representative democratic systems (Frankland et al. 2008). Ultimately, GAL supporters seem to constitute the group of voters who would support the decentralization of political power to local communities – even if this is accompanied by more integrated and consolidated local government structures, like this is often the case with decentralization reforms (Van Houwelingen 2018).

The last set of hypotheses concerns the local context within which citizens reside. In line with hypothesis H_{4a}, residents of smaller municipalities are more supportive of local autonomy. At the same time, and against H_{4a}, residents of center cities also tend to be more supportive of local autonomy. Attitudes towards local cooperation do not differ across small and large or across central and peripheral municipalities, which means that hypothesis H_{4b} has to be rejected.

Overall, these results corroborate the idea that many citizens indeed have differentiated – or rather opposed – views on local autonomy and local cooperation (Table 3). TAN party supporters and residents of small municipalities are more, and commuters as well as members in non-local associations are less supportive of local autonomy. Local cooperation is opposed by those with strong local attachment and by TAN party supporters, whereas it is supported by commuters and association members.¹⁰

¹⁰ With respect to the alternative explanations – socio-demographic variables as well as additional local context indicators – we find that younger persons are less supportive of strengthening local autonomy than middle-aged individuals (for full regression models, see Table C.4 in Appendix C). Moreover, we find intercept differences across metropolitan areas: French respondents are generally more supportive of strengthening local autonomy than Swiss or German respondents, a pattern already evident in Figure 1 – particularly when it comes to local tax autonomy. When we include institutional differences across metropolitan areas in the regression models, we do not find differences between metropolitan areas with or without a metropolitan government-like structure, nor between municipalities that are and are not part of the jurisdiction of a metropolitan government. Moreover, the fragmentation of a metropolitan area – expressed through a Herfindahl measure of population concentration in municipalities – is also not linked to attitudes towards local autonomy and local cooperation (see Figure C.1 in Appendix C).

Table 3: Summary of Main Results

Hypothesis	Indicator	Local Autonomy			Local Cooperation		
		Expectation	Result		Expectation	Result	
Local Ties	Residence Duration	H _{1a}	+	=	H _{1b}	--	(--)
	Homeowner	H _{1a}	+	--	H _{1b}	--	=
	Commuting	H _{1a}	--	--	H _{1b}	+	+
Local Identity	Local Member	H _{1a}	+	=	H _{1b}	--	+
	Local Attachment	H _{2a}	+	=	H _{2b}	--	--
GAL-TAN	TAN party vote	H _{3a}	+	+	H _{3b}	--	--
Political	Size	H _{4a}	--	--	H _{4b}	+	=
Control	Center	H _{4a}	--	(+)	H _{4b}	+	=

5. Conclusion

In this paper we have assessed citizens' attitudes towards strengthening local autonomy and local cooperation in eight West European metropolitan areas. We assumed that those citizens who support the strengthening of local autonomy are rather opposed to strengthening local cooperation. We have argued that this is the case, because those citizens who are supportive of local autonomy could be called "locally rooted communitarians", whereas those who are supportive of local cooperation are "locally detached cosmopolitans".

The empirical analysis of respondents from French, German, Swiss, and British metropolitan areas suggests that citizens' attitudes towards local autonomy and towards local cooperation indeed constitute two separate latent dimensions that are captured by distinct items. More importantly, we show that those individuals who support strengthening local autonomy are not the same as those who support strengthening local cooperation. The former tend to have stronger local ties, they do not support established center-right or center-left parties, but TAN (and also GAL) parties, and they live in smaller municipalities. By contrast, those who support local cooperation are more mobile, they are less attached to their local community, and they support established and GAL parties, but not TAN parties. Overall, these findings support our main argument.

One finding requires further attention, namely the fact that GAL party supporters favor both the strengthening of local autonomy and local cooperation. They thus seem to be the one group which would support national governments' policies to simultaneously devolve political authority to local governments, while at the same time engaging in a restructuring of the local government landscape with the aim to render it more integrated. However, this networked "grass-roots" idea of political authority (Frankland et al. 2008) does not seem to appeal to supporters from other parties. For policy-makers, this means that they face a

difficult task: if they want to decentralize political decision-making to local governments, they have to do so without transforming local government landscapes in order not to face criticism and increase dissatisfaction among a substantial part of the population. Ultimately, attitudes towards the integration and consolidation of the local government landscape seem to follow similar patterns as attitudes towards demarcation and integration at the supranational level: liberal cosmopolitans favor integration while conservative communitarians favor demarcation (Kriesi et al. 2008, De Wilde et al. 2019, Strebel 2019).

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Appendices

Appendix A – The survey and sampling strategy

The aim of the survey was to interview a sample of roughly 600 respondents that are representative of the general population in each of the eight metropolitan areas. Due to administrative circumstances, we had to rely on two different recruitment strategies in the four countries.

In Switzerland, a random sample of 2257 valid individual addresses of the resident population (aged 18 to 75) in the Bern and Zurich metropolitan areas could be drawn by the Swiss Statistical Office. For the field phase we relied on the Swiss Survey Institute MIS Trend. Invitation letters to fill in an online questionnaire were sent to all these individuals, together with an unconditional incentive of 10 Swiss Francs (~10.12 US\$). A first reminder was sent two weeks after the initial letter, a second reminder was sent after one month to those individuals who had not replied by then. The second reminder included a paper version of the questionnaire and a prepaid return envelope. Individual identifiers were used for each potential respondent in order to exclude multiple responses to the survey. All in all, 1162 respondents filled in the questionnaire, either online (n=936) or on paper (n=226). The response rate (calculated on the valid addresses) is 52 percent. The field phase of the survey in Switzerland lasted from mid-September 2015 to early January 2016.

In the remaining three countries, respondents were recruited from online-access panels and a quota-sampling strategy was applied to mirror the distribution of core features of the basic population (i.e. residence in the center city or the surrounding area, gender, age, employment status and education level). In these three countries, the survey was fielded by the international survey institute TNS Infratest. The field phase lasted from beginning of October to end of November. In this period between 606 and 667 complete interviews were conducted in each metropolitan area. Respondents were incentivized through coupons by the panel providers. Due to the quota sampling procedure used in Germany, France and the UK, response rates for these countries are not available, as the sample composition (i.e. the contacted people) changes in the course of the field phase to meet the quotas.

Table A.1 presents an overview of the composition of the eight metropolitan samples and their representativeness of the respective metropolitan population before and after weighting based on the aforementioned indicators. The biggest differences between the samples and the target populations are present for education level. Highly educated individuals are over- and less educated individuals under-represented in all eight metropolitan samples. While this non-

response pattern constitutes a problem, it is a common issue in population-based surveys that can be countered to a certain extent with the assignment of weights. The weights are calculated based on the indicators shown in Table A.1 with the `-ipfweight-` package in Stata. The largest weights are constrained to not exceed 5 and the lowest weights are constrained to be greater or equal to 0.2.

Table A.1 Sample-population comparison for selected indicators


	Bern					Zurich					Berlin					Stuttgart				
	U	W	P	$\Delta 1$	$\Delta 2$	U	W	P	$\Delta 1$	$\Delta 2$	U	W	P	$\Delta 1$	$\Delta 2$	U	W	P	$\Delta 1$	$\Delta 2$
Female	47.5	51	51	3.5	0.1	43.9	49.8	49.8	5.9	0	48.9	49.9	49.9	1	0	48.3	49.9	49.9	1.6	0
Age Cohorts																				
<25	7.9	10.1	10.1	2.2	0	7.5	10	9.7	2.2	-0.3	7.6	9.8	9.8	2.2	0	9.8	10.6	10.6	0.8	0
25-34	16.1	19	19	2.9	0	16.2	20.2	20.6	4.4	0.4	23.2	18.6	18.7	-4.5	0.1	19.8	17	17	-2.8	0
35-44	21.8	19.3	19.3	-2.5	0	19.5	21.2	21.6	2.1	0.4	20.7	17.9	17.9	-2.8	0	21.4	19.5	19.5	-1.9	0
45-54	19.4	20.2	20.2	0.8	-0.1	26	19.6	20.2	-5.9	0.5	19.3	21.7	21.7	2.4	0	20.2	21.6	21.5	1.3	-0.1
55-64	19.4	17	17	-2.4	0	15.5	14.8	15.1	-0.4	0.3	19.7	16.1	16.1	-3.6	0	18.6	15.7	15.7	-2.9	0
>65	15.1	14.4	14.4	-0.7	0	15	14.2	12.8	-2.2	-1.4	9.4	15.9	15.9	6.5	0	10	15.6	15.6	5.6	0
Education																				
Low	7.4	13.3	13.5	6.1	0.2	7.3	15.1	15	7.7	-0.1	10.5	12.8	12.8	2.3	0	14.4	15.8	15.8	1.4	0
Medium	46.5	47	47.1	0.6	0.1	48.4	44.6	44.1	-4.3	-0.5	55.7	52.2	52.2	-3.5	0	50.1	51.7	51.7	1.6	0
High	45.9	39.7	39.5	-6.4	-0.2	44.2	40.3	40.9	-3.3	0.6	33.6	35	35	1.4	0	35.4	32.5	32.5	-2.9	0
Employed	74.2	72.6	72.6	-1.6	0	79.6	73.1	72.7	-6.9	-0.4	68.9	56	56	-12.9	0	70	68	68	-2.0	0
Center	34.1	35.4	35.9	1.8	0.5	29.2	30.3	31.8	2.6	1.5	76	68.4	69	-7.0	0.6	25.1	23.4	23	-2.1	-0.4
	Paris					Lyon					London					Birmingham				
	U	W	P	$\Delta 1$	$\Delta 2$	U	W	P	$\Delta 1$	$\Delta 2$	U	W	P	$\Delta 1$	$\Delta 2$	U	W	P	$\Delta 1$	$\Delta 2$
Female	46.5	51.8	51.5	5	-0.3	52.6	51.5	51.4	-1.2	-0.1	53.9	50.6	50.6	-3.3	0	52.6	51.6	50.7	-1.9	-0.9
Age Cohorts																				
<25	7.1	13.4	13.2	6.1	-0.2	10.9	15.7	15.1	4.2	-0.6	4.9	12.7	12.6	7.7	-0.1	5.5	12.8	13.6	8.1	0.8
25-34	20.7	21	21.2	0.5	0.2	22	19.6	19.8	-2.2	0.2	20.4	24.3	24.2	3.8	-0.1	18.7	18.9	18.9	0.2	0
35-44	21.6	20.7	20.8	-0.8	0.1	23.2	19.6	19.8	-3.4	0.2	21.9	21	21.1	-0.8	0.1	23.1	19.2	19.3	-3.8	0.1
45-54	20.8	18.8	18.9	-1.9	0.1	20.8	18	18.2	-2.6	0.2	20	18.4	18.3	-1.7	-0.1	20.8	18.9	19	-1.8	0.1
55-64	16.9	15.6	15.9	-1.0	0.3	11.7	15.6	15.7	4	0.1	19.4	13.3	13.3	-6.1	0	20.3	15.4	15.5	-4.8	0.1
>65	12.8	10.5	10	-2.8	-0.5	11.2	11.4	11.4	0.2	0	13.2	10.4	10.4	-2.8	0	11.4	15	13.6	2.2	-1.4
Education																				
Low	9	19.4	19.3	10.3	-0.1	4.2	17.5	17.5	13.3	0	23.2	28	28	4.8	0	33	40.5	40.5	7.5	0
Medium	33.1	38.1	38.3	5.2	0.2	37.3	42.9	42.9	5.6	0	17.7	26.3	26.3	8.6	0	23.8	31.1	31.2	7.4	0.1
High	57.9	42.4	42.4	-15.5	0	58.5	39.5	39.5	-19.0	0	58.9	45.7	45.7	-13.2	0	43.1	28.3	28.3	-14.8	0
Employed	69.3	65.3	65	-4.8	-0.3	68.6	63.8	63.8	-4.8	0	66.7	67.3	68	1.3	0	63.5	57.7	57	-6.5	-0.7
Center	18.8	20.1	20	1.2	-0.1	28.8	28	29	0.2	1	33.7	24.2	24.2	-9.5	0	52.2	41.6	42	-10.2	-0.6

Note. Cell entries are percentages; U=Sample unweighted, W= Sample weighted, P=Population, $\Delta 1$ =Difference population-sample unweighted, $\Delta 2$ =Difference population-sample weighted; *Italics*=Difference population-sample unweighted > 5 %-points.

Appendix B – International Surveys & Question Wording


Figure B.1: Questions on Multilevel Relations/Devolution in International Surveys

a. EVS (1999): Devolving Power




Data Source: European Values Study 1999, Question 57H

b. EB 70.1 (2008): Impact on Life




Data Source: Eurobarometer 70.1 (2008), Question QH1

c. EB 70.1 (2008): Regional/Local Interests



Data Source: Eurobarometer 70.1 (2008), Question QH2

d. EB 70.1 (2008): Representation in EU



Data Source: Eurobarometer 70.1 (2008), Question QH3

Table B.1: Question Wording

	Variable	Question Wording
<i>Local Cooperation</i>	Local Decisions: Other Interests	Please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements [0=strongly disagree - 10=strongly agree] - When making decisions, local politicians should take into account the interests of other localities in the [X] region.
	Local Resources: Sharing	- When a locality in the [X] region is facing financial difficulties, it should be supported by the other localities via equalization payments.
	Intermunicipal Cooperation	In the [X] region, there are problems in certain realms that go beyond the boundaries of a single local authority. There are several options to deal with these problems. Please indicate to what extent you would support the following possible solutions. [0=strongly disagree - 10=strongly agree] - the cooperation of several local authorities in the corresponding problem areas
<i>Local Autonomy</i>	Local vs. Central Decisions	Some say that things would work better, if more domestic political decisions would be taken at the local level, whereas others say that it would be better, if more domestic political decisions would be taken at the national level. What is your stance on this? Please situate yourself with respect to the following statements on the scale below. a. Things would work better, if more decisions would be taken by local politicians (0) VS Things would work better, if more decisions would be taken by politicians on the national level (10)
	Local vs. Central Representation	b. Local politicians know better what I expect from politics (0) VS Politicians on the national level know better what I expect from politics (10)
	Local vs. Central Tax Collection	c. Local authorities should be able to determine their level of taxation (0) VS Taxes should be the same in the whole country and be determined by the national government (10)
<i>Hi: Local Ties</i>	Residence Duration	How long have you been living in your locality? 1. Recently moved, less than 1 year 2. 1-3 years 3. 4-10 years 4. 11-20 years 5. More than 20 years 6. Have always lived here, apart from short stays (less than 1 year) elsewhere
	Homeownership	Homeownership Are you a tenant or are you the owner of your apartment/house? 1 Tenant 2 Owner
	Commuting Frequency	[Suburb-City:] Please indicate how often you engage in the following activities in the city of [CITYNAME] ... [City-Suburb/Suburb-Suburb:] Please indicate how often you engage in the same activities outside the city of [CITYNAME], meaning in other localities in the

Table B.1: Question Wording

Variable	Question Wording
Association Membership	<p>[CITYNAME] region [FILTER: (apart from your own locality)] ... [FILTER: Only people in the surrounding area]</p> <p>a. Shopping b. Leisure activities (sports, cinema, theater, restaurants, etc.) c. Club/Associational activities (social or political engagement, etc.) b. Visiting friends and family e. Working</p> <p>[1=daily, 2=several times a week, 3=once a week, 4=once a month, 5=less than once a month, 6=never; 88=DK]</p> <p>There are several ways to get involved outside of work and family, e.g., in a club or organisation. Can you please indicate each organisation of which you are an active member. By "active" we mean that you regularly participate in events, meetings, etc. of the respective organisation. [1=Yes, 2=No]</p> <p>a. sports group/club b. a church or religious/spiritual group c. a social / charitable or non-profit institution (e.g., Red Cross, Oxfam) d. an interest group (e.g., professional association, trade union, consumer protection group) e. an environmental or a human rights organization f. a political party g. a game / hobby / leisure club h. another not mentioned organisation</p>
<i>H₂: Local Identity</i>	<p>Rank Attachment Local</p> <p>How attached do you feel to... [0=not at all - 10=very strong]</p> <p>A. the neighbourhood in which you live? B. the local authority area in which you live? C. the [X] region? D. the [country] as a whole? E. Europe? F. the world, humanity as a whole?</p>
<i>H₃: GAL-TAN</i>	<p>GAL-TAN</p> <p>Do you generally think of yourself as a supporter of a political party or is there some party that you feel closer to than the others?</p> <p>a. Yes b. No</p> <p>If a.: Which party is that? [no party=0, other party=1, TAN party=1, GAL party=2]</p>

Appendix C – Additional Tables and Figure

Figure C.1: Metropolitan Governance Structures and Country Differences




Table C.1 Exploratory Factor Analysis for Eight Metropolitan Areas

	Bern		Zurich		Berlin		Stuttgart	
	LA	LC	LA	LC	LA	LC	LA	LC
Intermunicipal Decisions: Other Interests	.09	.79	-.08	.73	-.05	.74	.09	.84
Intermunicipal Resources: Sharing	-.09	.64	-.25	.60	-.07	.70	-.36	.48
Intermunicipal Cooperation	-.00	.76	.22	.75	.19	.79	.22	.75
Local vs. Central Decisions	.89	-.05	.84	-.03	.90	.03	.87	.07
Local vs. Central Interest Representation	.93	.08	.81	.01	.90	.07	.90	.15
Local vs. Central Tax Collection	.40	-.04	.67	.06	.40	-.20	.45	-.29
Eigenvalues	2.03	1.43	2.13	1.28	1.98	1.54	2.04	1.47
Variance (%)	31.3	28.0	33.4	25.8	30.9	28.8	32.8	27.3
N	419		462		522		490	
	Paris		Lyon		London		Birmingham	
	LA	LC	LA	LC	LA	LC	LA	LC
Intermunicipal Decisions: Other Interests	.00	.78	.08	.80	-.02	.81	.05	.84
Intermunicipal Resources: Sharing	-.15	.72	-.16	.73	-.09	.75	-.01	.82
Intermunicipal Cooperation	.10	.80	.08	.82	.11	.75	-.05	.82
Local vs. Central Decisions	.89	-.02	.89	.07	.90	-.01	.88	-.04
Local vs. Central Interest Representation	.91	-.04	.88	.02	.88	.01	.90	.02
Local vs. Central Tax Collection	.84	.06	.75	-.08	.72	-.01	.76	.01
Eigenvalues	2.65	1.51	2.22	1.83	2.43	1.49	2.60	1.64
Variance (%)	41.3	31.8	36.5	31.2	37.1	31.4	38.0	36.3
N	517		531		516		525	

Table C.2: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max	P25	P50	P75
Local Autonomy	3982	0	1	-2.6	2.49	-.63	-.05	.67
Local Cooperation	3982	0	1	-3.97	2.06	-.62	.05	.68
<i>H1: Local Ties</i>								
Residence: < 1 year	5042	.04	.20	0	1	0	0	0
Residence: 1-3 years	5042	.15	.35	0	1	0	0	0
Residence: 4-10 years	5042	.23	.42	0	1	0	0	0
Residence: 11-20 years	5042	.2	.4	0	1	0	0	0
Residence: > 20 years	5042	.26	.44	0	1	0	0	1
Residence: Whole life	5042	.12	.32	0	1	0	0	0
Homeowner (=1)	4996	.46	.5	0	1	0	0	1
Commuting Frequency	5044	.14	.4	0	3.15	0	0	0
Association: No Member	5044	.38	.49	0	1	0	0	1
Association: Member (Non-Local)	5044	.04	.19	0	1	0	0	0
Association: Member (Local)	5044	.58	.49	0	1	0	1	1
<i>H2: Local Identity</i>								
Rank Local Attachment	5009	.44	.29	0	1	.2	.5	.7
<i>H3: GAL-TAN</i>								
GAL-TAN: No Party	5044	.54	.5	0	1	0	1	1
GAL-TAN: Other Party	5044	.33	.47	0	1	0	0	1
GAL-TAN: TAN Party	5044	.09	.29	0	1	0	0	0
GAL-TAN: GAL Party	5044	.05	.21	0	1	0	0	0
<i>H4: Political Control</i>								
CENTER (=1)	5044	.38	.48	0	1	0	0	1
log(Population) (std.)	5033	0	1	-5.5	1.63	-.66	.04	.85
<i>Alternative Explanations</i>								
Gender	5036	.5	.5	0	1	0	0	1
Age: < 25	5044	.08	.27	0	1	0	0	0
Age: 25-34	5044	.2	.4	0	1	0	0	0
Age: 35-44	5044	.22	.41	0	1	0	0	0
Age: 45-54	5044	.21	.41	0	1	0	0	0
Age: 55-64	5044	.17	.38	0	1	0	0	0
Age: ≥ 65	5044	.12	.32	0	1	0	0	0
Education: Low	4900	.14	.35	0	1	0	0	0
Education: Medium	4900	.39	.49	0	1	0	0	1
Education: High	4900	.47	.5	0	1	0	0	1
Income: Low	5017	.28	.45	0	1	0	0	1
Income: Medium	5017	.42	.49	0	1	0	0	1
Income: High	5017	.3	.46	0	1	0	0	1
Local Median Income (std.)	4828	0	1	-1.31	1.7	-.97	-.3	.7
Unemployment Rate (std.)	5044	0	1	-2.64	4.33	-.77	-.05	.67

Table C.3: Random Effects ANOVA

	Local Autonomy			Local Cooperation		
	LAU2	Metro Area	Country	LAU2	Metro Area	Country
Constant (γ_{00})	.016 (.019)	-.002 (.045)	-.001 (.053)	-.010 (.017)	.001 (.42)	.001 (.052)
Level-1 Variance (σ^2)	.931 (.023)	.986 (.022)	.990 (.022)	.961 (.024)	.987 (.022)	.989 (.022)
Level-2 Variance (τ_{00})	.075 (.016)	.014 (.008)	.010 (.008)	.038 (.012)	.012 (.007)	.10 (.007)
Total Variance ($\sigma^2 + \tau_{00}$)	1.006	1.000	1.000	.999	.999	.999
N (Level-2)	1231	8	4	1231	8	4
Intra-Class Correlation ^a	.075 (.016)	.014 (.008)	.010 (.008)	.038 (.012)	.012 (.007)	.010 (.007)
LR χ^2	38.27	41.13	33.58	15.87	33.10	31.08
p > χ^2	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000

Note. ^a ICC = $\frac{\tau_{00}}{\sigma^2 + \tau_{00}}$; Standard errors in parenthesis, N (Level-1)=3982.

Table C.4: Regression Models

	Local Autonomy	Local Cooperation
<i>Hypothesis 1: Local Ties</i>		
Residence Duration (B= ≥ 20 years)		
< 1 Year	.182* (.041)	-.167 (.062)
1-3 years	-.045 (.447)	.000 (.994)
4-10 years	-.039 (.440)	-.016 (.751)
11-20 years	-.011 (.815)	-.027 (.589)
Whole Life	.031 (.591)	-.146* (.013)
Homeowner (=1)	-.097** (.008)	-.003 (.936)
Commuting Frequency	-.130* (.018)	.094 (.090)
Association (B=No Member)		
Member (Non-Local)	-.509*** (.000)	.122 (.255)
Member (Local)	.050 (.153)	.215*** (.000)
<i>Hypothesis 2: Local Identity</i>		
Rank Local Attachment	.026 (.657)	-.116* (.050)
<i>Hypothesis 3: GAL-TAN</i>		
GAL-TAN (B=No Party)		
Other Party	-.071 (.052)	.245*** (.000)
TAN Party	.175** (.003)	-.283*** (.000)
GAL Party	.129 (.105)	.186* (.020)
<i>Hypothesis 4: Political Control</i>		
log(Population) (std.)	-.060* (.033)	.030 (.280)
Center Municipality (=1)	.109 (.087)	.009 (.891)
<i>Alternative Explanations</i>		
Gender (=1)	.043 (.187)	-.036 (.274)
Age Cohorts (B=45-54)		
<25	-.202** (.004)	-.021 (.765)
25-34	-.272*** (.000)	.009 (.870)
35-44	-.116* (.021)	-.013 (.795)
55-64	.072 (.167)	-.006 (.915)

Table C.4: Regression Models

	Local Autonomy	Local Cooperation
	≥ 65	
	.091	.082
	(.130)	(.175)
Education (B=Medium)		
	Low	
	.054	-.090
	(.322)	(.097)
	High	
	-.012	.071
	(.747)	(.061)
Income (B=Medium)		
	Low	
	-.036	-.045
	(.390)	(.279)
	High	
	.046	-.030
	(.240)	(.450)
Local Median Income (std.)	.003	-.033
	(.911)	(.163)
Unemployment Rate (std.)	-.036	.006
	(.160)	(.802)
Metropolitan Area (B=Bern)		
	Zurich	
	.236**	-.153
	(.004)	(.052)
	Berlin	
	.174*	.048
	(.050)	(.565)
	Stuttgart	
	.190*	-.166*
	(.017)	(.028)
	Lyon	
	.468***	-.174*
	(.000)	(.029)
	Paris	
	.290***	-.165*
	(.000)	(.031)
	London	
	.056	.072
	(.473)	(.344)
	Birmingham	
	.211*	.085
	(.014)	(.300)
Constant		
	-.131	-.064
	(.161)	(.488)
Level-1 Variation	.883***	.903***
	(.000)	(.000)
Level-2 Variation	.038***	.023***
	(.000)	(.000)
N	3642	3642
Municipalities	1149	1149
Log. Lik.	-5007.13	-5023.71
LR χ^2	282.32	277.27
p > χ^2	.000	.000
AIC	10088.25	10121.43
BIC	10317.66	1035.84

Note. Entries are coefficients obtained from a linear multilevel regression model in Stata (-mixed-), p-values in parentheses; * p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001