

The Rise of the Urban Left in Switzerland, 1980–2020

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Abstract

Major cities across the globe are governed by the political left, and smaller urban centres shift to the left as well. Yet, we know surprisingly little about how or when exactly these changes came about and, consequently, how we can explain the varying strength of the left across different cities. In this paper, we examine the long-term evolution of left-wing parties' executive strength in 111 Swiss cities over 40 years (1980–2020). Two main explanations are tested based on a rich and unique dataset: 1) whether and to what extent the rise of the urban left coincides with changes in the socio-economic composition of the local electorate is assessed through official census-data; 2) whether value change and especially a greater emphasis on post-materialism took place in the existing electorate is tested through the local-level results of some 500 nation-wide referendums held over that period. Our main findings are that as of the 1990s, the traditional support base of the left among workers has been replaced by socio-cultural professions, and that around the same time preferences for post-materialism and cosmopolitanism became much more important determinants of left-wing success. This has important implications for debates about urban-rural polarisation, on the one hand, as well as the political role and significance of “the left” in contemporary democracies more generally, on the other.

Keywords: City, urban-rural, left, local democracy, parties, polarization, Switzerland

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Urbanisation, globalisation, and polarisation seem closely connected phenomena. As entire economies, cultures and individuals connect and integrate ever more closely across the globe, cities have become key nodes as “spaces of flow” (Castells 2010). They offer to meet functional needs for jobs, housing, and childcare with sufficiently local rootedness to satisfy identity-related demands. At the same time, however, the economic and social gap between truly global cities and their rural and exurban hinterland is widening. This causes the political landscape to increasingly coalesce around two not only ideologically but also territorially defined poles. For instance, support for Brexit read as “taking back control” from European technocrats amounted to some 74% in the East Midlands, whereas in the city of London some areas voted 80% remain (Electoral Commission 2019). A similar gulf opened in the 2020 US presidential elections: for instance, Trump’s sovereignist agenda (“America first”) raked up a staggering 90% of the vote in Glascock county/GA with 3000 inhabitants, whereas less than two hours away, in DeKalb County around Atlanta with 700,000 inhabitants, Joe Biden won 83% (SOS GA 2020). In fact, 2020 US presidential elections saw the greatest polarisation yet between urban and rural areas (Kanick & Scott 2020; also Scala & Johnson 2017).

Yet, how exactly urbanisation, globalisation and polarisation relate to each other is not entirely clear. Has globalisation enabled (some) cities to again become attractive places for both working and living, true to the medieval motto of “*Stadtluft macht frei*”? If so, then the liberal or left-wing turn of cities and a widening gap vis-à-vis conservative or right-wing rural and exurban areas is above all a function of socio-economic changes in the electorate and/or a certain type of immigration (e.g. Bishop 2008; Maxwell 2019). A changing, thriving and especially “creative” (Florida 2012) *economy* in the cities makes for a different electorate with a different ideology. People willingly deciding to stay away from cities, those unable to move and profit from globalisation, and disillusioned urban residents seeking greater realisation of their “rural” interests will increasingly be pitted against urban cosmopolitans (Kenny & Luca 2021; Dijkstra et al. 2020).

An alternative explanation is that as the political *values* and especially the priorities ascribed to certain goals change among the existing urban electorate, left-wing parties have become an increasingly attractive vote choice. Globalisation is then not seen as a primarily economic but rather a social and political development – an ideology of “globalism” defends the same universal values across the globe (e.g. Steger & Wilson 2012; Mueller & Heidelberger 2020). A related shift is the one from materialist to post-materialist orientations (Inglehart 1977, ch.

10; also Kriesi 2010; Bornschieer et al. 2021). The new questions asked are much more moral or cultural in nature and cover issues such as abortion rights, gun control, drug legalisation, gender equality and environmental protection. Left-wing parties in particular offer stricter regulation and state intervention in these areas to reach the postulated, globally shared goals. In such a development, globalisation will have played a role of diffusion accelerator of new values and corresponding policy solutions.

This paper contributes to these debates by studying the evolution, speed and spread of the rise of the left in over 100 Swiss cities across 40 years. This promises to remedy two main downsides of most existing research: the limited temporal coverage of comparative survey data on values and attitudes, on the one hand, and their disconnect from actual spatial results. The European Social Survey, for instance, goes back “only” to 2002 and data is insufficiently fine-grained to be matched to municipal outcomes (e.g. Kenny & Luca 2021, 570). By contrast, we combine three main datasets: information on the yearly partisan composition of Swiss urban executives between 1978 and 2020, which provides us with a full picture for 111 cities from all three Swiss language regions; census data on the socio-economic composition of the electorates of these urban entities for 1970 until 2020; and the respective local-level results for over 200 post-materialist and/or cosmopolitan Swiss referendums in that same period.

Our main findings are that as of the 1990s, the traditional support base for the combined green-left among workers has been replaced by socio-cultural professions; and that at about the same time urban voters’ preferences for post-materialism and cosmopolitanism became much more important determinants of left-wing success than before. This has important implications for debates about urban-rural polarisation, on the one hand, as well as the political role and significance of “the left” in contemporary democracies more generally, on the other.


1 The urban left in Switzerland and elsewhere

Switzerland is hardly the country one would think of first when asked to name progressive places. Indeed, never since the creation of the modern Swiss federation in 1848 have left-wing parties dominated at the national level; the best score of the Social-Democrats, Greens, and various alternative, revolutionary and radical left parties combined dates to 2003 and

amounts to just 32% of the vote for National Council elections (BFS 2022). In the federal executive, too, the Swiss Social-Democrats have never had more than two out of seven seats (29%), albeit at least uninterruptedly so since 1959. The general performance of left-wing parties in Switzerland mirrors this stable minority position (Figure 1).

Yet looking at the federal level only masks important subnational variation and quasi-revolutionary shifts in party-political fortunes, as Figure 1 reveals. Here we see that already shortly before and after WWII, left-wing parties basically reached executive parity in the main cities' 5-, 7- or 9-member executives. In both time periods they held a majority of executive seats in Zurich, Basel, and especially Lausanne. Average executive representation then fell under 30% in the mid-1980s but subsequently recovered and achieved new heights after the mid-1990s. Since 2018, the average executive seat-share of left-wing parties stands at 71%, with clear Socialist-Green majorities in all top-six Swiss cities. In other words: in large urban centres, the Swiss left has become as dominant as it remains a minority overall.

Figure 1: Seat-share of left-wing parties in the governments of the six largest Swiss cities, 1922–2020



Note: Left-wing parties include the Social-Democrats (SP/PS), radical left (Zurich: Kommunistische Partei and Alternative Liste; Lausanne: Parti Ouvrier Populaire; Geneva: Parti du Travail and Alliance de Gauche/À Gauche Toute/Ensemble à Gauche), and green parties (Green Party and, in Bern, Grüne Freie Liste). Where available (Geneva: 1842–; Basel: 1875–; Lausanne: 1882–; Zurich: 1892–; Bern: 1920–), data are plotted already pre-1922. National Council results are Swiss-wide vote shares for elections to the lower chamber, available every three (1919–31) or four years (1931–2019). Source: own compilation based on city archives and BFS (2022).

At the same time, these six largest Swiss cities are hardly very large by international standards: by 2019, Zurich had 420'000 inhabitants by 2020, Geneva 200'000, Basel 170'000,

Lausanne 140'000, Bern 135'000, and Winterthur 115'000 (BFS 2022). Even summed these figures amount to only 14% of the total Swiss population, so these cities are hardly dominant demographically either. Nevertheless, some parts of Switzerland have had a close and intimate relationship with the political left. Lenin famously dwelled in exile in Zurich before heading back to Russia, and Bakunin is buried in Bern because deeply involved in the creation of the Anarchist movement at the end of the 19th century (e.g. Enckell 2012). In November 1918, at the close of World War I, trade unions across Switzerland organised a general strike that was ended only because of the presence of the army but which left a lasting political legacy nonetheless (Degen 2012). But that's about it with (radical) left successes in Switzerland – the overall record is rather tilted to the other side, with the female right to vote introduced only in 1971, the welfare state developing late and incompletely (Bonoli 2014; Häusermann & Zolliger 2014), and more emphasis placed on individual and local responsibility than state interventionism and redistribution (Linder & Mueller 2021).

Nevertheless, the rise of the political left in Swiss cities depicted in Figure 1 mirrors developments elsewhere, leading to ever starker contrasts between urban and rural areas (Rodden 2019; Maxwell 2019). The most liberal places in the US are San Francisco and Washington, DC, for instance (Tausanovitch & Warshaw 2015, 609), with the divide being one “between cities of knowledge and skill and the rest” (Florida 2013). Social-democratic parties in particular have first profited from industrialisation, after World War II, but then been unable to compensate for both the shrinking and ideological reorientation of their core support base: workers (Benedetto et al. 2020). One of the results of this increasing disconnect between urban cosmopolitanism, on the one hand, and state-wide conservatism and sovereignism, on the other, are “rebel cities”: urban governments that refuse to cooperate with the central state because they are pursuing opposite policy goals in areas such as law and order, immigration, and climate change (Cordes 2017; Rose & Goelzhauser 2018; Sassen 2013).

What makes Swiss cities a particularly fruitful terrain to study the conditions, extent, spread, and speed of the rise of the left is their diversity in terms of structure, economy, and culture, on the one hand, and broadly shared institutional characteristics. Zurich, Geneva, and Basel belong to the most prominent and successful cities worldwide and regularly occupy top spots

in such rankings.¹ Each draws extensively on the service industry, especially finances, and international connectedness (airports, cross-border workers, global organisations, universities etc.) for its wealth and reputation. At the same time, with only a handful of exceptions, all Swiss cities are located in the same state-wide multi-party system, directly elect their collegial executives of between 5 and 9 members alongside urban parliaments, and possess more or less extensive local autonomy (Ladner et al. 2019). The risk for omitted variable bias is thus lower than comparing across countries, and the validity of our measure of the dependent variable higher.

2 Explanations and resulting hypotheses

The main question addressed in this paper is what explains the rise of the left in Swiss cities at the end of the 20th century. A satisfying answer to that question is one that addresses both temporal and spatial variation and that can travel beyond the urban and Swiss context, too. By left we mean all parties that offer socially progressive, economically interventionist policies. Although the two main explanations we introduce in this section are presented sequentially, this does not exclude their parallel operation or even mutual reinforcement. To simplify, the rise of the urban left is either due to new jobs or new values.

2.1 It's the economy, stupid!

A first set of factors that potentially matter are of an economic nature. The basic assumption is neo-Marxist in that existing individual material structures and opportunities condition the kind of policies sought and, accordingly, the type of party voted. If jobs and/or the people doing them change, politics changes, too. In that context, over the past few decades, cities ceased to be industrial cores – factories closed, moved away or modernised, and third-sector employment opportunities in insurance, banking, real estate, education, tourism, programming and the like flourished. The urban replacement of blue- with white- or even “no collar” workers (Florida 2012, 100) is a blow to the electoral fortunes of left-wing parties to

¹ There are too many such rankings to provide an overview, but Mercer's “Quality of living city ranking” for instance accords Zurich, Basel and Geneva places 2, 9 and 10 for 2019; see <https://mobilityexchange.mercer.com/Insights/quality-of-living-rankings> [24.1.2022].

the extent that they remain the preferred party only of the former, which was still the case in the 1970s across Europe (e.g. Rennwald 2020, 40).

The same development works in their favour, however, in that the new left-wing voters are (also) highly educated, well-paid citizens employed in the socio-cultural milieu so typical of cities: high-schools, universities, theatres and cinemas, as well as public administrations are all concentrated in the cities, not in the countryside. Florida (2012, 38) famously called people engaged in these sectors members of the creative class: “scientists and engineers, university professors, poets and novelists, artists, entertainers, actors, designers, and architects, as well as the thought leadership of modern society: nonfiction writers, editors, cultural figures, think-tank researchers, analysts, and other opinion makers.”

We operationalise these seemingly contradictory but in actual fact perfectly reconcilable (Benedetto et al. 2020; also Abou-Chadi & Wagner 2019) statements through the following hypotheses. Based on Oesch and Rennwald (2018, 787), the main electorate of the left have traditionally been *production workers*, while their new stronghold lies with *socio-cultural professionals*. Hence, regarding workers:

H1.1: The higher the share of production workers among the urban electorate, the higher the executive seat share of left parties.

H1.2: The correlation between the share of production workers among the urban electorate and the executive seat share of the left diminishes over time.

Regarding socio-professionals:

H2.1: The higher the share of socio-cultural professionals among the urban electorate, the higher the executive seat share of left parties.

H2.2: The correlation between the share of socio-cultural professionals among the urban electorate and the executive seat share of the left increases over time.

We now turn to the main alternative explanation which is based on changing values instead of changing jobs.

2.2 *New values in old bottles?*

Another reason why left-wing parties could thrive in cities but not on the countryside is that, in addition to offering interventionist remedies on the economic axis, they place themselves clearly on the progressive side of the cultural cleavage (e.g. Abou-Chadi & Wagner 2019). Hence, in questions concerning abortion, environmental protection, green and renewable

energy, gun ownership, drug legalisation, gender and racial equality as well as (im-)migration and asylum seekers, both Socialist and Green parties can usually be quite clearly distinguished from their centre-right adversaries – particularly in Switzerland (see e.g. Jolly et al. 2022; Bornschier et al. 2021). While different policies in these areas might also entail economic costs and benefits (e.g. cheaper or more expensive public transport, tax revenue arising from legalised drugs or fossil fuels etc.), they are often debated along a primarily post-materialist or “cultural” value axis (Norris & Inglehart 2019, ch. 4; also Kriesi 2010).

Historically, “post-materialism” emerged in the writings of Ronald Inglehart (1977, 286) on the student revolts in the US, Germany and especially France:

For a significant portion of society (though still a minority) economic gains no longer seemed most urgent. The resulting shift toward emphasis on new political goals might be called the Post-Materialist phenomenon. [...] Efforts to fight the dehumanizing tendencies inherent in Industrial society took high priority; it was a fight against hierarchical relationships on both the domestic scene and in international politics.

The concept later expanded into a “growing tolerance of diverse lifestyles, religions, and cultures; international cooperation and aid for human development; views toward criminal justice that are more liberal; [and] support for democratic governance and civil rights and liberties.” (Norris & Inglehart 2019, 88). Nevertheless, in operationalising shifting value changes we have decided to separate the national from the international sphere. Post-materialism thus refers to preferences for giving people more say in important political decisions and protecting freedom of speech *at the expense of* maintaining order in the nation and fighting rising prices (Moors 2003, Inglehart 1997, ch. 4). Cosmopolitanism, in turn, refers to preferences for international cooperation, solidarity and indeed supranational integration in the economic, social and political spheres. We measure the extent of both through local vote shares in nation-wide referendums classified accordingly by Bolliger (2007; for details see next section). Hence, regarding post-materialism:

H3.1: The higher the vote share in a city in favour of post-materialist issues, the higher the seat share of left parties.

H3.2: The correlation between the local vote share in favour of postmaterialist issues and the seat share of left parties increases over time.

Regarding cosmopolitanism:

H4.1: The higher the vote share in a city in favour of cosmopolitan issues, the higher the seat share of left parties.

H4.2: The correlation between the local vote share in favour of cosmopolitan issues and the seat share of left parties increases over time.

3 Research Design

3.1 Data and operationalization

We combine data from three different sources. For our dependent variable, the share of seats held by left-wing parties in Swiss city governments, we rely on the yearbooks of the Swiss Union of Cities. These data cover the same 111 Swiss cities between 1978 and 2020. In addition, we have gathered data for 22 cities that date much further back – as early as the mid-19th century in some cases. Left parties in Switzerland encompass the Social-Democrats, the Green party and its affiliates, as well as smaller radical and alternative left parties. The Social-Democrats and the Greens hold very similar positions on most issues, whereas radical left parties hold somewhat more extreme positions, both with respect to economic and cultural issues (Jolly et al. 2022; Vatter 2020, ch. 3).

To measure the socio-demographic structure of a city's electorate, we rely on census data from the Swiss Federal Office of Statistics. We have obtained individual-level data for four census years (1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000) as well as individual-level yearly data from the structural survey – which replaces the census in Switzerland since the new millennium – for 2010–19.² For this last decade, we have aggregated the data from the structural survey for two time periods (2010-2015 and 2016-2019). With this data, we calculate the percentage of production workers and socio-cultural professionals among the Swiss working population residing in a city, as well as the percentage of persons with tertiary education among the Swiss population aged 15 and older.

Finally, to capture the political values that the respective urban electorate holds in a given period, we use the municipal-level results of those nation-wide popular votes that revolved

² The structural survey is a survey based on a random sample of the Swiss population aged 15 or older which is conducted on a yearly basis among 200'000 individuals. While it does not cover the full Swiss population, it still allows to calculate population characteristics for municipalities that have 15'000 or more inhabitants (<https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/en/home/statistics/population/surveys/se.html>). Individual-level census data from before 1970 are not available.

around either post-materialist or cosmopolitan questions. The classification and selection of popular votes is based on Bolliger (2007, 88ff.), who classified all national popular votes held between 1945 and 2003 with respect to two dimensions: whether the vote was about post-materialist issues (e.g. environmental protection) or to do with “openness versus tradition” (e.g. concerning foreign policy, security, and immigration). For each referendum, Bolliger (2007) indicates the extent to which the campaign preceding it was salient on either of these two dimensions. For our analysis, we focus only on referendums that were classified as very salient (score of 2, on a scale from 0 to 2) (see Table 1).

Table 1: Classification of Swiss Popular Votes on two Dimensions, 1956–2021

Years	Period	N opening-closing votes	N post-materialism votes	N total votes voted
1956-1965*	1	4 (2)**	4 (1)**	37
1966-1975	2	5	7	46
1976-1985	3	17 (16)	20 (17)	87
1986-1995	4	23 (21)	32	88
1996-2005	5	27 (25)	36 (34)	101
2006-2015	6	11	27 (25)	76
2016-2025*	7	6	22 (20)	59
<i>Total</i>		<i>93 (86)</i>	<i>148 (136)</i>	<i>494</i>

Note: *local-level results available only for 1960–2021. **number of votes used for calculating period scores in brackets (reason: missing data pre-1960 and post-2021, missing Social-Democratic Party recommendation for all others). Source: Bolliger (2007) and own classification based on Swissvotes (2022).

Referendums held between 2004 and 2021 we classified ourselves.³ We can see that the number of popular votes in the two categories increased until period 4 (1996–2005) and then slightly decreased again. However, the absolute increase of referendums is a general pattern of Swiss direct democracy (see last column of Table 1). Moreover, the correlation between the two dimensions on the basis of ca. 2’200 local-level results is generally high, as is the

³ Classification was done by the two authors separately, disagreements were resolved consensually. The face validity of our coding compared to Bolliger’s seems to be very high: we obtain about the same share of different legal types of referendums, subject areas as per Swissvotes (2022), and relative number of votes over time. On that latter, see Appendix C for details.

Cronbach alpha for votes on the same issue in the same period (see Appendix C for details). For those votes that fall into one of the two dimensions, we take the share of the vote in favour of openness or post-materialism as an indicator for the value orientations among a city's electorate. To code whether the "yes" or the "no" vote share is to be considered a vote in favour of openness/post-materialism, we rely on the voting recommendation of the Social-Democratic party, assuming that this best reflects the direction we intend to capture with our measure.

We control for a city's population size, because large cities tend to have more progressive governments than smaller ones. The language region a city belongs to might matter, too, because the French-speaking part of Switzerland is generally more progressive than the German-speaking part. We also control for whether a city is the capital of a canton and whether it possesses a university or not. Both characteristics are likely related to a larger workforce in the public sector, a characteristic known to coincide with higher support for state intervention, which is predominantly a position advocated by left-wing parties. Finally, we also control for whether a city merged with surrounding municipalities or not between 2000 and 2020. In this period, the Swiss local government landscape underwent substantial consolidation, and while this consolidation process was mainly concentrated in rural areas, it also involved some cities such as Bellinzona, Lugano, or Lucerne. Merging with surrounding, hitherto suburban municipalities might change the social make-up and political power distribution of a city, consequently leading to losses for the left.

3.2 Methods

Given that the census data are only available every ten years, we create 10-year averages for both our dependent variable and the share of support in popular votes for openness and post-materialism in order to match the census data. We combine the five years preceding a census and the five years following it into one period (e.g. 1976–1985 for the 1980 census; see also Table 1). While it would of course be preferable to have yearly observations on the socio-demographic structure of Swiss cities, this recoding into 10-year periods also presents an advantage: it levels out (arbitrary) fluctuations in both our dependent and independent variables, ultimately increasing our measurement validity.

To test our hypotheses, we use multilevel linear regression models with cities as level-2 and time-periods as level-1. Multilevel regression models are one way to undertake longitudinal

analysis, since time points are nested within units – or cities, in our case (Hox 2010, ch. 5). To model temporal developments, we include time-period dummy variables; to test our hypotheses concerning the evolution of correlations, we interact these time-period dummies with the respective independent variable.

The baseline model focuses on the period between 1980 and 2020, since this is the time period for which we have data on all 111 cities on all dependent and independent variables. We have also conducted robustness analysis for a sub-sample of 22 cities, for which we have data on the dependent variable since 1920 or even before, and census data and popular vote results since 1970. As a second robustness check, we have included the percentage of production workers, socio-cultural professionals, and persons with tertiary education among the persons that *moved* to a particular city in the five years prior to when the census/survey was conducted and calculated interaction effects between these variables and our time periods. The results remain largely unchanged, which might also be due to the very high correlation between the total share of these socio-demographic strata among the working population and the percentage of these groups among those who recently moved to a particular city (see Appendix, Tables A.2–A.7).

4 Results

Figures 1 to 4 and Tables B.1 and B.2 in the Appendix display the results of our multilevel regression analysis.⁴ Overall, we find support for both our hypotheses that the shares of production workers and of socio-cultural professionals among the Swiss workforce are correlated with a higher seat share of left parties in a city’s government (see Table B.1 and B.2, models 1 and 7). Yet what is striking is that the first is significantly correlated with left-wing executive strength only until the mid-1990s. Since the new millennium, we do not find a correlation between the percentage of production workers and left executive strength anymore (Figure 1). The exact opposite is the case for the socio-cultural professionals: While the percentage of this professional group is slightly negatively correlated with left executive

⁴ Given the very high correlation between the variable capturing the vote share in favour of openness and the vote share in favour of post-materialism (see Tables A.2-A.6 and Appendix C), we ran separate regression models, including each of these variables in turn. The results reported in Figures 1-4 are based on the model including the “openness” dimension, but results for the models including the “postmaterialism” dimension are very similar.

strength until the mid-1990s, we find an increasingly strong and positive correlation since then (Figure 2). This clearly shows that the core of the left electorate has shifted from production workers to socio-cultural professionals not only at the national, but also and perhaps *especially* at the local level, where many of the services demanded by the latter – sufficient and subsidized childcare, public transport and bicycle lanes, theatres and cinemas, support systems for persons and families in distress etc. – are in fact provided.

Turning to the alternative set of hypotheses, those to do with the value orientation of a city's electorate, our results also yield rather clear support (see Tables B.1 and B.2, models 5 and 7). The average vote share in favour of issue positions associated with openness and post-materialism in national-level votes is strongly correlated with the seat share of left parties in city governments. Again, however, this correlation is heavily subjected to a temporal dynamic (Figures 3 and 4): In the first two periods covered by our study – until the mid-1990s – the correlation between cosmopolitan and post-materialist voting behaviour is not or only weakly correlated with the seat share of left parties. Yet, since the new millennium has begun, there is a clear and very strong correlation between post-materialist and cosmopolitan voting and the urban executive strength of left parties.

In sum, our results suggest that the mid-1990s marked a double turning point for left parties in Swiss cities. On the one hand, their core electorate changed from production workers to socio-cultural professionals; on the other hand, their success started to be crucially linked to cultural issues. However, while this means that the socio-economic structure of a city's electorate matters for left party's electoral success, different strata have held different keys to that success over time.

Note that we do not find evidence that education matters. We find neither a consistently significant correlation between the percentage of highly educated and the seat share of left parties in city governments, nor a clear evolution over time. Furthermore, while we cannot disentangle the intricate and certainly complex linkages between the economic and shifting value processes with our data, there is clear evidence that they are related. Tables A.2–A.7 provide correlation matrices between the socio-demographic variables and the value variables for each decade. They show that until the mid-1980s, there is no, or even a negative, correlation between the percentage of socio-cultural professionals and the vote percentage in favour of progressive and postmaterialist issues. At the beginning of the 1990s, the correlation becomes medium-strong and positive (.4) for issues related to openness versus

tradition; since the end of the 1990s, this correlation is strong (>.6). This could mean that socio-cultural professionals *themselves* shifted their cosmopolitan value preferences and especially priorities towards more cosmopolitan and postmaterialist positions, and that left parties started to mobilize this group based on these issues. At the same time, the correlation between the share of production workers and the vote in favour of cosmopolitan/postmaterialist positions depicts the opposite trend, with no clear association in the late 1960s, to a medium-strong *negative* correlation since the 1990s.

Swiss direct democracy also allows us to distinguish “facultative referendums” that challenge Acts of Parliament in favour of the status quo from “popular initiatives” that pro-actively seek to amend the constitution. Cross-tabulating the vote recommendations of the main left- with the main right-wing party, the SP and the SVP respectively, we see that in *post-materialism* referendums the Social-Democrats were seeking change in 85% of cases, compared to only 15% in which they challenged parliament so as to maintain the status quo. Green, left, and alternative parties and civil society organisations demanded for instance an end to nuclear energy (1979, 1984, 1990, 2003 and 2016) and a progressive gender and family policy (1984, 2000, 2020). By contrast, the SVP more often challenged parliament to maintain the status quo (66%) than itself arguing for change (34%). In the cosmopolitan *opening-closing* dimension, however, the role of the SVP is inverted: it argued for change in 52% of cases, often against all other political parties. The party rose to prominence by fighting Switzerland’s accession to the European Economic Area, in 1992, and equally famously had its initiative to “end mass immigration” accepted in 2014 (Mueller & Heidelberger 2021). The SP is also more often in favour of change than the status quo (63% vs. 37%) but that is much less remarkable for a left-wing party in centre-right party system.

Figure 1: % Production Workers and % Left over Time




Figure 2: % Socio-Cultural Professionals and % Left over Time




Figure 3: % Votes Pro Openness and % Left over Time





Figure 4: % Votes Pro Post-materialism and % Left over Time



5 Conclusion

What has driven the quite remarkable rise of the urban left across Switzerland? This paper has studied the executive strength of green, radical, alternative, and mainstream left-wing parties in a total of 111 cities over a period of 40 years. We have presented evidence for two main explanations: changes in the urban electorate, from production workers to socio-cultural professionals, and a growing emphasis on cosmopolitan and post-materialist values such as supranational integration, environmental protection, and gender equality. For both processes, the 1990s present a turning point – perhaps because the end of the Cold War freed the left of its association with soviet authoritarianism, or because the European integration project took off for good with the Maastricht Treaty (providing for a common citizenship and currency) and further enlargements.

Our data did not allow us to address a third explanation (Maxwell 2019; Kenny & Luca 2021): whether people moving into a city bring their values with them, or whether they adopt those of their urban destinations. Nor does the nature of our census and aggregate electoral results allow us to conclusively link new jobs and values to choices at the ballot. Thus, our results should be read above all else as a complement to existing studies. What we do add to the literature, then, is that it is worthwhile to seek to understand political changes also at the level closest to where people live.

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Appendix

Appendix A – Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrices

Table A.1 Descriptive Statistics

	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
% Left in Executive	683	29.17	17.64	0	85.71
% Tertiary Education	577	19.16	9.79	4.18	51.37
Population	681	34242	54812	2251	440170
log(Population)	681	9.94	0.84	7.72	12.99
Capital	683	0.30	0.46	0	1
University	683	0.17	0.37	0	1
Language					
German	683	0.67	0.47	0	1
French	683	0.26	0.44	0	1
Italian	683	0.04	0.19	0	1
Bilingual	683	0.03	0.18	0	1
City Has Merged	683	0.05	0.22	0	1
<i>Social Structure</i>					
% Production Workers	577	17.22	8.97	3.19	46.66
% Socio-Cultural Professionals	577	11.43	3.82	3.09	25.18
<i>Values</i>					
% Votes pro Openness	574	54.62	7.72	36.90	81.83
% Votes pro Postmaterialism	573	52.08	6.85	18.67	72.92
Time Periods					
1916-1925	683	0.03	0.17	0	1
1926-1935	683	0.03	0.17	0	1
1936-1945	683	0.03	0.17	0	1
1946-1955	683	0.03	0.17	0	1
1956-1965	683	0.03	0.18	0	1
1966-1975	683	0.03	0.18	0	1
1976-1985	683	0.16	0.37	0	1
1986-1995	683	0.16	0.37	0	1
1996-2005	683	0.16	0.37	0	1
2006-2015	683	0.16	0.37	0	1
2016-2020	683	0.16	0.37	0	1

Table A.2. Correlation Matrix 1966-1975

	% Production Workers	% Production Workers (moved 5 years)	% Socio- Cultural Professionals	% Socio-Cultural Professionals (moved 5 years)	% Tertiary Education	% Tertiary Education (moved 5 years)	% Votes pro Openness
% Production Workers (moved 5 years)	.907***	1					
% Socio-Cultural Professionals	-.721***	-.615**	1				
% Socio-Cultural Professionals (moved 5 years)	-.568*	-.631**	.781***	1			
% Tertiary Education	-.552*	-.482*	.745***	.464*	1		
% Tertiary Education (moved 5 years)	-.357	-.578**	.156	.337	.507*	1	
% Votes pro Openness	.149	-.0650	-.125	-.230	-.0151	.0618	1
% Votes pro Postmaterialism	.411	.0678	-.382	-.142	-.180	.390	.562*

Table A.3. Correlation Matrix 1976-1985

	% Production Workers	% Production Workers (moved 5 years)	% Socio- Cultural Professionals	% Socio-Cultural Professionals (moved 5 years)	% Tertiary Education	% Tertiary Education (moved 5 years)	% Votes pro Openness
% Production Workers (moved 5 years)	0.916***	1					
% Socio-Cultural Professionals	-0.535***	-0.557***	1				
% Socio-Cultural Professionals (moved 5 years)	-0.217*	-0.349***	0.863***	1			
% Tertiary Education	-0.805***	-0.745***	0.566***	0.302**	1		
% Tertiary Education (moved 5 years)	-0.710***	-0.739***	0.574***	0.397***	0.916***	1	
% Votes pro Openness	-0.381***	-0.386***	0.225*	0.00592	0.293**	0.343***	1
% Votes pro Postmaterialism	-0.274**	-0.301**	0.108	0.0607	0.251*	0.334***	0.731***

Table A.4. Correlation Matrix 1986-1995

	% Production Workers	% Production Workers (moved 5 years)	% Socio- Cultural Professionals	% Socio- Cultural Professionals (moved 5 years)	% Tertiary Education	% Tertiary Education (moved 5 years)	% Votes pro Openness
% Production Workers (moved 5 years)	0.933***	1					
% Socio-Cultural Professionals	-0.456***	-0.447***	1				
% Socio-Cultural Professionals (moved 5 years)	-0.196*	-0.229*	0.884***	1			
% Tertiary Education	-0.750***	-0.724***	0.576***	0.325***	1		
% Tertiary Education (moved 5 years)	-0.722***	-0.751***	0.539***	0.315***	0.932***	1	
% Votes pro Openness	-0.492**	-0.510**	0.403**	0.179	0.373**	0.454**	1
% Votes pro Postmaterialism	-0.0967	-0.113	0.123	0.118	0.173	0.188*	0.250**

Table A.5. Correlation Matrix 1996-2005

	% Production Workers	% Production Workers (moved 5 years)	% Socio- Cultural Professionals	% Socio-Cultural Professionals (moved 5 years)	% Tertiary Education	% Tertiary Education (moved 5 years)	% Votes pro Openness
% Production Workers (moved 5 years)	0.936***	1					
% Socio-Cultural Professionals	-0.467***	-0.437***	1				
% Socio-Cultural Professionals (moved 5 years)	-0.285**	-0.310***	0.924***	1			
% Tertiary Education	-0.793***	-0.755***	0.519***	0.331***	1		
% Tertiary Education (moved 5 years)	-0.785***	-0.793***	0.452***	0.291**	0.942***	1	
% Votes pro Openness	-0.512***	-0.426***	0.601***	0.423***	0.565***	0.529***	1
% Votes pro Postmaterialism	-0.481***	-0.395***	0.614***	0.467***	0.294**	0.303**	0.833***

Table A.6. Correlation Matrix 2006-2015

	% Production Workers	% Production Workers (moved 5 years)	% Socio- Cultural Professionals	% Socio-Cultural Professionals (moved 5 years)	% Tertiary Education	% Tertiary Education (moved 5 years)	% Votes pro Openness
% Production Workers (moved 5 years)	0.926***	1					
% Socio-Cultural Professionals	-0.332***	-0.264**	1				
% Socio-Cultural Professionals (moved 5 years)	-0.185	-0.132	0.880***	1			
% Tertiary Education	-0.755***	-0.691***	0.486***	0.333***	1		
% Tertiary Education (moved 5 years)	-0.741***	-0.725***	0.476***	0.336***	0.937***	1	
% Votes pro Openness	-0.436***	-0.394***	0.674***	0.591***	0.550***	0.519***	1
% Votes pro Postmaterialism	-0.461***	-0.432***	0.647***	0.576***	0.457***	0.443***	0.926***

Table A.7. Correlation Matrix 2016-2020

	% Production Workers	% Production Workers (moved 5 years)	% Socio- Cultural Professionals	% Socio-Cultural Professionals (moved 5 years)	% Tertiary Education	% Tertiary Education (moved 5 years)	% Votes pro Openness
% Production Workers (moved 5 years)	0.910***	1					
% Socio-Cultural Professionals	-0.339***	-0.265**	1				
% Socio-Cultural Professionals (moved 5 years)	-0.284**	-0.252**	0.883***	1			
% Tertiary Education	-0.753***	-0.678***	0.488***	0.400***	1		
% Tertiary Education (moved 5 years)	-0.755***	-0.729***	0.424***	0.413***	0.929***	1	
% Votes pro Openness	-0.450***	-0.381***	0.655***	0.564***	0.684***	0.646***	1
% Votes pro Postmaterialism	-0.417***	-0.360***	0.715***	0.591***	0.451***	0.439***	0.803***

Appendix B – Regression Models

Table B.1. Multilevel Regression Models, with Openness-Tradition as Value-Operationalization

	Social Structure			Values				Social Structure & Values			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
<i>Controls</i>											
log(Population)	7.9*** (1.9)	7.8*** (1.9)	9.1*** (1.9)	8.1*** (1.9)	8.0*** (1.9)	9.0*** (1.9)	8.4*** (1.8)	8.2*** (1.8)	9.2*** (1.8)	8.5*** (1.8)	9.2*** (1.9)
Capital	-2.8 (3.5)	-2.7 (3.5)	-0.8 (3.4)	-3.0 (3.5)	0.7 (3.2)	-0.1 (3.3)	-2.3 (3.2)	-2.0 (3.1)	-0.9 (3.3)	-2.5 (3.2)	-2.0 (3.3)
University	-1.8 (6.0)	-1.7 (5.9)	-2.3 (5.7)	-1.7 (5.9)	-2.7 (5.6)	-3.6 (5.7)	-2.9 (5.5)	-3.0 (5.4)	-3.2 (5.5)	-2.9 (5.4)	-3.6 (5.6)
Language (B=German)											
French	14.9*** (2.7)	14.6*** (2.6)	15.0*** (2.6)	14.5*** (2.7)	11.0*** (2.6)	12.3*** (2.7)	11.0*** (2.6)	10.0*** (2.6)	12.2*** (2.6)	10.5*** (2.6)	11.4*** (2.7)
Italian	-2.2 (6.6)	-4.1 (6.6)	-3.3 (6.4)	-3.3 (6.6)	-0.7 (6.2)	1.3 (6.4)	0.3 (6.2)	-2.2 (6.0)	-1.8 (6.1)	-0.8 (6.1)	1.7 (6.2)
Bilingual	8.8 (8.7)	8.4 (8.6)	9.4 (8.4)	8.1 (8.6)	7.9 (8.0)	8.5 (8.3)	4.8 (8.0)	3.8 (7.8)	5.9 (8.0)	4.1 (7.9)	5.6 (8.1)
City Has Merged	-1.6 (2.0)	-1.3 (2.0)	-2.2 (1.9)	-1.5 (2.0)	-2.2 (2.0)	-1.0 (2.0)	-2.4 (2.0)	-2.0 (2.0)	-2.7 (2.0)	-2.3 (2.0)	-1.4 (2.0)
<i>Social Structure</i>											
% Production Workers	0.7*** (0.2)	0.6*** (0.2)	0.3 (0.2)	0.6** (0.2)			0.7*** (0.2)	0.7*** (0.2)	0.4* (0.2)	0.6** (0.2)	0.5** (0.2)
% Socio-Cultural Professionals	1.0*** (0.3)	1.1*** (0.3)	-0.9 (0.5)	1.1*** (0.3)			0.9** (0.3)	1.0*** (0.3)	-0.6 (0.5)	1.1*** (0.3)	0.7* (0.3)
% Tertiary Education	0.7*** (0.1)	0.4* (0.2)	0.3 (0.2)	0.4 (0.5)			0.3 (0.2)	-0.1 (0.2)	0.1 (0.2)	-0.1 (0.5)	0.1 (0.2)
<i>Values</i>											
% Votes pro Openness					0.7*** (0.1)	0.1 (0.2)	0.5*** (0.1)	0.6*** (0.1)	0.4** (0.1)	0.6*** (0.1)	0.2 (0.2)
Time Period (B=1976-1985)											
1986-1995	-4.5*** (1.3)	-9.5 (5.5)	-4.2 (4.5)	1.2 (4.2)	0.4 (1.3)	11.1 (11.9)	-1.5 (1.4)	-4.4 (5.7)	-1.0 (4.8)	3.5 (4.3)	10.5 (11.8)
1996-2005	4.2	6.7	-13.4*	4.5	1.5	-30.7**	9.4**	15.0**	-7.4	8.7	-17.2

Table B.1. Multilevel Regression Models, with Openness-Tradition as Value-Operationalization

	Social Structure				Values			Social Structure & Values			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
	(2.9)	(4.9)	(5.7)	(6.3)	(1.3)	(11.9)	(3.0)	(5.2)	(6.2)	(6.6)	(12.8)
2006-2015	-4.1	7.7	-19.1***	-8.3	5.3***	-40.4***	5.3	23.0***	-9.4	-1.1	-29.4**
	(3.2)	(6.1)	(5.3)	(5.8)	(1.3)	(10.7)	(3.7)	(6.7)	(6.3)	(6.2)	(11.2)
2016-2020	-8.8*	0.2	-25.6***	-9.7	-3.7*	-45.6***	-3.2	11.1	-19.2**	-4.3	-32.9**
	(3.8)	(6.8)	(5.7)	(6.4)	(1.8)	(11.7)	(3.8)	(7.1)	(6.2)	(6.7)	(12.5)
% Production Workers x Time Period											
1986-1995 x % Production Workers		0.2						0.2			
		(0.2)						(0.2)			
1996-2005 x % Production Workers		-0.1						-0.3			
		(0.3)						(0.3)			
2006-2015 x % Production Workers		-0.7*						-0.9**			
		(0.3)						(0.3)			
2016-2020 x % Production Workers		-0.4						-0.7*			
		(0.3)						(0.3)			
% Socio-Cultural Professionals x Time Period											
1986-1995 x % Socio-Cultural Professionals			0.3						0.2		
			(0.5)						(0.5)		
1996-2005 x % Socio-Cultural Professionals			1.8***						1.5**		
			(0.5)						(0.5)		
2006-2015 x % Socio-Cultural Professionals			2.0***						1.6**		
			(0.5)						(0.5)		
2016-2020 x % Socio-Cultural Professionals			2.2***						1.8***		
			(0.5)						(0.5)		
% Tertiary Education x Time Period											

Table B.1. Multilevel Regression Models, with Openness-Tradition as Value-Operationalization

	Social Structure			Values			Social Structure & Values				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
1986-1995 x % Tertiary Education				-0.4						-0.3	
				(0.4)						(0.4)	
1996-2005 x % Tertiary Education				0.1						0.1	
				(0.4)						(0.4)	
2006-2015 x % Tertiary Education				0.3						0.5	
				(0.4)						(0.4)	
2016-2020 x % Tertiary Education				0.2						0.3	
				(0.4)						(0.4)	
% Votes pro Openness x Time Period											(0.5)
1986-1995 x % Votes pro Openness						-0.2					-0.2
						(0.2)					(0.2)
1996-2005 x % Votes pro Openness						0.6**					0.5*
						(0.2)					(0.2)
2006-2015 x % Votes pro Openness						0.9***					0.7**
						(0.2)					(0.2)
2016-2020 x % Votes pro Openness						0.8***					0.6*
						(0.2)					(0.2)
Constant	-86.8*** (19.8)	-81.9*** (19.7)	-68.2*** (19.6)	-83.5*** (20.6)	-92.2*** (18.4)	-68.5*** (19.9)	-116.3*** (19.7)	-114.4*** (19.3)	-93.2*** (20.5)	-111.8*** (20.6)	-94.3*** (21.1)
Level-1 Variance	74.1*** (5.0)	73.0*** (4.9)	70.9*** (4.8)	74.0*** (5.0)	78.7*** (5.4)	71.0*** (4.9)	74.7*** (5.3)	73.3*** (5.2)	71.6*** (5.0)	74.5*** (5.2)	70.6*** (5.0)
Level-2 Variance	125.2*** (19.5)	121.0*** (18.9)	114.7*** (17.7)	120.1*** (18.9)	102.1*** (16.2)	111.8*** (17.4)	100.0*** (17.4)	93.0*** (16.2)	99.6*** (16.9)	95.4*** (16.6)	103.4*** (17.5)
N	555	555	555	555	536	536	536	536	536	536	536
N Cities	111	111	111	111	110	110	110	110	110	110	110
Log. Lik.	-2107	-2102	-2093	-2105	-2040	-2022	-2027	-2020	-2018	-2025	-2017
LR X ²	172	186	212	180	177	215	209	235	233	221	233

Table B.1. Multilevel Regression Models, with Openness-Tradition as Value-Operationalization

	Social Structure				Values			Social Structure & Values			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
p > X ²	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
AIC	4248	4245	4227	4251	4110	4081	4091	4083	4080	4093	4077
BIC	4321	4336	4318	4342	4174	4163	4168	4178	4174	4187	4171

Table B.2. Multilevel Regression Models, with Postmaterialism as Value-Operationalization

	Social Structure				Values			Social Structure & Values			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
<i>Controls</i>											
log(Population)	7.9*** (1.9)	7.8*** (1.9)	9.1*** (1.9)	8.1*** (1.9)	6.7*** (1.7)	7.4*** (1.7)	7.0*** (1.7)	6.9*** (1.7)	7.7*** (1.7)	7.1*** (1.7)	7.8*** (1.7)
Capital	-2.8 (3.5)	-2.7 (3.5)	-0.8 (3.4)	-3.0 (3.5)	0.6 (2.9)	0.2 (2.9)	-1.2 (3.0)	-1.2 (3.0)	-0.4 (3.0)	-1.5 (3.0)	-0.5 (2.9)
University	-1.8 (6.0)	-1.7 (5.9)	-2.3 (5.7)	-1.7 (5.9)	-1.7 (5.1)	-3.5 (5.1)	-1.8 (5.1)	-1.8 (5.1)	-2.2 (5.1)	-1.9 (5.0)	-2.8 (4.9)
Language (B=German)											
French	14.9*** (2.7)	14.6*** (2.6)	15.0*** (2.6)	14.5*** (2.7)	12.9*** (2.2)	9.5*** (2.3)	12.9*** (2.3)	12.6*** (2.3)	13.1*** (2.3)	12.3*** (2.3)	9.4*** (2.3)
Italian	-2.2 (6.6)	-4.1 (6.6)	-3.3 (6.4)	-3.3 (6.6)	-7.3 (5.6)	-6.5 (5.6)	-5.1 (5.6)	-6.8 (5.7)	-5.7 (5.7)	-6.5 (5.6)	-5.5 (5.4)
Bilingual	8.8 (8.7)	8.4 (8.6)	9.4 (8.4)	8.1 (8.6)	8.4 (7.3)	6.1 (7.4)	6.4 (7.4)	6.1 (7.3)	6.7 (7.4)	5.7 (7.2)	4.2 (7.1)
City Has Merged	-1.6 (2.0)	-1.3 (2.0)	-2.2 (1.9)	-1.5 (2.0)	-0.6 (2.0)	-0.0 (1.9)	-1.0 (1.9)	-0.8 (1.9)	-1.4 (1.9)	-0.8 (1.9)	-0.4 (1.9)
<i>Social Structure</i>											
% Production Workers	0.7*** (0.2)	0.6*** (0.2)	0.3 (0.2)	0.6** (0.2)			0.6*** (0.2)	0.5** (0.2)	0.4* (0.2)	0.4 (0.2)	0.5** (0.2)
% Socio-Cultural Professionals	1.0*** (0.3)	1.1*** (0.3)	-0.9 (0.5)	1.1*** (0.3)			0.5 (0.3)	0.6* (0.3)	-0.6 (0.5)	0.7* (0.3)	0.2 (0.3)
% Tertiary Education	0.7*** (0.1)	0.4* (0.2)	0.3 (0.2)	0.4 (0.5)			0.3* (0.1)	0.1 (0.2)	0.1 (0.2)	-0.3 (0.5)	0.1 (0.2)
<i>Values</i>											
% Votes pro Postmaterialism					1.0*** (0.1)	0.6* (0.3)	0.9*** (0.1)	0.8*** (0.1)	0.8*** (0.1)	0.9*** (0.1)	0.8** (0.3)

Table B.2. Multilevel Regression Models, with Postmaterialism as Value-Operationalization

	Social Structure				Values			Social Structure & Values			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Time Period (B=1976-1985)											
1986-1995	-4.5*** (1.3)	-9.5 (5.5)	-4.2 (4.5)	1.2 (4.2)	-1.6 (1.2)	23.9 (15.1)	-2.9* (1.3)	-5.0 (5.6)	-3.7 (4.7)	1.9 (4.2)	31.2* (15.2)
1996-2005	4.2 (2.9)	6.7 (4.9)	-13.4* (5.7)	4.5 (6.3)	2.1 (1.2)	-33.1* (15.6)	7.6** (2.7)	10.3* (5.0)	-5.5 (5.9)	3.9 (6.3)	-20.6 (16.2)
2006-2015	-4.1 (3.2)	7.7 (6.1)	-19.1*** (5.3)	-8.3 (5.8)	6.0*** (1.2)	-44.2** (14.8)	5.3 (3.1)	16.5** (6.1)	-6.7 (5.7)	-1.8 (5.9)	-33.0* (15.2)
2016-2020	-8.8* (3.8)	0.2 (6.8)	-25.6*** (5.7)	-9.7 (6.4)	0.1 (1.4)	-36.9* (14.7)	-1.0 (3.6)	6.8 (6.8)	-12.5* (6.1)	-4.5 (6.4)	-23.7 (15.2)
% Production Workers x Time Period											
1986-1995 x % Production Workers		0.2 (0.2)						0.1 (0.2)			
1996-2005 x % Production Workers		-0.1 (0.3)						-0.1 (0.3)			
2006-2015 x % Production Workers		-0.7* (0.3)						-0.7* (0.3)			
2016-2020 x % Production Workers		-0.4 (0.3)						-0.3 (0.3)			
% Socio-Cultural Professionals x Time Period											
1986-1995 x % Socio- Cultural Professionals			0.3 (0.5)					0.3 (0.5)			
1996-2005 x % Socio- Cultural Professionals			1.8*** (0.5)					1.3* (0.5)			
2006-2015 x % Socio- Cultural Professionals			2.0*** (0.5)					1.3** (0.5)			

Table B.2. Multilevel Regression Models, with Postmaterialism as Value-Operationalization

	Social Structure			Values			Social Structure & Values				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
2016-2020 x % Socio-Cultural Professionals			2.2***						1.3*		
			(0.5)						(0.5)		
% Tertiary Education x Time Period											
1986-1995 x % Tertiary Education				-0.4						-0.2	
				(0.4)						(0.4)	
1996-2005 x % Tertiary Education				0.1						0.3	
				(0.4)						(0.4)	
2006-2015 x % Tertiary Education				0.3						0.6	
				(0.4)						(0.4)	
2016-2020 x % Tertiary Education				0.2						0.4	
				(0.4)						(0.4)	
% Votes pro Postmaterialism x Time Period											
1986-1995 x % Votes pro Postmaterialism						-0.5					-0.6*
						(0.3)					(0.3)
1996-2005 x % Votes pro Postmaterialism						0.7*					0.6
						(0.3)					(0.3)
2006-2015 x % Votes pro Postmaterialism						1.0***					0.9**
						(0.3)					(0.3)
2016-2020 x % Votes pro Postmaterialism						0.7*					0.5
						(0.3)					(0.3)
Constant	-86.8***	-81.9***	-68.2***	-83.5***	-93.7***	-80.5***	-111.6***	-107.8***	-95.8***	-104.2***	-106.0***
	(19.8)	(19.7)	(19.6)	(20.6)	(16.6)	(19.7)	(17.7)	(17.7)	(18.4)	(18.6)	(20.8)
Level-1 Variance	74.1***	73.0***	70.9***	74.0***	73.5***	66.1***	70.9***	69.8***	69.1***	70.6***	66.1***
	(5.0)	(4.9)	(4.8)	(5.0)	(5.1)	(4.6)	(5.0)	(4.9)	(4.8)	(5.0)	(4.6)

Table B.2. Multilevel Regression Models, with Postmaterialism as Value-Operationalization

	Social Structure				Values			Social Structure & Values			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Level-2 Variance	125.2*** (19.5)	121.0*** (18.9)	114.7*** (17.7)	120.1*** (18.9)	83.2*** (13.8)	85.7*** (13.9)	83.6*** (14.8)	82.8*** (14.5)	84.6*** (14.5)	80.0*** (14.1)	76.8*** (13.4)
N	555	555	555	555	535	535	535	535	535	535	535
N Cities	111	111	111	111	110	110	110	110	110	110	110
Log. Lik.	-2107	-2102	-2093	-2105	-2012	-1990	-2004	-2000	-1999	-2001	-1985
LR X ²	172	186	212	180	258	312	277	289	289	290	339
p > X ²	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
AIC	4248	4245	4227	4251	4053	4017	4044	4044	4041	4046	4013
BIC	4321	4336	4318	4342	4117	4099	4121	4138	4136	4140	4107

Appendix C – Post-materialist and globalist referendums

Table C.1. Cronbach's alpha within and correlation between referendums on the two dimensions

Years	Period no.	Cronbach's alpha opening-closing votes	Cronbach's alpha post-materialism votes	Correlation opening & post-materialism. measures
1956-1965*	1	-10.163	NA (just 1 vote)	.218
1966-1975	2	0.786	0.456	.811
1976-1985	3	0.838	0.625	.670
1986-1995	4	0.906	0.905	.278
1996-2005	5	0.944	0.902	.817
2006-2015	6	0.96	0.944	.917
2016-2025*	7	0.949	0.949	.844
<i>Overall</i>		<i>0.978</i>	<i>0.964</i>	-

Figure C.1. Share of globalist referendums per year from all referendums voted, 1945–2021





Figure C.2. Share of post-materialist referendums per year from all referendums voted, 1945–2021



Note to Figures C.1 and C.2: red vertical line indicates beginning of own classification; horizontal blue lines are LOESS lines with 90% confidence intervals in grey.